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The blog of the Wilson Center's Environmental Change and Security Program
  • Guest Contributor

    Myanmar’s Democratic Deficit: Demography and the Rohingya Dilemma

    April 12, 2016 By Rachel Blomquist & Richard Cincotta
    Rohingya camp

    According to political demographers, who study the relationship between population dynamics and politics, two characteristics when observed together provide a rather good indication that a state is about to shed its authoritarian regime, rise to a high level of democracy, and stay there. Myanmar has both.

    The first is demographic: the “right” age structure. A median age of 29 years marks the point when the historical probability of a country being a democracy, measured by Freedom House’s annual study of political rights and civil liberties, passes the 50-percent mark. According to the United Nations Population Division, Myanmar’s median age at mid-year 2015 was at 27.9 years and it is projected to pass the 50-percent mark in 2019.

    The second is political: a pragmatic (rather than ideological) military-controlled government. This type of regime, although always repressive and sometimes ruthless, has proven exceedingly vulnerable to democratization as a country’s age structure matures. Only a handful of military regimes have survived past a median age of 30 years (Figure 1).

    So why, despite an impressive succession of social reforms and political reversals, including the recent victory of the National League for Democracy led by Aung San Suu Kyi and the first elected civilian president, U Htin Kyaw, should analysts remain somewhat skeptical of Myanmar’s ability to make the leap to liberal democracy? The answer can be found in Myanmar’s dismal record of managing inter-ethnic politics, particularly the systematically disenfranchised Muslim Rohingya minority.

    Population Problems?

    During the pre-census mapping phase of the 2014 census, Myanmar’s Department of Population estimated about 1 million people who self-identified as Rohingya in Rakhine State, 31 percent of the state’s population. Yet the census classified them as “not enumerated.” Most reside primarily in the western portion of Rakhine State and are stateless – officially considered a foreign population by Myanmar’s central government.

    Democracy vs Military Regimes as Countries AgeWhereas relatively small but significant Rohingya insurgent activities, run by the Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO), have operated off-and-on near the Bangladesh border since independence, there has been little evidence of recent RSO activity. Generally, Rohingya communities have been the targets of discrimination and political violence at the hands of neighboring Rakhine Buddhists, another of Myanmar’s minorities. In recent years, thousands of Rohingya have risked their lives (and many have lost them) illegally crossing densely forested borders or paying the crews of fishing vessels who drop them along the coasts of neighboring states.

    Inter-ethnic demographic differences play a prominent role in the conflict. Buddhist nationalists – represented by organizations such as MaBaTha and the 969 Movement – assert that persistently high rates of population growth among the Rohingya have reduced Rakhine communities to a minority in the western districts of Rakhine State, territory once ruled by Arakan kings and populated by the ancestors of today’s Rakhine Buddhists. The Rohingya have thus become the target of local regulations obstructing family formation, and more recently, the focus of central government legislation seeking to regulate childbearing.

    In our research, we have explored two key questions that concern the origins and dynamics of the Rohingya conflict. The first question is demographic: Are Rakhine Buddhists’ perceptions accurate – that Rohingya fertility is higher, and their growth rate is faster than other local populations? Our second question is political: Can the central government in Naypyidaw help reduce these ethno-demographic differences in the long run?

    A Youthful Minority

    As a general rule, where information about ethnic demographics has critical political implications, data is likely to be scarce. So it is in Myanmar.

    Because those who self-identified as Rohingya were not enumerated in Myanmar’s 2014 census, our estimates rely on an analysis using rates obtained from local surveys of Maungdaw Township in northern Rakhine State. Nearly 90 percent of the township’s 512,000 residents identified as Rohingya in surveys conducted by the United Nations (or “Bengalis” in Myanmar’s documentation), a significant proportion of the state’s Rohingya. Using estimates of crude rates provided by to the United Nations by Myanmar’s government, we employed standard demographic tables and statistical techniques to reconstruct an age structure and estimate fertility and growth.

    While our conclusions are necessarily tentative, our estimate of the Rohingya sample’s total fertility rate (number of children born per woman over her lifetime) for 2012 is about 3.8, and we estimate its population growth was at 1.5 percent per year. While neither Rohingya fertility nor growth rates were as high as corresponding rates in Myanmar’s Chin State (adjacent to Rakhine State and also bordering Bangladesh), they were considerably higher than published current estimates of Rakhine Buddhist total fertility rate, at 2.2 children per woman (Figure 2).

    Blom-Cinc_Fig2

    The Dilemma

    These results seem to confirm perceptions of the Rohingya growing more quickly than Rakhine Buddhists, but what about the second question: what can – or should – the government do about it, if anything?

    To structure our analysis, we rely on a theory that Christian Leuprecht refers to as the “demographic security dilemma.” While reviewing contemporary studies of states with escalating inter-ethnic tensions, he frequently noted a wide ethnic fertility gap, separating the majority from the minority. Typically, the marginalized minority experienced a substantially higher level of fertility than the majority – often as much as two children per woman, and sometimes more. Leuprecht explained these gaps as products of a policy dilemma. 

    Further marginalization can ultimately sustain high fertility

    The dilemma, Leuprecht argues, arises when the state reacts to minority population growth by denying minority members proper access to services, constraining their economic mobility, and suppressing their political rights. These are conditions that have been experienced by the Rohingya. For many, conditions are far worse. According to International Crisis Group, upwards of 137,000 people in Rakhine State, mostly Rohingya, remain in displacement camps following violence in 2012.

    Leuprecht noted that such policies are self-defeating. When further marginalized, high-fertility minorities – typically already less educated and poorer, more religious, usually rural, and with less access to modern contraception than their urban counterparts – are inclined to retain, or even revert to, traditional patterns of marriage and childbearing, and practices that constrain women’s activities outside the home and sustain high fertility.

    Paradoxically, marginalization can ultimately slow or stifle minority fertility decline, widen the ethnic fertility gap, promote minority population growth, and yield even larger proportions of minority young adults. Past and present examples of this include the treatment of Palestinians in Israel, Indios groups in Guatemala and the Andean states, Pattani Muslims in Thailand, Muslims in northern India, African Americans in the United States, Tamils in Sri Lanka, and the Sinai Bedouin in Egypt. While economically weakening minority communities in the short run, such policies threaten to erode the demographic position of the majority – and worse.

    In the case of Myanmar, the central government’s lack of response to the discrimination and violence suffered by the Rohingya is fashioning an inviting political environment for Islamic extremism. Whereas recent government-reported RSO activity has been difficult to substantiate, that could change if the current situation is left to brew for too long.  Without some attempt to resolve the dilemma, Naypyidaw runs the risk of creating its own worst nightmare – the rise of another ethnic insurgency and the more diffuse threat of terrorism.

    Is a Turnabout Possible?

    Theoretically, the surest and most logical pathway out of the minority demographic security dilemma is (as Leuprecht notes) a full 180-degree policy reversal. That’s not an easy political pill to swallow anywhere. Moreover, too rapid a turnabout would alarm Rakhine Buddhist communities.

    On the other hand, it is unlikely that the international community, with the possible exception of China, which has had considerable political, economic, and security influence over Myanmar’s military junta, will continue to tolerate reproductive coercion and forced migration as the centerpieces of Naypyidaw’s Rohingya policy. And given the past five years of turbulent relations between Naypyidaw and Beijing – including China’s sunken investment in the suspended Myitsone Dam and the Kokong conflict near the border in Myanmar’s northeast – neither Myanmar’s military establishment nor the new National League for Democracy seems eager to wedge themselves into a geopolitical corner where China is their one and only friend.

    What would such a policy reversal mean? Rather than turning a blind eye to disruptive inter-ethnic violence, the central government would need to actively protect Rohingya communities.

    It will be telling to see who is included in Suu Kyi’s vision of a free Myanmar

    Instead of keeping the Rohingya at the margins of society, the state would double investments in Rohingya health care and secular education, and ensure that Rohingya girls and women have the opportunity to complete high school education and beyond.

    Rather than attempting to enforce restrictions on reproduction, the Naypyidaw government would secure women’s access to state-run secular family courts (as opposed to informal village or religious adjudication) while providing quality maternal and child health care, and family planning.

    Impossible? In today’s Myanmar, very nearly. Such a turnabout would require the expenditure of enormous political capital, at a level held by only top officials in the government.  Moreover, the reversal would precipitate an early showdown with popular Buddhist nationalists – something that Aung San Suu Kyi would rather put off to a later date. She may not have that luxury. The path to democracy seems to cut directly through the Rohingya issue.

    It is no easy task to meld a unified modern state from the diverse cultural and linguistic mixture of peoples who once settled and established kingdoms on the fertile flood plains of the Irrawaddy and hills surrounding the Salween and Mekong. At independence, the new government inherited a long list of promises of autonomy and territorial concessions made by the British colonial government to many of the country’s minorities. Although the military has negotiated a halt to 8 of the country’s 15 active ethnic conflicts, the government is still far from either quelling ethnic separatism or eliminating inter-ethnic violence. Meanwhile, the Rohingya are still struggling for their most basic right – to be considered citizens in the land of their birth. As the National League for Democracy works to consolidate its power in the coming years, it will be telling to see whether the Rohingya are included in Suu Kyi’s vision of a free Myanmar.

    Rachel Blomquist is a Master’s candidate at Georgetown University’s Asian Studies Program in the School of Foreign Service. This research is a product of her internship at the Stimson Center and her Master’s thesis. Richard Cincotta is a Wilson Center global fellow and director of the Global Political Demography Program at the Stimson Center.

    Sources: Department of Population (Myanmar), Freedom House, Human Rights Watch, International Crisis Group, Studies in Population, UNFPA, United Nations.

    Photo Credit: A girl in a Rohingya camp in May 2013, courtesy of flickr user Steve Gumaer.

    Topics: Asia, Bangladesh, China, conflict, democracy and governance, demography, development, family planning, featured, global health, Guest Contributor, human rights, humanitarian, hydropower, maternal health, migration, military, Myanmar, population, poverty, security, South Asia, youth
    • Karl

      You don’t have enough testicles to stop the Rakhine people from copying the example of the USA, which did ==not== allow the Confederacy to define itself as a peoplehood out of thin blue air, as the “rohingya” are trying to do. Colonialism is finished. If you meddle in Rakhine, you are putting your life in jeopardy. You will rest eternally, next to Rachel Corrie.

    • Lex Rieffel

      The demographic aspect of this blog post is seriously flawed because it does not provide estimates for the Crude Death Rate of the Rohingya community versus others. Furthermore, while it estimates the population growth rate in the Rohingya community, it does not estimate the population growth rate for other communities. It is possible that the Crude Death Rate of the Rohingya is considerably higher and that the population growth rate is significantly lower. If so, the Rohingya community is shrinking relative to the other ethnic communities. Lex Rieffel, Brookings Institution, Washington DC

      • Madhavaraob Banaji

        Out breed and export Muslims all over the world is the policy everywhere in this world whether Syria,African Muslims or Pakis,Banghlis,Iranis,to name a few.Finally islamise the world by sheer fertility and numbers.Others will disappear from map of the world including commentors in these columns!

    • http://www.stimson.org/experts/rcincotta Richard Cincotta

      Lex,

      Thanks for your comment. Some of the information that you seek, as well as more technical information, were not included in this heavily condensed “blog version” of our paper. Our apologies (we’ve asked the editor if we can return some of that content to the blog).

      Here is what is missing: The reported Rohingya crude birth rate (CBR) was 27.2 per thousand, and its reported CDR was 12.4 per thousand. This yields a Rohingya growth rate of 1.5% (as stated in the essay).

      For the Rakhine population, the CBR was reported as 18.0, and we estimated a CDR of 9.4 (from simulation modeling), yielding a growth rate of ~0.9%. I explain how the Rakhine CDR was estimated, below.

      State and regional population CDRs were NOT reported in the 2014 Myanmar Census. Total fertility rates (TFR), infant mortality rates (IMR), under-5 mortality rates, and CBRs were reported. However, CDRs can be estimated from other demographic data by using regional model life tables–a demographic tool developed by Coale and Demeny (1966; Coale, Demeny & Vaughan,1983) and by the UN Population Division (UN, 1982).

      Model life tables were produced because, early on, demographers observed that there are characteristic patterns by which the “array” of age-related mortality rates declines. Ansley Coale and Paul Demeny grouped these patterns into four regional models based on the European experience (north, south, east, and west). The UN has created additional patterns for developing regions. Both sets are included in DemProj, software produced for USAID Policy IV Project (Stover and Kirmeyer, 2005) that gives users access to the cohort-component method of demographic projection.

      Because CDR and CBR are heavily influenced by age structure, they can be estimated by “plugging in” age-structural data (males by 5-yr age groups, females by 5-yr age groups) and the TFR, and then by choosing the most applicable model life table based on the level of infant mortality (IMR for the Rakhine population was reported at 65 per thousand).

      I applied four different model life tables that could apply to populations in South and Southeast Asia. These four simulations produced CDRs ranging from 9.4 to 10.4 per thousand. Based on the reported Rakhine IMR, I chose the “UN South Asia model life table.” This model produced the lowest CDR (9.4 per thousand population) and the smallest gap between the Rakhine and Rohingya growth rates.

      Nonetheless, our estimated gaps between Rakhine and Rohingya TFRs and growth-rates are large: Rakhine TFR, 2.2; R, ~0.9%/yr; versus Rohingya TFR, ~3.8; R, 1.5%.

      Just to review, the three basic premises of the paper are (below):

      1) In majority-minority conflicts, the “grievance rhetoric” of low-fertility majority groups frequently reflects a majority-held perception that the minority is experiencing higher fertility or a higher population growth rate. This majority perception is frequently voiced in the Rakhine-Rohingya conflict (within which the Rohingya are the principal victims).

      2) In some historical cases, the majority-held perceptions of a “fertility gap” or “growth-rate gap” are not valid. However, we conclude that, at the time of the UN surveys, the Rohingya minority probably did experience higher fertility and more rapid growth than the Rakhine population.

      3) Taking our theoretical lesson from Christian Leuprecht’s “minority demographic security dilemma”, we argue that a legitimate way out of this dilemma is for the new government in Myanmar to focus quality educational and health services, and opportunities (especially for women), on the Rohingya minority, rather than further deprive them.

      If you would like further clarification of our methods, please contact me (rcincotta@stimson.org) or we can communicate by phone. Once again, thank you for your comment and interest.

      • RVK

        Thanks for your analysis.
        There is need to change in policy outlook of Myanmar government.
        Health and Education remain the essential factors for nurturing the population.

        At the same time world must give some time to this nascent democracy Myanmar to take progressive action for Rohingyas.

        If Myanmar fails to do provide such protection then UNSC should go for resolution. But again China may block in the process.

        • abhishek jaatav

          Not only china, even India will block ur treacherous racist anti burmese propositions. UNSC can no longer be a western propaganda tool for war. No need for UN’s opinion, the same UN that appointed saudi arab in human rights committee. Coming to rohingya, they voted for division of burma in 1947, and started the insurgency that killed millions. Naturally burma has every right to defend its sovereign boundary.

          • RVK

            Hey! calm down!
            First mind your words of allegations against me!

            An eye for an eye would make whole world blind.

            In the veil of sovereignty and nationalism, innocent life must not be brought to peril.

            It’s a moral responsibility.

            I have you would understand this . Jai Bhim!!

            • abhishek jaatav

              Ur twisting my opinion. Firstly, its about self defence, not eye for eye. If I try to burn ur house to capture territory, u will call the police. A self righteous guide, ask the australian whites how they colonized new guinea and mainland australia. Makkah worshippers raped Dalit women for three centuries, because self defence is not an option, thats why we Dalits stood up and removed the makkah worshipper progenists. Hope that answers ur doubt.

            • RVK

              So you are assuming that all Rohingyas are the threat to Myanmar’s National security?
              So what about the Army of Myanmar who is brutally raping and murdering the innocent. Is it just? Will any modern civilized society allow this?

              History no doubt teaches you some lesson but it cannot be the only way to understand the complexity. You can co-relate with ‘Lucas critique’ phenomenon(very significant in Economics). You ought to look into not only macro perspective but also the micro perspective of the matter.
              In this matter Rohingyas are facing problems due to the influence of Junta government and leaving virtue of democracy in peril, on the other hand, there is the threat of terrorism, radicalisation among Rohingyas due to retaliation. My concern is that if this same policy of Myanmar against Rohingyas continues then it would further create entropy in future of South Asia.

              Myanmar must distinguish between terrorism and life of innocent otherwise whole future generation would suffer. The world community and Myanmar must find the solution, at least providing Education, Health to them so that those venom of radical thinking stops.
              I hope you would agree on this point.

            • abhishek jaatav

              Thats why people are running, because not everybody wants to live in a war zone, dont advocate people shud stay and join Al Qaeda instead of finding safety. Most of the selective victim pictures u refer online has been proven morphed, snide remarks about Burmese govt stems from the media frustrated by Burma acting as a thorn against american hegemony in the region. China also made a statement on the issue, read that for a neutral perspective. Out of choice human shield of AlQaeda always claimed divinity, because their motive is demonizing Burmese govt or any Govt fighting them. A similar insurgency also forcing a migration from syria, why nobody blames qatar and turkey for reinforcing the war? Rohingyas are raping and butchering the buddhists since 1947, A loaded gun pointed to a civilizations head is not a tolerance issue. In this context, Ur talking about a compromise, not a solution, If a group of foreigners openly declare to have more children to outgrow the locals and divide the country, its a declaration of war.

            • RVK

              Mr. Jaatav,
              Few things I would argue:
              1) So think that all Rohingyas are involved in violence and raping since 1947?
              Which is most reductionist and biased argument I have ever come across.

              2) Most of the Rohingyas people living in Myanmar at least since 50 Years and unfortunately they were always treated as liabilities. If the governance policy is biased against one particular community then how come you expect those communities to play a constructive role in the country. For god sake, they didn’t have proper health and education. How can you expect balanced Total Fertility Ratio? Meanwhile, I would like to substantiate my argument regarding biased Myanmar government policy. The Chin Province of Myanmar with Buddhist population has higher Fertility rate than Rohingyas, now if high population and fertility rate was an issue then the so-called secular, democratic Myanmar should have equally taken the step to tackle this overgrowth in Chin Province. But they didn’t do so? You know why? Because Myanmar has the influence of Junta(Army) and Theology. It is so ironical that people who call themselves a true follower of Buddhism has tainted this peaceful religion.
              So this nascent democracy must be protected. The solution is not compromised but Integrative conflict resolution.
              3) No doubt we all must condemn terrorism but that doesn’t mean that all Rohingyas are terrorist.

              4) Whatever happens in South Asia, we must ensure that future generation life is secured and they have all rights to have adequate health and Education so that we can end this cycle of misery.

              5) As far as resource mobilization is concerned, the nascent Myanmar government does not have enough resources, it is a moral duty to provide Finances and other supports of capacity building and ensure better future for a future generation.

              I had a great discussion with you and all the best for you future endeavour. Jai Bhim.

            • abhishek jaatav

              Taking ur points one by one.
              1…So do u think all Rohingyas are involved >>> I said not everyone is involved, thats why most people are finding a safe zone. The insurgency has backfired, people distancing themselves instead of joining it.

              2…Most rohingyas are atleast 50 years old >>> By that logic, the indonesians of west papua are also 40 yrs of age, but the illegal exchange of territory done by australia done without the permission of papuans doesnt make the indonesians ethnic people of west papua. Same case in rakhine, the ulterior motives of the british imported insurgents disqualifies the case of ethnicity. And the morphing of pictures shows a pattern to sympathize with more arms to keep the insurgency going.

              They didnt have proper healthcare >>> Healthcare is gold standard in saudi arab, then why do they have highest fertility rate in asia? Chin district has higher fertility growth because the christian baptists preach to the Zo women to stay indoor and make more kids, happening since 1891. Hence healthcare is just a theory.

              Why didnt burma stop Chin people from having kids ??? >>> A population law is enabled in high density growth districts inf burma, I dont think you are aware of current policies. The rohingya killed three officers who were implementing the rules last year

              3…Not all rohingya are terrorist >>>Exactly, what I said, thats why many rohingya are returning to bangladesh , instead of taking part in the insurgency, because not all are terrorist.

              4…Must end cycle of misery >>> Dalit hindus are being butchered, Shias getting mauled in pakistan, millions displaced since 1947, as long as people dont stop brushing things under the carpet

    • Sen Philip

      You have reached the conclusion that the buddhists perception of the population of Rohingas growing much faster than the buddhists is probaably correct.This you have concuded after studying the past groth rates of fertility,death and birth rates
      In any projection based on past statistics,projections for the future are bound to be heavily influenced by other extraneous conditions, which the statistical projection cannot take note of
      The Buddhist perception of the Rohingas faster growth however is shared by many observers of the sub continentThe simplistic explanation of course in India, Bangla Desh and Burmais that because muslims are not monogamous, they will have more children
      Your statistical projection takes account of past growth rates and projects them statistically.The number of women of reproductive age is reasonably well estimable.I wonder if we could add in the factor that gives the buddhists their perception.A study on the no of intercourse the known population of women will surely have a bearing on the crude birth rate,and if you factor in a falling infant mortality rate and an increasinds nuber of live births.I think the projected population growth rate will escalate on the lines of the buddhist perceptions!!If you add the growing prosperity of the Buddhists their projecteed rates of fertile intercourse per woman ,the population growth figures will be cosiderably different from yours.
      Perhaps this is a field where your researchers excellent studies could carry further

      Sen

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