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The blog of the Wilson Center's Environmental Change and Security Program
  • Guest Contributor

    Consensus, Certainty, and Catastrophe: The Debate Over Ocean Iron Fertilization

    May 3, 2017 By Kemi Fuentes-George
    Greenpeace

    Almost three decades ago, at a conference at the Woods Hole Institute, oceanographer John Martin said with “a half a tanker of iron…I will give you the next ice age.”

    Martin was referring to a process now known as ocean iron fertilization (OIF) that he hypothesized could create vast amounts of phytoplankton. By literally dumping iron into certain regions of the ocean, called high nutrient, low chlorophyll zones, he suspected one could create vast plumes of phytoplankton that would absorb CO2 from the air, like their plant brethren on land, and convert it to energy, cooling the atmosphere.

    Between 1992 and the present day, several actors have tried to promote OIF under the international climate change regime. However, proponents have been stymied by the advocacy efforts of a network of critics, drawn from the research and NGO communities. These critics argue that OIF is part of a controversial and dangerous set of climate governance mechanisms known as geoengineering.

    As I explore in a new Global Environmental Politics article, the fact that advocates have been able to successfully oppose a process that seems to present such clear material incentives illustrates how the language we use to describe problems can shape our understanding of their dimensions, including their significance and their risk.

    Against Geoengineering

    In the years after Martin’s presentation there were concerted efforts by proponents in the science, corporate, and government sectors to create a system legitimizing ocean iron fertilization as a climate governance mechanism. By the early 2000s, they argued that OIF could allow states with carbon offset obligations to meet them cheaply. For example, Michael Markels, founder of GreenSea Ventures, claimed he could sell credits at $2 per ton in comparison to the $20 per ton price from land use processes being discussed within the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.

    Not coincidentally, such a scheme would have provided millions of dollars to GreenSea Ventures and other agencies selling OIF credits. However, OIF’s most vociferous opponents were a coalition of oceanographers and members of environmental NGOs, like Greenpeace and the ETC Group, who charged it was part of a scientifically and ethically dubious constellation of practices known as geoengineering.

    Would ocean iron fertilization have to be implemented more or less forever?

    In short, geoengineering refers to large-scale environmental interventions that “use or affect the climate system (e.g., atmosphere, land, or ocean) globally or regionally and/or…cross national boundaries.” For critics, geoengineering comes with a specific set of flaws that make it more problematic than other kinds of environmental intervention.

    First, geoengineering is portrayed as a “gamble” with the Earth’s ecosystems. Since most geoengineering proposals are so large scale – sometimes planetary scale – the consequences for getting something wrong are immense. Their scale also makes it difficult to properly test concepts and proposals because there is no Planet B.

    Second, geoengineering is structurally problematic. It presents a solution to the climate change crisis that does not depend on changing our underlying behavior. Rather than cutting emissions, we can continue to pollute and use geoengineering to save our skins. But what about other emissions besides carbon dioxide, critics point out. What about the fact that extracting fossil fuels brings additional environmental harms, such as deforestation, land loss, and local air pollution? What about the second and third order effects of more phytoplankton in the oceans? And would OIF have to be implemented more or less forever? The likelihood of unforeseen consequences down the line is high.

    Third, geoengineering is undemocratic. By design, geoengineering proposals are supposed to have global effects. If the technology becomes available to states or private actors, there is a real possibility that just a few people could interfere with the climate unilaterally.

    Uncertainty as Risk

    Crucially, these storylines meant that opponents of geoengineering – and ocean iron fertilization itself, as it became more closely association with the concept – became more likely to interpret uncertainty as an indicator of risk. The effect of this framing can be seen in a string of OIF-related actions.

    For example, in 1999, Greenpeace issued a report to the London Convention on maritime pollution and dumping warning that OIF could, among other things, transform planktonic communities and disrupt marine food webs. In 2001, Sallie Chisholm, Paul Falkowski, and John Cullen from the Department of Oceanography in Canada published what became one of the most widely cited articles on OIF, raising “great concern” about the “potential long-term consequences” of OIF, including its “purposeful eutrophication” of ocean ecosystems.

    In 2007, Planktos, a firm started by budding geoengineer Russ George, attempted to conduct an OIF experiment off the coast of Ecuador. Greenpeace blockaded the experiment, forcing George to call it off. In the aftermath, the International Union for Conservation of Nature called on the international community to oppose OIF out of a concern that it would alter “the nature and function of the ocean marine food chains” and increase the production of other greenhouse gases. Greenpeace and the ETC Group also submitted a recommendation to the London Convention arguing that OIF created the “potential for unpredictable and irreversible adverse impacts on marine ecosystems.”

    In a 2008 conference at the Woods Hole Institute, critics like oceanographer John Cullen noted: “How many ecological manipulations that were done with the greatest of intentions had unintended consequences?…Can we know when it’s going wrong? I would argue that we can’t.”

    In 2012, George launched another experiment, this time successfully dumping 100 tons of iron off the coast of Canada. This precipitated a plankton bloom approaching 10,000 square kilometers. While George insisted he had the support of researchers and indigenous groups in Canada, the media, environmental groups, and oceanographers condemned him. In 2012, The New Yorker described George as a “geo-vigilante” and concluded by stating that even if a local village approved, “no village on earth should have the power to approve a project the consequences of which, for the entire planet, cannot possibly be foreseen.”

    A Pitfall?

    As the dialogue around ocean iron fertilization shows, language can have a powerful effect on how international society responds to emerging environmental problems. Prior to 2007, firms used the iron hypothesis to argue that international society should legitimate the sale of credits from OIF. In response, environmental NGOs and oceanographers stated that OIF was geoengineering, and as a result, uncertainty should be taken as an indicator of potentially severe harm.

    If climate change becomes severe enough, moral calculus may shift

    Ultimately, OIF critics have successfully pushed the international community to implement a moratorium. In 2008, the Convention on Biological Diversity issued Decision IX/16, which argued that iron fertilization should “not take place until there is an adequate scientific basis on which to justify such activities.” The London Convention issued Resolution LC-LP.1, which cited Decision IX/16 of the CBD and stated “ocean fertilization activities other than legitimate scientific research should not be allowed.” In 2013, the Convention passed Resolution LP.4(8), reiterating that all ocean fertilization activities except for scientific research “shall not be permitted.” At the time of writing, international society has continued to reject the commercialization of OIF.

    At this point, ocean iron fertilization is not known to be either objectively good or objectively bad; it exists in a state of uncertainty. The norms underlying what to do about geoengineering projects have encouraged cautious application of this technology – if any at all.

    However, relying so much on uncertainty to underpin anti-geoengineering arguments may have unforeseen consequences itself. If climate change becomes severe enough, the international community’s moral calculus may shift, as the uncertainty of a geoengineered world is seen as less catastrophic than the certainty of a climate changed world. Critics will then have a much harder time arguing against its eventual application. With that in mind, it might be best to establish a framework for geoengineering governance now, rather than at a time of crisis.

    Kemi Fuentes-George is the author of ‘Between Preservation and Exploitation’ (MIT Press).

    Sources: Convention on Biological Diversity, ETC Group, The Earth Observatory, Futures, Global Environmental Politics, Greenpeace, The Guardian, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, International Maritime Organization, The New Yorker, Science, The Washington Post, Wired, Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution.

    Photo Credit: Greenpeace activists in the Netherlands, November 2008, courtesy of RNW.org.

    Topics: backdraft, climate change, climate engineering, environment, environmental health, featured, Guest Contributor, international environmental governance, media, mitigation, natural resources, North America, oceans, security, U.S.
    • strauss

      Almost all OIF activities have been scientific research undertaken by traditional scientific institutions. The activities by private firms represent a small minority.

      Geoengineering is not necessarily structurally problematic. Your essay assumes that, in order to be problematic, any activity to address climate change must change our underlying behavior. What about adaptation? What about zero-carbon automobiles? Those do not change our underlying behavior. Are they structurally problematic?

      OIF is not anti-democratic because it would have global climatic effects. It would remove CO2 from the atmosphere. That has the same net effect as reducing emissions, which you notably do not criticize as somehow anti-democratic. OIF would have climatic effects that would be different from emissions reductions only if it were to reduce atmospheric CO2 concentration to less than the pre-industrial level, which would be impossible. (To be clear, OIF may impact the marine environment of the high seas in undesirable ways, and that should be — and now is — regulated.)

      The international community did not implement a moratorium on OIF. It called for it to not take place with the exception of legitimate scientific research, for which the amendment to the London Protocol provides some criteria. As noted above, the vast majority of OIF activity were scientific research.

      • Kemi

        Thanks for the comment, strauss. Here are my responses:

        1. As I say in the post (and in the fuller paper), treating climate change as something that can be solved without changing our underlying patterns of behavior is problematic. This does not mean that they are inherently bad, but they should be examined closely, particularly if they contribute to a mindset that we can continue extracting from the environment, and later fix things with an easy patch. Having spoken to & done research on geoengineers & their proponents, I can tell you that there is a common thread that we can continue to consume & use energy at current rates in the developing world, and “simply” geoengineer (or buy carbon credits) to make up for it. This is a dangerous and seductive idea.

        2. As I indicate in this blog post (and in the fuller paper), I am aware that scientific research on OIF is allowed (see my mention of Resolution LC/LP.1). However, there is a moratorium on the use of OIF to generate carbon credits, despite strong interest in using OIF as a carbon sink in the 1990s and early 2000s.

        3. OIF, and geoengineering in general, is definitely anti-democratic in a way that reducing emissions is not. Creating plankton blooms in specific locations on the high seas, or seeding clouds, or putting mirrors in space, or whatever, will have very different and significant local impacts depending on where they take place. For example, besides having plankton blooms in some areas, rather than others (and possibly hypoxia), studies of cloud seeding have shown that there will be different rates of rainfall & precipitation across regions, depending on meteorological conditions and local climate conditions. That is fundamentally different from a global reduction of greenhouse gases.

        • John Laumer

          There is an alternate and equally valid perspective that Earth is in the emergency room already (patient needs stabilization prior to full diagnosis and treatment plan) and that there is already enough carbon in the atmosphere to take Earth into the morgue,having really nothing to do with the resolve or lack of for curbing present emission rates. I await your answer. JL

          • Kemi

            Hi John! I’m sorry – I’m not on Disqus often enough to get notifications. I just saw your message. I understand what you’re saying, and I see where you’re coming from. Ultimately, the tension between what I’m advocating and what you’re advocating has to do with different assessments of 1) what is feasible; 2) who is responsible.

            In terms of what is “feasible,” advocating for geoengineering (e.g. OIF) as the solutions assumes a) that it will work; b) that it will not lead to additional consequences that worsen climate change of other environmental harms; c) that we’ll have enough political will that it can be carried out on a large scale. In terms of who is responsible, as I mention in the article & in the paper, geoengineering solidifies the claim that control of the environment is something that can be carried out unilaterally, and without input from those who are more vulnerable to environment.

            On the other hand, cutting carbon emissions – despite supposedly being “impossible” is far from it. Remember the global financial crisis: trillions of dollars were mobilized to bail out financial speculators who ruined the economy. Can we not mobilize billions to save the climate? I maintain that we can. Sure, there are significant interests opposing a real shift to low carbon, but is doing so less likely than creating feasible geoengineering options? I’m not convinced.

            However, the problem is both of our claims are hampered by uncertainty. I don’t have proof of mine; you don’t have proof of yours. So, we’re at an impasse. We both have to use some normative judgment to assess uncertainty & come to some kind of conclusion in order to advocate for our preferred position. In mine, I caution against geoengineering for the reasons above, and believe that low-carbon is more possible; for yours, you caution against low-carbon, and believe geoengineering is more possible.

            This is not an issue we’re going to solve now, since this debate is characterized by moral disequilibrium. However, as I mentioned in the article & in the full paper, the crisis may become serious enough that the normative arguments against geoengineering lose power. I don’t think we’re there yet. I think, even post Trump, that low carbon economy is feasible.

            Like I said, sorry about the delayed response. I’ll check back to see if you replied.

            • John Laumer

              Hi and thanks for reply. In short, I’m a fan of parallel path management, so while emissions are being constrained to the maximum extent possible, I favor prototype testing those geoengineering alternatives with the lowest likelihood of political and econsystem blow back. Clarifications: 1.) anything that involves natioinal defense department budgets, large missiles, explosives, and artillery is NOT in this low likelihood or bad outcome category. Agricultural practice modification, cool roof coatings, reforestation, and ocean iron seeding (OIS) are examples of practices with a low likelihood of adverse repurcussions on a global scale. While there are additional practices that might fit in the latter category, I would hasten to point out that in my opinion “biochar” is a nonsense happy talk idea promoted by people who have no concept of chemical process technology. The amount of emssions from large scale kilns and solid waste (tars) from them containing carcinogenic PARs should take this off the table for all but boutique applications. Hint: there’s a reason chimney sweeps get cancer at elevated rates.

              Further, I’d point out the OIS is easy to conduct oversight on using present day satellite imagery, with some sort of permitting process that controls scale and deployment over time. More importantly, with marine food chains and fisheries in collapse from over fishing, acidification, and iron deficiency in the pelagic zones, OIS offers parallel benefits and low costs per unit of application. In other words, even if the resulting carbon sequestration in everything from blue whales to tuna and salmon that results turns out to less than projected, at least you get the fish to eat, which is something one can not claim for umbrellas in the sky or sulfate bombs lauched by missiles!

              At a higher level, it is a pretty easy task to sort all the prospective technologies into traditional 4 X 4 quadrants for the purpose of looking at feasibility and risk benefit ratio.
              Examples, 1.) one quad with X axis the years needed before prototype testing at large scale and Y axis order of magnitude of cost per unit of carbon extracted from atmosphere and sequestered for more than one year. 2.) X axis qualitative assessment of risk of unanticipated highly adverse and lasting side effects (low, medium, or high), Y axis is time scale needed to conduct large scale field trials (now, 5 years, 10 years or more).
              I’ve already done this on all the methods I’ve read of and I think you know what the outcome was!
              Lets’ agree there’s nothing reasonbable to be gained when comparing sulphate injection in the upper atmosphere with OIS. Completely different animals.

              Let’s also agree that moralizing and blaming big industry for climate change is counterproductive.

            • Kemi

              They ARE different in a lot of important ways – for one, OIF is something that can actually be carried out. Russ George single-handedly did 2 experiments, and there were several through the 90s and early 2000s; SOIREE, IronEx I, IronEx II etc. Who knows if/how sulfate seeding or mirrors in space (!!!) can/will be carried out.

              I think there’s something else that’s pretty important here that speaks to one of my concerns & indicates that the position of the “false moralizers” isn’t as far from yours as you think. Just to be clear, I don’t think raising ethical questions about OIF/OIS/geoengineering is necessarily counterproductive.

              As you indicate, OIF/OIS can lead to salmon growth & other positive outcomes. And, in a lot of ways, OIF to create plankton could pose the same kinds of problems as afforestation. I made that same argument in the article & paper – that the same criticisms of OIF could apply to mechanisms that have been approved (LULUCF), but since OIF was given this extra moral weight, that this moral weight explained the resistance to it’s application. Whether you’re for or against OIF, it’s important to realize that international resistance to it is not solely (primarily?) informed by science, but by the use of normative claims to fill in gaps of scientific uncertainty.

              All the same, the history of OIF shows that it can and has been used unilaterally. Presumably, with better oversight from international institutions, or some kind of consultation, the criticisms of OIF/OIS’s undemocratic nature could be addressed. Some of the moral critiques are on the process of OIF and geoengineering writ large – who designs the methods, who participates in deciding when they get applied, and so on. These are important ethical questions, and recognizing that they exist & need to be addressed isn’t necessarily counterproductive, I don’t think.

            • Kemi

              I do want to be clear, however, that listening to both those in favour of, and opposed to geoengineering in general, and OIF in particular, I have noticed that both “sides” describe the debate as one characterized by a great deal of uncertainty – uncertainty about negative impacts, projections, and ability to control outcomes. The key difference is that the more cautious OIF critics are more risk averse given the possibility of, e.g., eutrophication, are genuinely worried about the ability of OIF to be unilaterally deployed, and are concerned that focusing on OIF and geoengineering will lead to moral hazard, in which fossil fuel extraction will be let “off the hook,” since we can theoretically geoengineer our way out of the problem.

              to the last point, I have to say that having read the arguments for OIF produced over the past 2+ decades, that they may have a point. Some of the most vocal proponents of OIF have couched it in a way to suggest that we can continue to extract & exploit fossil fuels, since we can use OIF to stay within our carbon budget. Needless to say, the extraction of fossil fuels has far more environmental harms than increased atmospheric CO2 – see the residents in US gas country who have flammable water; the displaced fishermen in Louisiana & the killed workers on the Deepwater blowout; the Native Americans in Canada who lost their land; and tribal minorities in Nigeria.

            • Kemi

              I do want to be clear, however, that listening to both those in favour of, and opposed to geoengineering in general, and OIF in particular, I have noticed that both “sides” describe the debate as one characterized by a great deal of uncertainty – uncertainty about negative impacts, projections, and ability to control outcomes. The key difference is that the more cautious OIF critics are more risk averse given the possibility of, e.g., eutrophication, are genuinely worried about the ability of OIF to be unilaterally deployed, and are concerned that focusing on OIF and geoengineering will lead to moral hazard, in which fossil fuel extraction will be let “off the hook,” since we can theoretically geoengineer our way out of the problem.

              to the last point, I have to say that having read the arguments for OIF produced over the past 2+ decades, that they may have a point. Some of the most vocal proponents of OIF have couched it in a way to suggest that we can continue to extract & exploit fossil fuels, since we can use OIF to stay within our carbon budget. Needless to say, the extraction of fossil fuels has far more environmental harms than increased atmospheric CO2 – see the residents in US gas country who have flammable water; the displaced fishermen in Louisiana & the killed workers on the Deepwater blowout; the Native Americans in Canada who lost their land; and tribal minorities in Nigeria.

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