As the novel COVID-19 coronavirus swept the planet in early 2020, researchers scrambled to find effective treatments and vaccines. Within a year, there was a clarion call from heads of state, the World Health Organization (WHO) and other agencies to create an international “pandemic preparedness and response” treaty. WHO noted that COVID-19 offered “a stark and painful reminder that nobody is safe until everyone is safe” from zoonotic disease outbreaks.

The countries of the Western Sahel find themselves in the tightening grip of a set of mutually reinforcing crises. These include deepening seasonal food insecurity and surges of food-aid dependency, widening income inequalities, widespread childhood stunting, low levels of education attainment and pervasive unemployment, as well as acute political instability and a rapidly growing Islamist-led insurgency that has already displaced some 2.5 million people across the region. In our recent report, What Future for the Western Sahel? The Region’s Demography and Its Implications by 2045, (published by the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security), we argue that, unless the Sahelian states focus on reversing the underlying conditions that sustain high fertility—the cause of a persistently youthful and rapidly growing population—they will likely not be able to resolve these crises in the foreseeable future.  

The Arctic is ground zero for climate change. Warming in the region is occurring at three times the rate of the global average and September Arctic sea-ice is now declining at a rate of 13 percent per decade. However, the reverse is also true. The complex changes taking place in the Arctic are having profound effects on the rest of the world, and major economies are taking note. 

Pakistan is just one of 142 countries that has signed on to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), but is arguably the flagship partner among the group. BRI is an infrastructure investment project and aims to bring between $1 to $8 trillion dollars in development initiatives to global railways, highways, power plants, hydropower dams, and ports under the BRI umbrella. However, since the two governments formalized the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a framework of infrastructure connectivity, there have been strong concerns from the Pakistani public about the social and environmental costs of Chinese investment. 

“Most of the people living here are helpless,” said a woman in Jaffna, a district of northern Sri Lanka, nearly ten years after the country’s civil war ended. It was 2017, and I was conducting research with women in two villages in Jaffna. This woman’s sentiment reflected the challenges many in her community are still facing, including the ability to access health services. Through this research, my colleagues and I found that women’s access to healthcare was influenced by both their gender—particularly gender norms and gender roles—and household income. Better understanding of how gender and gender dynamics impact healthcare access will be essential to improving their lives. 

Gender issues, climate change, and security problems are interconnected in complex and powerful ways. Unfortunately, some of these connections have not received enough attention from scholars, policy analysts, and policymakers. This has serious, real-world implications for the promotion of gender equality, the mitigation of climate change, and the advancement of peace and security—three priorities that everyone should care about.  

Human rights have been central to the family planning movement for well over half a century, although family planning programs have not always lived up to the human rights commitments that governments publicly subscribe to. The right of couples to control their fertility was first codified in the 1968 Tehran Declaration, which noted that:

“Parents have a basic human right to determine freely and responsibly the number and spacing of their children.”

Some people falsely believe that the Afghanistan takeover by the Taliban during a drought increases the risk of violence over shared waters such as the Helmand and Kabul Rivers. Violent clashes over scarce resources have been predicted as “likely,” or even “certain” for 35 years, and despite such “water wars” never having happened, hypotheses about them keep cropping up around conflict-affected regions such as the Middle East and South Asia. In reality, conflicts are multidimensional with social, political, economic, and ecological drivers producing conflicts through their complex interrelations. Because of these multidimensional conflict drivers, the water war message is wrong-headed and needlessly scaremongering.