After enduring sexual violence in the DRC conflict, Steven Kighoma fled to Uganda where he became an activist with the NGO, Men of Hope Refugee Association, supporting male victims of conflict-related sexual violence. The experiences of male victims include rape, being forced to watch family members being raped, being beaten on the genitals, and enduring other kinds of abuse. Compounding their trauma, men who have suffered sexual violence in the region are often seen as not properly masculine and face homophobic violence and criminalization, regardless of their sexual orientation. In addition, they face exclusion from survivor support services which assume that only women face sexual violence.

The biggest challenge is “the ignorance of the government, the medical institutions, the community, not knowing a male victim of sexual violence exists,” says Kighoma. “There is a confusion when you talk about male victims of sexual violence. People confuse it with homosexuality.”

Over the past decade, our understanding of how climate change affects conflict and security has advanced considerably. Yet, how to best address the overlapping challenges of climate change, conflict, and human security remains an open question. In an article published in World Development, I address this topic by examining how climate security discourses inform development policy and, in turn, how the structures of development enable or constrain institutional capacity to address climate security. This research identifies not only the unique barriers the development sector must overcome, but also the ways in which the most common framings of climate change (i.e., as a threat multiplier) limit the scope for policy and programming.

Attempts to reduce the amount of waste flowing into the ocean from Indonesia are having limited success.  

Smog, water pollution, deforestation and desertification—for decades, citizen activists and protestors have attempted to fight the environmental impacts of China’s development and industrialization. Now, confronted with climate change, the Communist Party of China (CCP) is well aware not only of citizen discontent, but also of the risks that climate change poses to the long term security, stability, and survivability of the regime. Rising seas will affect the great cities of Shanghai, Tianjin, and other areas along China’s coast. Glacier melt on the Tibetan Plateau will cause floods in the short term and in the long run fail to replenish the falling aquifers of the thirsty North China Plain. The prospect of high numbers of displaced Chinese citizens, internally displaced by global warming, is real. 

“Never let a good crisis go to waste,” said Winston Churchill. Like other acute stressors, the COVID-19 pandemic acts as a multiplier of chronic or pre-existing vulnerabilities, such as the challenges of servicing rapidly growing informal populations, particularly in urban settings. This multiplier effect may accelerate water insecurity at unprecedented levels. However, together with UNESCO Intergovernmental Hydrological Program (IHP), we’re reflecting on the possibility that COVID-19 can act as an accelerator of positive action toward achieving Sustainable Development Goal 6 on water. The nexus between issues and urban water security is particularly important.

In Africa, climate change and population expansion are increasing fragilities and vulnerabilities—including contributing to conflict dynamics—for many people who directly depend on nature. To cope with how their environment can no longer supply livelihood needs, people are migrating in search of security or economic stability. These factors interact with one another in ways that underline the need for inclusive conflict mitigation considerations in climate change action.

The recently released National Intelligence Council’s Global Trends 2040 report, clocking in at over 140 pages, is titled “A More Contested World.” That headline should come as no surprise to development professionals. The report, reviewed by the incoming Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines, before being sent to President Biden and Congress, examines key trends that will likely influence U.S. national security out to 2040. I blogged on the Global Trends Report back in 2015, when it was on the verge of being unveiled at the splashy South-by-Southwest (SXSW) festival in Austin. This year’s public release was much more muted and the overall outlook decidedly more bleak, chaotic, and turbulent, not just from the lingering fallout of a “long tail” COVID-19 pandemic, but from the ominous environmental consequences of climate change on everything from glaciers and rising sea levels, to more frequent and intense tropical storms, and an unprecedented numbers of wildfires, like those seen last year in the Western United States. The NIC report also speaks to the ominous societal changes coming our way, best characterized by a widening chasm between what governments can reliably deliver and what citizens can reasonably expect.

Already facing water stress, much of Latin America (such as the western slopes of the Andes and the dry corridor of Central America) is projected to experience intensified periods of drought in the coming decades, further complicating development efforts in the region. At the same time, heavy floods are the most common natural disaster in the region, disrupting life for countless people. According to the World Bank, in Latin America and the Caribbean alone roughly $14 billion per year is required to meet the 2030 water and sanitation targets of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. Typically, investments at this scale have been made by governments and large firms that invest in traditional infrastructure such as dams. But with ever-growing development needs and increased understanding of the impacts of climate change, Nature-based Solutions (NBS) are gaining momentum as a new way of incorporating environmental considerations into development responses.