As Russia’s war in Ukraine continues and nations are returning to behaviors best explained by realism, we are wrestling with these trends’ longer-term implications on water diplomacy. States are becoming inward-looking and prioritizing national sovereignty. Debates about water and climate are resurfacing, and we should better understand how hard power and inward-looking approaches can impact water diplomacy and cooperation. To inform policymakers about power sensitivities and power games played in diplomacy, water diplomats must rethink the future of water security and peace. They should reexamine leadership styles, cultural sensitivities, and knowledge exchange from the lens of realism.

From climate change to COVID-19 and the war in Ukraine, the world is a landscape of increasing instability. Book-ending the Top 5 posts of June are two articles that explore different aspects of these converging risks. In the top post for June, Steven Gale and Mat Burrows write that globally, younger generations are becoming increasingly disengaged and discontent with their democratic governments, civil society, and institutions. Youth disillusionment is not a result of ignorance to current affairs, but rather a lack of faith in democratic institutions to address today’s most pressing global issues. Tackling youth disillusionment, suggest Gale and Burrows, begins with examining youth engagement trends and placing it at the top of the agenda.

The Sahel region of Africa is a semi-arid, arc-shaped landmass that stretches 3,860 kilometres from Senegal across portions of Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria, Chad, and even Sudan. It is also the most neglected and conflict-ridden part of the planet, according to the Norwegian Refugee Council.

Last month, as global leaders met in Lisbon for the UN Oceans Conference, President Biden signed a National Security Memorandum to address the challenge of illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing. This event is a promising sign that the U.S. and other governments are accelerating the response to the threat that IUU fishing poses—not just to the environment, the economy and human rights, but also to global peace and security.

As climate change worsens, the once-unimaginable power to use technology to cool the planet—a method known as “solar geoengineering”—has quietly entered the realm of possibility. Yet the prospect of developing such planet-altering technologies has launched an intense debate: Can this be achieved responsibly? Should it be attempted at all?

In April 2021, the Biden administration announced a new greenhouse gas emissions reduction target for the United States. In the accompanying “nationally determined contribution” submitted to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the administration highlighted the interplay between national and subnational policy in driving climate progress. The document promised that federal action will “[build] upon and [benefit] from a long history of leadership on climate ambition and innovation from state, local, and tribal governments.”

My latest book—States and Nature: The Effects of Climate Change on Security (Cambridge University Press)—has been more than two decades in the making. And as I reflect on that journey, I see significant parallels between my own trajectory and the larger efforts to define and refine thinking about climate security.

The harm that comes to the environment during armed conflict is often permanent, yet the lack of advocates to fight for its protection as they happen creates a deafening stillness. Indeed, this state of affairs has led to the environment to be seen as the “silent victim of war.” Vietnam, Kuwait, Syria, Afghanistan, Ukraine, and several more nations have been permanently damaged due to the destruction of the environment during armed conflict which can persist long after hostilities have ceased.