In late 2023, Indonesia’s then President Joko Widodo presided over the launch of the country’s first floating solar power plant on the Cirata reservoir in West Java. Widodo touted how at 192MW it was “the largest floating solar plant in Southeast Asia.” He added the solar plant could eventually reach 500MW, generating enough electricity to power over 100,000 households in Indonesia. This floating powerhouse, made up of 300,000+ Chinese-built PV panels stretching 250 hectares on the water, has become the poster child for Indonesia’s commitment to going solar. 

The most persuasive argument for global EV adoption is the positive impact that these vehicles have for the environment. A scientific consensus has emerged around the benefits of electric vehicles and their zero tailpipe emissions, ranging from local air quality improvement to increased energy efficiency.  

Launched in 2013, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has drawn wide global attention, with scholars and policymakers examining its geopolitical and economic implications. Much less explored, however, are the subnational impacts of BRI in participating countries. The China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), adopted as Pakistan’s flagship BRI project in 2015, offers a case in point.

Summer is often a time for grim climate milestones, as ever-more intense heatwaves scorch large swathes of the planet. But this year, the bad news arrived earlier than usual when the United States refrained from sending representatives to the UN-sponsored climate talks in Bonn, Germany, for the first time in the talks’ 30-year history. The intercessional talks are in some ways more important ever than the more widely reported on climate COPs because they are where many especially tricky issues are negotiated. The Trump Administration’s unilateral withdrawal from international negotiations is bad news for the climate. But it is even worse news for US national security. Climate diplomacy is a big part of soft power and influence, and Washington is rapidly losing out to Beijing.

The numbers are staggering. A third of the food produced in the world is lost or wasted—from farms and food processing factories to grocery stores, restaurants, and homes. This growing mountain of rotting food is a major methane emitter, accounting for 8 to 10 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions. If food waste were a country, it would be the third largest greenhouse gas emitter, with the United States and China as leading food wasters. 

Pakistan’s summer sun is relentless, but its golden rays may hold a promising clean energy solution. 

During my visit to that country last summer, an energy sector expert I met expressed amazement that Pakistan had imported 13 gigawatts of solar modules from China in the first six months of 2024. Media reports celebrated how even remote villages were adopting rooftop solar systems. International observers lauded Pakistan’s “stunning solar boom.”

For decades, China has been the dominant force in hydropower development across the Mekong subregion, financing, and constructing massive dam projects that have transformed Southeast Asia’s economic and environmental landscape. Many analysts have framed this expansion as a meticulously orchestrated strategy to extend Beijing’s economic and geopolitical influence. But this narrative obscures a more complex reality—one in which China’s dam-building in the Mekong has been shaped by trial and error, reactive policy shifts driven by external shocks, local resistance, and intensifying geopolitical competition.

In a rural, hard-to-reach area of Blantyre district in southern Malawi, Ephraim Louis cannot imagine where his life would be without the solar panel on the roof of his house. “I am not a captive of darkness anymore,” says Louis, 42. “It’s been more than 10 years since I installed this [solar panel] system. We still don’t have the main grid anywhere near us and no one here thinks it will ever come.”