Showing posts from category conflict.
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Niger Delta Militants Escalate Attacks, Days After Government Establishes Ministry to Aid Delta’s Development
›September 19, 2008 // By Rachel WeisshaarNiger Delta militants destroyed Royal Dutch Shell’s Orubiri flow station on Tuesday and blew up a major oil pipeline near Rumuekpe on Wednesday, according to statements from the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), the main insurgent group. On Monday, militants attacked other Shell oil facilities, killing a guard and forcing nearly 100 workers to evacuate. Clashes between the militants—who demand a larger share of the oil revenue and greater political autonomy for Niger Delta residents—and the Nigerian army have reduced the country’s crude oil output by more than 20 percent since 2006. The conflict is “perhaps the most significant, most volatile, and potentially dangerous in that part of the world,” says Wilson Center Africa Program Director Howard Wolpe, who is part of a working group formed to advise policymakers on the issue.
On Wednesday, MEND announced it was broadening the scope of its land attacks beyond Rivers state, the heart of the Niger Delta, and would also seek to target offshore oil rigs. On September 14, MEND declared an all-out war on the Nigerian government for the first time—only three days after its declaration of a cease-fire. The cease-fire came in response to the Nigerian government’s announcement of the creation of a new ministry to accelerate infrastructure development, job creation, and environmental cleanup in the impoverished region.Perhaps the declaration of both cease-fire and war within the space of three days is not so surprising, given the disagreement among Niger Delta leaders over the new ministry. In an online statement, MEND said,
The people of the region should receive this latest dish with apprehension and not allow the over five decades of starvation to rule our emotions as this is not the first time such ‘palatable’ offers have been served to the region from the late 50’s to date. Creating a ‘Ministry’ is not the coming of the much awaited messiah. Nigeria has in existence, ministries over 40 years old which have not positively impacted on the people. It will be yet another avenue for corruption and political favoritism.
Yet People’s Democratic Party Chief Okotie-Eboh had a different take: “It is a very good measure and it shows the sincerity of President Yar’Adua to resolving the Niger Delta crisis. We should give him a chance. This ministry will get allocations like other ministries to tackle the problems of the Niger Delta.”
Although views on the new ministry vary widely, all agree that the Niger Delta faces several grave security, economic, and environmental threats. For instance, an International Crisis Group report recently concluded that one “major issue that has to be dealt with in the context of reconciliation [between the Ogoni people and Shell] is environmental clean-up. No significant study has been conducted to determine reliably the precise impact of oil industry-induced environmental degradation on human livelihoods in the area, but there are indications of severe damage.”
Yet the Delta must also contend with the longer-term implications of its demographic challenge. Forty-five percent of Nigeria’s population is younger than 15, which amounts to a serious youth bulge. The government’s chronic inability to provide these young people with education, health care, and jobs is likely contributing to instability in the Delta.
Photo: MEND fighters and hostages. Courtesy of Dulue Mbachu and ISN Security Watch. -
New Video “Water Wars or Water Woes?” Unveils Surprising Truths About Water, Conflict
›September 18, 2008 // By Wilson Center StaffIn the new video “Water Wars or Water Woes? Water Management as Conflict Management,” Environmental Change and Security Program (ECSP) Director Geoff Dabelko explains that although newspapers and politicians constantly warn of impending “water wars,” water rarely leads to interstate violence. By focusing on “water wars” – which evidence shows are extremely rare – we “are missing a lot of what is important around conflict management around water,” argues Dabelko.
According to Dabelko, cooperative water management can also help resolve conflicts caused by unrelated problems, such as those between India and Pakistan or Israel and Palestine. “You’ve got to go through it to get out of the conflict and support a sustainable peace,” he says.
“Water Wars or Water Woes?” is the newest addition to ECSP’s YouTube channel, which was launched earlier this summer with “Population, Health, and Environment: Exploring the Connections,” which offers a lively, brief, and accessible explanation of population, health, and environment (PHE) connections, with examples and photos from successful programs in the Philippines. -
PODCAST – Virunga National Park and Conflict in the DRC
›September 11, 2008 // By Geoffrey D. Dabelko“The resource base is a point of contact for local residents, refugees, rebel groups, park rangers, [and the] military as they struggle to survive,” says Richard Matthew of the University of California, Irvine, in this podcast interview, describing the significance of Virunga National Park to the diverse collection of actors in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. Matthew cites a fundamental tension between the needs of the park—which is home to some of the few remaining mountain gorillas in the world—and the desperate humanitarian needs of the people living in and around it. On a recent assessment trip to the area for the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), Matthew and his colleagues met with many of these groups to help find ways to reduce pressure on the park’s natural resources, while recognizing they are key to the livelihoods of millions of needy people in the region.I also asked Matthew to highlight some of the human security topics he and his colleagues pursue at the Center for Unconventional Security Affairs at UC Irvine. One such topic is microfinance. “Microfinance lending rarely takes into consideration the environmental impact and conflict-inducing impacts,” says Matthew. He and his colleagues are convening practitioners and conducting research on practical ways to “green” and reduce the conflict-generating impacts of this increasingly popular development strategy.
I conducted this interview in a noisy UN cafeteria in New York City. We were both in town to meet with David Jensen and colleagues from UNEP’s Disasters and Conflicts Programme and the UN Peacebuilding Commission. Expect a podcast and article soon from Jensen on the New Security Beat and in the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Environmental Change and Security Program Report, respectively.
Photo: A charcoal checkpoint in Virunga National Park. Courtesy of Richard Matthew. -
Somalia Battered by Drought, Food Shortages, Worsening Violence
›September 5, 2008 // By Will Rogers“The humanitarian nightmare in Somalia is the result of a lethal cocktail of factors,” writes Ken Menkhaus in a recent ENOUGH strategy paper, Somalia: A Country in Peril, a Policy Nightmare,” launched this week at the Wilson Center (video). Menkhaus was joined by Chris Albin-Lackey, a senior researcher at Human Rights Watch, and Harun M. Hassan, a Somali journalist and writer based in Washington, DC, for a discussion of the political and humanitarian situation in Somalia, which is ranked first on the 2008 Failed States Index.
The country has been plagued by “18 years of state collapse, failed peace talks, violent lawlessness and warlordism, internal displacement and refugee flows, chronic underdevelopment, intermittent famine, piracy, regional proxy wars, and Islamic extremism,” writes Menkhaus. Over the past 18 months, severe drought and increased attacks against relief agencies have left 3.2 million Somalis in dire need of humanitarian assistance. Two-thirds of Mogadishu’s population—700,000 people—has fled the city for Somalia’s harsh countryside, where they lack access to food, clean water, basic health care, livelihoods, and support networks.
Fighting between the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), Ethiopian troops, and regional militias has exacerbated food shortages, as TFG and Ethiopian troops target local markets, including the Bakaara market in Mogadishu, in retaliation for militia attacks. With drought “killing off livestock and reducing harvests in farming areas” and the economy crippled by violence and an outbreak of counterfeiting, food prices have skyrocketed.
Although Menkhaus rightly mentions a few of the situation’s environmental aspects, such as the drought’s role in the food crisis, he neglects the role population growth has played. The 2008 Failed States Index ranked Somalia as the state with the most demographic pressure – a significant indicator of state instability – (tied with Bangladesh). According to the Population Reference Bureau, Somalia has a total fertility rate of 6.7 children per woman and an annual rate of natural increase of 2.7 percent. With 45 percent of the population under 15, Somalia’s youth bulge increases the likelihood of continued violence; in addition, if Somalia ever does find peace and stability, its government will be hard-pressed to meet the needs of all its citizens for jobs, health care, and education.
Humanitarian agencies in Somalia have attempted to provide relief, but they face rampant extortion, corruption, and intimidation. According to Menkhaus, “uncontrolled and predatory TFG security forces, along with opportunistic criminal gangs, have erected over 400 militia roadblocks (each of which demands as much as $500 per truck to pass).” In addition, since May 2008, jihadist cells in Mogadishu operating under al-Shabaab, “a hardline military faction of the Islamist movement,” have stepped up attacks against relief workers and are assassinating “any and all Somalis working for western aid agencies or collaborating with U.N. and Western NGOs.”
Somali piracy has made humanitarian shipments to sea ports a treacherous task. According to Albin-Lackey, Somalia’s second-largest port, Kismaayo, fell to al-Shabaab militants last week after weeks of fighting between the Islamic group and TFG security forces, cutting off a crucial delivery point for humanitarian shipments. According to Menkhaus, with human insecurity worsening, Somalis who would not otherwise support fundamentalism will become more vulnerable to recruitment from criminal gangs and terrorist cells, including al-Qaeda. And although the Djibouti Accord was signed last month between the TFG and a faction of the opposition Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia, experts are pessimistic that it will do anything to end the violence.
Photo: Internally displaced people (IDPs) flee the escalating violence in Mogadishu for IDP camps on the outskirts of the city, where newcomers build their own makeshift shelters. Courtesy of Abdurrahman Warsameh and ISN Security Watch. -
Weekly Reading
›“African and global leaders must promote better integration of environment and health sectors and sustain more effective coordination across the continent,” argues an op-ed in The Lancet addressing the recent meeting of African health and environment ministers.Strengthening Land Tenure and Property Rights in Angola evaluates a U.S. Agency for International Development-funded project to bolster the land tenure and property rights of Angolans living in peri-urban and rural areas.
According to an article in the Christian Science Monitor, rebel groups in the
The Sierra Leone Integrated Diamond Management Program, which “was designed to improve local incentives for clean diamond management, enable local communities to benefit from the diamond resource, and to assist the Government of Sierra Leone (GOSL) in its effort to manage this critical resource,” has achieved considerable success over a short time period, according to a final report on the program.
The 2007 Liberia Demographic and Health Survey, available in full online, covers population; family planning; fertility; child health, mortality, and nutrition; maternal health, mortality, and nutrition; malaria, HIV/AIDS, and other diseases; gender-based violence; and a variety of other topics.
The
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UN Environment Programme to Conduct Post-Conflict Assessment in Rwanda
›August 27, 2008 // By Sonia SchmanskiAlthough it has been 14 years since violence devastated Rwanda, the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) is now preparing to conduct a Post-Conflict Assessment (PCA) of the country. As Rwanda Project Coordinator Hassan Partow explained, “UNEP does not initiate environmental assessment in any country, it only comes in when invited,” and Rwanda only recently requested that a PCA be conducted (see full list of PCAs here).
In a May 2004 presentation at the Wilson Center, Pekka Haavisto, former chairman of UNEP’s Post-Conflict Assessment Unit (PCAU)—now called the Disasters and Conflicts Programme and headed by David Jensen—remarked that “the post-conflict situation is a unique opportunity to create something new.” Just as environmental issues can lead to conflicts, they can also hamper efforts to create lasting peace following conflict, making PCAs invaluable tools in rebuilding nations following conflict. Common post-conflict environmental challenges include hazardous waste, radioactive materials, deforestation, chemical fires, overcrowded refugee camps, and contaminated water supplies. PCAs assess these challenges and offer recommendations for addressing them.
The environment can also provide a platform for dialogue and cooperation, said Haavisto, citing the case of the Palestinian Territories, where water has long been a nexus of tension and where PCAU has worked since 2001. Israeli and Palestinian officials both support PCAU’s operations in the region, where it brokered an agreement on future environmental cooperation and is working toward reestablishing the Joint Environmental Expert Committee to coordinate sustainable development in the area. Haavisto also noted that UNEP’s PCA work in Iraq following the Gulf War resulted in the first official meeting between Iraq and Iran in nearly 30 years.
The 2007 Sudan PCA cautions that “Sudan is unlikely to see a lasting peace unless widespread and rapidly accelerating environmental degradation is urgently addressed.” The PCA underscored how environmental stresses—including desertification, land degradation, and decreasing rainfall—have contributed to economic desperation, which has been a key instigator of the violence plaguing the region. “It is clear,” said UNEP Executive Director Achim Steiner, that “central to keeping the peace will be the way in which Sudan’s environment is rehabilitated and managed.” Sudan’s tragedy, he said, highlights “how issues such as uncontrolled depletion of natural resources like soils and forests allied to impacts like climate change can destabilize communities, even entire nations.” Yet promisingly, Sudan’s government recently established an environmental ministry, demonstrating how PCAs can spur governments to devote resources to environmental concerns by showing that they are integrally related to economic, health, and security issues.
Though PCAU has completed 18 PCAs since 1995 and has aided in the reconstruction of many countries, Haavisto acknowledged continuing difficulties in persuading governments to prioritize the environment. It has been an ongoing challenge, he said, to “convince different stakeholders that the environment is an important issue that needs to be dealt with immediately.” Yet as the above examples demonstrate, UNEP has achieved considerable accomplishments despite these difficulties. -
Biofuels: Catalyzing Development or Excluding the Poor?
›August 25, 2008 // By Wilson Center StaffThe International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) recently issued Fuelling exclusion? The biofuels boom and poor people’s access to land, a report that examines how the biofuels boom is likely to affect access to land. “Policy and market incentives to turn land over to biofuels production will tend to raise land values. While in some cases this could give new opportunities to poor farmers, it could also provide grounds for displacement of poorer people from land,” explain the authors. They conclude that “biofuels are not necessarily bad news for small-scale farmers and land users” but that this depends on the “security of land tenure.”
The Brazilian experience with biofuels and land tenure deserves further attention. Traditionally, land tenure has been fairly insecure in Brazil, as it is difficult for the federal government to exert its authority over the nation’s periphery.
The authors cite evidence that large-scale Brazilian soybean and sugarcane outfits have concentrated their land holdings at the expense of small-scale farmers. These findings are consistent with Brazil’s long-term trend of acreage concentration, which has diminished the participation of small-scale farmers in the country’s agro-industry. Since smaller family farms tend to employ more workers than more-efficient large-scale producers, acreage concentration may increase inequality in Brazil and further strain the provision of public goods and services in urban areas, where displaced farmers tend to migrate. Given the recent surge in biofuel production, this trend is likely to continue.
Although the report itself is fairly neutral, some of the specific claims the authors make regarding biofuels, land concentration, and violence in Brazil are undermined by weak supporting evidence. The report’s section on violence and land concentration in Brazil cites Van Gelder and Dros’ (2006) description of a 2004 labor inspection raid that “freed an unknown number of slaves” who worked in soy fields. Yet Van Gelder and Dros lack a citation for this event and provide no information regarding whether or not these soy fields were being used to produce biodiesel. We also don’t know whether this soy farm was on newly acquired land (i.e., we don’t know if it relates to the expansion of biofuel production). Slave labor exists in Brazil and is a serious problem, but it is not identical to the violent land conflicts generated by the expansion of biofuel production—the subject of this report.
Moreover, the authors of Fuelling exclusion? cite another source regarding land concentration and violence—Noronha et al. (2006)—that seems a bit questionable. A rural exodus from certain parts of Brazil is well-documented, but Noronha et al. try to argue that biofuel expansion has driven this migration, relying on macrodata showing increasing urbanization and decreasing rural populations. There is certainly some overlap between increases in biofuel production and this internal migration, but these data are not sufficient to substantiate a causal relationship. Even more troubling is that Noronha et al. maintain that over a 12-year period, there were 16 assassinations linked to the biofuels industry, citing an op-ed written by a union leader as their source. Yet the op-ed only cites the occurrence of 13 deaths—and not by assassination, but from illnesses possibly related to working in the fields. It’s not that there haven’t been deaths associated with the biofuels industry, it’s just that the sources cited by the authors of Fuelling exclusion? don’t prove as much.
There are real concerns about the social consequences of increased ethanol production in Brazil, particularly for the workers who harvest sugarcane by hand. Nevertheless, ethanol production has given Brazil a unique degree of energy independence and economic vitality. To the extent that this vitality is responsible for Brazil’s ability to (thus far) weather the latest international economic storm, it is possible to argue that it is at least indirectly responsible for the nation’s economic stability and the recent rise of the middle class. Yet until the government uses this stability to provide better land security for its rural population, the benefits of biofuels are likely to continue to accrue mainly to Brazil’s middle and upper classes.
By Brazil Institute Program Assistant Alan Wright and Brazil Institute Intern Matthew Layton.
Photo: Sugarcane plantation near Capixaba in Acre, Brazil. Courtesy of Flickr user visionshare. -
Update: Conflict in Ossetia
›August 13, 2008 // By Daniel GleickThe New York Times reports that Russian President Dmitri A. Medvedev has “ordered a halt to his country’s military operation in Georgia”; however, “he did not say that troops were pulling out and he insisted that Russian forces were still authorized to fire on enemies in South Ossetia.” Despite the ceasefire, a New York Times reporter said bombing continued.
As posted last week in the New Security Beat, the conflict in Ossetia has significant natural resources elements, as the region is rich in timber, manganese, iron ore, and copper and coal deposits. In a Foreign Affairs article last winter (which to a large extent predicted the current conflict), Nixon Center President Dimitri K. Simes pointed out that high energy prices have granted Russia newfound economic and political independence: “Energy exports finance about 30 percent of the Kremlin’s budget”—and this was at $61 per barrel.
By positioning itself as the major energy supplier to Europe, Russia is attempting to regain much of its sphere of influence. However, Georgia maintains oil and gas pipelines to Europe that offer alternatives to the Russian supplies. Some of these, such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, were built at the strong urging of the United States.
Reuters reports that Georgia “accused Russia of bombing its fuel lines on Tuesday.” However, while British Petroleum “has closed two oil and gas pipelines [including BTC] running from its Caspian Sea fields through Georgia,” according to inspections “neither has been damaged by recent fighting in the country.”
The BTC pipeline is “the only major conduit for Central Asian resources not under Russian control,” notes The Telegraph, which quotes the Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili on Russia’s motivation: “They need control of energy routes.”
I also asked Matthew to highlight some of the human security topics he and his colleagues pursue at the 
“The humanitarian nightmare in Somalia is the result of a 
The International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) recently issued 
