Coordinating international financing for climate adaptation and mitigation remains a persistent challenge. In its 2020 Adaptation Gap Report, the United Nations Environment Programme observes that the annual cost of climate adaptation in developing countries could rise from $70 billion today to $280-500 billion by 2050—and current funding levels are growing at too modest a pace to keep up.

As climate change impacts become starker, interest in geoengineering is growing. Geoengineering is “climate manipulation technologies that we can use to alter the climate to offset the worst parts of climate change,” says Beth Chalecki, Associate Professor of International Relations at the University of Nebraska Omaha, and Research Fellow at the Wilson Center, in a recent episode of Wilson NOW. “It sounds like a technological fix, but of course it’s not that simple,” says Chalecki.

Already facing water stress, much of Latin America (such as the western slopes of the Andes and the dry corridor of Central America) is projected to experience intensified periods of drought in the coming decades, further complicating development efforts in the region. At the same time, heavy floods are the most common natural disaster in the region, disrupting life for countless people. According to the World Bank, in Latin America and the Caribbean alone roughly $14 billion per year is required to meet the 2030 water and sanitation targets of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. Typically, investments at this scale have been made by governments and large firms that invest in traditional infrastructure such as dams. But with ever-growing development needs and increased understanding of the impacts of climate change, Nature-based Solutions (NBS) are gaining momentum as a new way of incorporating environmental considerations into development responses.

Humanitarian actors play a critical role in responding to climate-related crises, armed conflict, or a combination of both. Their response comes with an environmental cost. Humanitarian staff air travel, for instance, represents a significant source of carbon emissions and humanitarian logistics remain heavily dependent on fossil fuels. As the demand for humanitarian response climbs and countries increase their commitments to curb climate change, a question arises: Can humanitarian organizations mitigate their environmental impact and remain effective in responding to the consequences of armed conflict and climate impacts?

In January, the Biden Administration released the Executive Order on Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and Abroad. It is a sweeping document that integrates climate concerns into policy and governance, including into national security. It recognizes that environmental security, the integration of environmental considerations into national security strategy, policy, and programs, is essential to combat the global climate crisis and should be mainstreamed across U.S. government efforts. The idea is not a new one. One of the authors (Goodman) led early environmental security efforts in the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) for 8 years of the Clinton Administration in the 1990s, during the first chapter of awareness of environmental considerations in defense and foreign policy.

“We need to devote our full attention to the relationship between water, climate, and security, increase understanding of the issue, and take urgent action,” said Carola van Rijnsoever, Director of Inclusive Green Growth at the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at a recent Hague roundtable on building a transatlantic coalition for climate action on water and security challenges in countries of risk.

Of the many ways in which the 2020 presidential election might reshape American society, its impact on climate policy may well be the most significant. The Biden administration’s ability to move forward with its agenda, however, is greatly constrained by the carbon-climate cleavage that increasingly shapes American legislative politics and electoral competition. The administration has met this challenge with a three-prong strategy intended to bridge this cleavage.

Whether and how climate change drives conflict has driven considerable debate over the past decade. Yet understandings of climate-conflict remain general, and in many respects, unsettled. A recent assessment of potential future directions for climate-conflict research highlights the need to go beyond generalities and deepen insight into the contextual mechanisms that link climate change to conflict. That type of knowledge requires in-depth studies that trace climate-conflict dynamics in particular places and times. In an article recently published in Climate and Development, I examine how climate change alters conflict outcomes and vulnerability in Karamoja, Uganda.  The case offers direct insight into both why the climate-conflict relationship can be so difficult to interpret and also the need to broaden conceptualizations of the climate-conflict relationship.