Not All Water Cooperation Is Pretty

Guest Contributor

Not All Water Cooperation Is Pretty

June 4, 2008 By Mark Zeitoun

As Karin Bencala and Geoff Dabelko point out in the current issue of Columbia University’s Journal of International Affairs, transboundary rivers and aquifers all over the world can, and do, provide opportunities to bring riparian parties together. We can identify a degree of cooperation in the management of most of the transboundary water resources in Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa. But now is the time to stop the pendulum from swinging too far towards mistaken notions of “water peace.” Tensions linger on the Tigris and simmer on the Jordan. The Nile is allocated in a remarkably inequitable and unsustainable manner, as are many of the rivers falling in all directions off the Tibetan plateau. We must continue to question regimes that preserve inequity, treaties that are ineffective “paper tigers” (Bernauer 2003, p. 547), and organisations designed chiefly as sinks for lending and donor agencies. We will be doing the world no great service if our gaze shifts to under-qualified examples of cooperation and away from the root causes of water conflict.

We should be wary of applying the “cooperation” label to transboundary interactions where asymmetric cooperation merely poisons relations and prolongs unfair arrangements. Cooperation has many faces, and not all of them are pretty. The 1994 Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty is regularly cited as a model of cooperation, for example, yet as Itay Fischhendler (2008) (subscription required) has shown, the ambiguity built into the agreement favours the more powerful (Israeli) side. In private conversations, Jordanian officials concede frustration that the agreement they signed fell far short of guaranteeing Jordan an equitable share of the waters. Last month, the Economist highlighted several other cases of such asymmetric water cooperation.

Recent efforts by Friends of the Earth Middle East (FOEME) demonstrate cooperation of a completely different nature. FOEME’s Good Water Neighbors project brings together mayors from Jordanian, Palestinian, and Israeli towns on the Jordan River in an effort to improve its quality. The project, like the organisation itself, represents all sides in equal measure. This equitable cooperation should be the standard analysts and policymakers shoot for.

We must be careful not to divorce small-scale cooperation from the broader water conflict within which it takes place, however. At the state level, the distribution of transboundary freshwater between Israel and the Palestinian territories remains an inequitable 90-10 split. The Israeli-Palestinian Joint Water Committee (JWC) established following the 1995 Oslo II interim agreement gives the Israeli side an effective veto over even basic rainwater catchment projects (for instance, in the southern West Bank). Multiple USAID, European, and UN development projects remain stalled because they have not cleared the JWC’s triple hurdle requiring that all water-related projects obtain Israeli technical (fine), political (?) and military (!) approval. Jan Selby (2003) (subscription required) insists this is not cooperation, but “domination dressed up as cooperation.”

While asymmetric, dominative, strategic, self-interested, and token cooperation all fall short of violent conflict, we should bear in mind that the tensions relating to the uglier faces of cooperation do not disappear with time. At the very least, treaties must be structured more equitably, in accordance with the basic water-sharing principles of international water law. They should also include re-visiting clauses, to modify the agreement when changes in politics or climate present the people dependent on the waters with a different set of circumstances. The ongoing water negotiations between Israel and Palestine and the imminent negotiations between Israel and Syria make understanding water cooperation much more than an academic indulgence. We must all push where we can to get it right.

Mark Zeitoun is a fellow at the London School of Economics’ Centre for Environmental Policy and Governance and heads the London School of Economics/King’s College London London Water Research Group.

Topics: conflict, cooperation, foreign policy, Guest Contributor, water
- http://gsionline.csis.org Rachel Posner
  
  Mark, you raise an excellent point. Transboundary water cooperation is not always pretty. But given the examples you’ve cited, this begs the question: Is it the *international* nature of the interaction that brings the power asymmetry, or is it the inherent conflict over a finite resource, or other factors?
  
  A curious example is the transboundary water ‘cooperation’ between a number of states in the American West. Water from the Colorado River is peacefully diverted for use in Arizona, California, and Nevada, but tensions are high. Some communities in the upper basin argue that they can’t spare the water any longer. Although the compacts between these states are decades old, I am still curious to know how water apportionment decisions are made within the United States. Is the decision-making process for allocation of the Colorado River at all similar (at least below the surface) to that of the Nile?
  
  With rising water stress across the country, the U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI) launched an initiative in 2004 entitled “Water 2025” to prevent water conflicts in the U.S. in the years ahead. An interesting map is available on the “Water 2025” website, showing hotspots for potential water conflict (http://www.usbr.gov/water2025/supply.html).
  
  According to DOI, “By working with irrigation and water districts, Western States, Tribes, and other local entities to develop innovative on-the-ground solutions to water supply problems, competing interests can be brought together to find collaborative, local solutions for the future.” (http://www.usbr.gov/water2025/index.html) But can cases of asymmetric cooperation be found here?
  
  Thank you, Mark, for stimulating this thought-provoking discussion!
- http://www.blogger.com/profile/18337694112852162181 Geoff Dabelko
  
  Thanks Mark for this post. It concisely captures some of the cogent points you made earlier this spring in friendly debate with Oregon State’s Aaron Wolf at the International Studies Association meeting in San Francisco. My colleague Meaghan Parker did a quick write-up on new water conflict, and cooperation research at ISA which includes links to papers and audio of presentations by CIESIN’s Marc Levy, the Pacific Institute’s Peter Gleick, and Wolf.
- Harald Frederiksen
  
  Mark Zeitoun: ‘Not All Water Cooperation is Pretty’ is excellent.
  
  Seeking a fair resolution in conflicts among militarily unequal riparians parallels the futility of fighting windmills. As we discussed, Aron Wolf’s notion of equating ‘no shooting’ water conflicts to peaceful cooperation is a theme found in much that is written on the subject and in papers at the innumerable conferences and workshops. These distracting efforts don’t elevate ones confidence in many political leaders and ‘experts’ engaged in the water field.
  
  A paper at a UNESCO conference in Valencia (The “World Water Crisis: Ramifications of Politics Trumping Basic Responsibilities of the International Community”, (2003) Water Resources Development, Carfax Pub.) cited several examples, where the powerful are taking what they want from the powerless while the international community watches in ilence. Power politics inevitably governs most international water decisions. This continues even after many decades of deliberations among international legal and political specialists to craft international principles and laws. The latest is the UN’s “Law of International Water Courses –“.
  
  It is a situation similar in every respect to the
  nuclear non-proliferation and climate change treaties. Except on the subject of international water conflicts, the UN is crippled and displays no interest — or does even one leader of any of the ten most powerful countries,
  
  For it will take nothing less than the combined
  and explicit action by key country leaders. A paper, “Water: Israeli Strategy and the Implications for Peace and the Viability of Palestine” (Frederiksen Middle East Policy journal vol,X no. 4) discussed the Community’s role and responsibilities in that conflict with the 1947 passage of UN Resolution 181. Subsequent Middle East Policy papers have suggested measures for the Community to address this explosive situation that is at the heart of the most volatile disputes in the world.
  
  Climate change will only multiply the conflicts and the resulting human tragedy fostered by the precedents set by the silent community — unless a leader appears soon.
  
  Harald Frederiksen
  3967 Shasta View Street
  Eugene, OR 97405
  541-3345-2130
  haralddf@comcast.net.
- http://www.blogger.com/profile/10078294466325777756 Mark
  
  Some thoughts about Rachel’s question about how power affects water allocations at the sub-national level (western US) and international level (Nile).
  
  Hi Rachel
  
  Clear differences between the sub-national and international contexts must be borne in mind. One of the more crucial differences is that at the sub-national level – at least in States where the judicial system functions with some objectivity – there is an overarching authority that can mediate claims. The so-called weaker stakeholders (states, native groups, farmers) stand a chance at achieving their interests if the Feds can help level the playing field. [That’s a big ‘if’, but another story.]
  
  There is no such authority in the relatively anarchic international system. The rule of the jungle ensures that those most able to adapt, or who ally themselves to the stronger, will survive. Outside funders may induce the riparian States on the Nile to cooperate by securing funds for water projects, but are unlikely to have any effect on the actual distribution of the river itself (and if cooperation that does develop between the parties does so on the most powerful State’s terms, it will be unsustainable asymmetric cooperation). Water-sharing ethics and International Water Law may substitute in the absence of an objective mediator. Let’s see how these play out during the ongoing negotiations at the Nile Basin Initiative for a framework agreement between the ten states.
  
  Mark Reisner was right when he emphasised that ‘water flows uphill to money’ (towards Los Angeles, in his case). Riparian actors with money and other forms of power can create unfair forms of ‘hydro-hegemony’ that are very difficult to shake off. The same States can also use their hegemonic position to lead the others to sustainable and equitable water use, as some would claim South Africa is doing on the Orange. Furthermore, when it comes to negotiating in the jungle, strong actors are not as all-powerful as we sometimes think, and the less-strong actors have many ways to conform to or confront their counterparts (Scott’s ‘weapons of the weak’ and counter-hegemony theory). When we’re looking at distributional issues, it is always interesting to seek out the opinions and positions of the non-hegemonic players – lots to dig up, there.
  
  Hoping to generate some debate,
  
  Mark Zeitoun
  Centre for Environmental Policy and Governance, LSE
  
  [PS – on water conflict prediction, the power-interest-position theory of Frey and Naff remains a solid starting point.]
- http://www.blogger.com/profile/12871749575352820527 ECSP Staff
  
  “Dear Mark —
  
  I’m afraid that many of Reisner’s statements were more for effect than fact. The US federal and state judicial system plays the determinant roles in water settlements. Obviously, politics play a role at all levels of water resources management since the governing legislatures enact the laws. Money really doesn’t play a role as such (other that in elections) — but it sounds good.
  
  Essentially in all federal forms of government (USA, Canada, China, India —), the states / provinces have sovereignty over the land and water resources — not the federal government. The one exception, and this is pertains to all federal governments, regards treaties on international water-ways. Matters of international relations are the jurisdiction of the national government.
  
  One exception in the US relates to lands owned in the western US states by the federal government, but even in these cases, the states are effectively in control of the water resources. Indian tribes have a standing as independent ‘nations’ under federal laws today. They did not have that status during the earlier periods — just like tribal’s ‘rights’ during colonial days in the world.
  
  India brings interstate allocations up for review every fifty years. Thus the states’ investments (and those of their residents) are always at some risk since all rivers are over-developed already. Hence, the states in India have greatly overbuilt (25 to 50%) their irrigation schemes in order to argue their position at these federal tribunal hearings every fifty years. And of course the affected farmers continue with rain fed cropping among the idle infrastructure facilities.
  
  The resolution of rights to interstate water bodies in the US is through negotiations among the riparian states followed by confirming hearings in the federal judicial system and ratification by the US Congress and state legislatures.
  
  The water rights systems in the Western US states may be summed up as ‘the first to develop valid uses, the first in priority of rights to that portion of the source of the water’. California developed its agriculture and urban demands earlier that the other riparians to the ‘lower reaches of the Colorado river.” This ‘rights’ form and their early development gave them an advantage in the negotiations.
  
  Regards — Harald”
  
  -Harald Frederiksen

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