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The blog of the Wilson Center's Environmental Change and Security Program
  • One in Three People Will Live in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2100, Says UN

    June 8, 2011 By Schuyler Null

    Between now and 2100, three out of every four people added to world population will live in sub-Saharan Africa. That’s what the medium variant of the UN’s world population projections estimates.* As we noted in our previous post on the latest UN numbers, Nigeria leads sub-Saharan growth, but other countries will also grow by major multiples: Tanzania and Somalia will be 7 times larger; Malawi more than 8 times; and Niger, to grow to more than 10 times its current population.

    Between now and 2100, three out of every four people added to world population will live in sub-Saharan Africa

    Sub-Saharan Africa’s growth, if it follows these projections, will likely have important geopolitical repercussions. Today, the region is home to more than 877 million people, or roughly 12 in every 100 people on Earth. In 2100, the medium-variant projection for sub-Saharan population is 3.36 billion people, or one in every three people on the planet. Such an increase in human capital could be a major asset, but whether or not economies can grow quickly enough to accommodate it – as well as provide the number of new schools, hospitals, infrastructure projects, and other services that will be needed in general – will be a crucial challenge.

    For example, a population and development report by the Ethiopian government issued last fall projects that the country would need to create 5.4 million new jobs, provide 21.2 million metric tons of additional cereals, and quadruple their number of doctors by 2035 to meet basic requirements under a plausible high fertility scenario.

    “The question for Africa is: Are we going to be ready?” said Eliya Zulu of the African Institute for Development Policy in Kenya, speaking to ECSP earlier this year about the impending demographic hurdles facing African leaders. “We need to prepare,” he said, and “for that to happen it’s not just about saying ‘let’s have fewer children.’ I think we also need to do this from a social developmental perspective where we also look at ways in which we can improve the quality of the population, empower women, invest in education, and so on.”

    Demographic Momentum and Uncertainty

    It’s important to note that the UN’s numbers are based on projections that can and do change. The range of uncertainty for the sub-Saharan African region, in particular, is quite large. The medium-variant projection for the region’s total population in 2100 is 3.36 billion people, but the high variant projection is 4.85 billion and the low variant is 2.25 billion. The vast differences between projections (the lower variant is less than half of the high) are due to the predicted trajectory of total fertility rate (TFR, or average number of children per woman). Historically, TFR has declined – sometimes very quickly – as countries develop, but it has remained stubbornly high throughout many parts of sub-Saharan Africa.

    Compared to the rest of the world, the region’s TFR has declined much more slowly over the last few decades than anywhere else (see figure above) – the Middle African sub-region’s TFR even rose during the 1980s and 90s. As a result, the date when countries in sub-Saharan Africa will reach a TFR of 2.1 (considered “replacement level” – when population stabilizes) has been repeatedly pushed back, and some experts expect this “demographic stalling” to continue. This uncertainty leads to the high variability in the UN Population Division’s population projections.

    Turning the Ship

    Certainly one avenue for steering the region’s growth towards the lower variant is an increased focus on family planning (listen to Eliya Zulu’s take on this as well). Only 18 percent of married women in sub-Saharan Africa currently use modern contraceptives, according to the Population Reference Bureau, and at least 35 million women want to delay or stop childbearing but do not have access to contraceptives. Doing so would not only reduce overall population growth to more manageable levels faster, but also address child and maternal health indicators and help increase resilience in areas where climate change is expected to have negative impacts (a large portion of the region, unfortunately).

    The UN projections illustrate the sheer mathematical challenge that sub-Saharan African leaders face

    Because of the momentum of demographic change, much of the projected near-term growth in sub-Saharan Africa is fairly unavoidable. In the long term, however, reducing total fertility rate can bend the region’s trajectory towards the low-variant projection, which would mean the difference between a median age as high as 41 years old in 2100 (Sweden today) or as low as 30 (Tunisia in a year or two).

    In addition to allaying economic and development pressures, a more mature age structure can reduce the chances of youth-related civil conflict and political instability, such as what we’ve seen in the Middle East during the Arab Spring.

    Despite the inherent fuzziness of estimates that extend so far into the future, the UN projections illustrate the sheer mathematical challenge that sub-Saharan African leaders face in meeting developmental goals and highlight the importance of demographics to planning for the future.

    *It should be noted that Asia’s bell curve of mid-century growth and then decline by 2100 is masked using a simple start/end-date calculation. In 2053, when Asia’s population is projected to peak, sub-Saharan Africa would represent only 36 percent of the world’s total growth increment. The difference is that sub-Saharan Africa is projected to keep growing through the end of the century, while Asia is projected to peak and then decline.

    Sources: Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (Ethiopia), Population Reference Bureau, UN Population Division.

    Chart Credit: Data from the UN Population Division, arranged by Schuyler Null.

    Topics: Africa, demography, development, economics, family planning, featured, Malawi, Niger, Nigeria, population, Somalia, Tanzania, UN
    • http://www.blogger.com/profile/10648727700659999180 Schuyler Null

      Ed Carr has a good take on these projections on Open the Echo Chamber, where he takes a closer look at Ghana’s track in particular. He notes that he thinks the projections, even the lower ones, are overstated:

      “The only way Ghana’s projection can be made to work is to assume massive demographic momentum that I am not sure will play out in the face of expected declines in infant mortality and the increased cost burden for prospective parents supporting older family members for much longer than they do today.”

      It’s worth noting though that the UN has been criticized before for being too optimistic on sub-Saharan demographics, and it doesn’t appear that they’ve simply become more pessimistic across the board. As one of my colleagues at the Wilson Center noted to me, Pakistan’s projections, under the 2010 revision, are actually significantly lower than those made in 2008.

      There’s certainly a lot more to these numbers to explore, and the more country-specific the better. As Carr points out, we’re still waiting on more clarification on the UN’s underlying assumptions.

    • http://www.populationaction.org Elizabeth Leahy Madsen

      Thanks very much to Schuyler and ECSP for these in-depth posts on the projections. This year's revision, with the extension to 2100 and methodology changes, is especially interesting.

      One thing we've noticed at PAI is that under the constant-fertility variant, the world's total fertility rate (TFR) rises steadily from 2.5 in 2005-2010 to 4.4 children per woman by 2100. At first glance this seems counterintuitive, but the world’s fertility rate must be itself an aggregation of weighted country fertility rates. It seems that if fertility remained unchanged (a purely hypothetical exercise), the relative influence of high-fertility countries in the global fertility rate would increase over time as their populations grew quickly, and their share of world population increased.

      On the question of very dramatic changes between revisions in countries' projected populations and TFRs, Pakistan is a great example where both indicators have been revised downward (Pakistan's 2050 population is 18% lower in the new projections than it was in the last revision) without any new data that would support such a change in assumption. Although the new methodology incorporates a more individualized approach to historic country trends, the experiences of all other countries are still an important component of the model that projects fertility rates in the future. Once socioeconomic and political factors are taken into account, it doesn't seem realistic that fertility in Pakistan (for example) will decline at the same pace as other countries, but it would be difficult to incorporate these complex realities into a purely demographic model.

      Meanwhile, Nigeria is an example where new data (a 2008 DHS) has become available since the previous projections were devised, and in this case, the projections had to be revised significantly upward as a result. Nigeria’s population is 100 million higher in 2050 than it was in the previous revision (389 million vs. 289 million). The 2008 DHS showed a TFR of 5.7 (only a three percent decline since 1991), so the UN now estimates Nigeria’s fertility for 2005-2010 at 5.6, compared to 5.3 in the previous revision.

      Regarding the 35 million women (in sub-Saharan Africa) who want to avoid pregnancy, I wanted to clarify whether you’re certain that they do not have access to contraception or whether this figure is a measure of unmet need for contraception. Unmet need is often interpreted as indicating a lack of access, but surveys consistently show that lack of knowledge of where to obtain family planning and inability to afford contraceptives are very small fractions within the reasons that women are not using these services. Ensuring universal access to family planning is a critical goal, but will also require tackling some of the deep-seated barriers related to gender, culture and education.

      Finally, readers should know that although the "assumptions" page on the Population Division's website still says "coming soon," a technical white paper that explains the new projection model in great detail is available on their website in the methodology section: http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Documentation/EGM-RFTF_P16_Raftery.pdf

    • http://www.blogger.com/profile/10648727700659999180 Schuyler Null

      Thanks for the great comment Liz. The 35 million number I reference in the post is from PRB’s latest edition of Family Planning Saves Lives, and they define it simply as women that “want to delay or stop childbearing but are not using any contraceptive method,” which I suppose would also include cultural barriers – but not much clarification is given.

    • Pingback: National Intelligence Council Releases 'Global Trends 2030 ... - Breckland Security()

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