The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) poses numerous challenges for the Nile river basin, but it also presents an opportunity for regional collaboration and shared prosperity, said Aaron Salzberg, Director of the Water Institute at the University of North Carolina and Wilson Center Global Fellow, at a recent event hosted by the University of North Carolina’s Center for Middle East and Islamic Studies.

Dams can be a double-edged sword, said Aaron Salzberg, a Wilson Center Global Fellow, Director of the Water Institute at the University of North Carolina, and former Special Coordinator for Water Resources for the U.S. Department of State. He spoke in a recent episode of Wilson NOW about the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, which will become Africa’s largest hydroelectric dam, once it’s fully operational.

Trouble is brewing on the Nile. For years, use of the river was mainly about the needs of Egypt, by far the largest and most powerful riparian country in the basin. But since the Arab Spring of 2011, the situation has changed considerably. Egypt’s troubles over the last decade have weakened its ability to project power southward, while upper riparian states—Ethiopia in particular—have enjoyed a period of economic growth and relative stability, which has led them to look at the great river as an important national resource. Tensions have come to a head since Ethiopia announced the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), construction of which is now almost complete. Once full, the resulting reservoir will be larger than the whole of Greater London. Much of the water it holds would have previously reached Sudan and Egypt largely unhindered.

A special type of tree could facilitate peacebuilding in the Sahel. A stretch of semi-arid land south of the Sahara that runs from the Red Sea to the Atlantic Ocean through 10 countries (Eritrea, Sudan, Chad, Niger, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Mali, Algeria, Mauritania, and Senegal). But the western subregion covering the Lake Chad area (the intersection of Chad, Cameroon, Nigeria, and Niger) and Liptako-Gourma (the tri-border zone of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger) in the Sahel has been the scene of a growing humanitarian crisis. Armed groups are terrorizing local populations. Rampant insecurity has forced 1 million people to flee their homes. People have been cut off from their livelihoods. Food insecurity is worsening. Casualties continue to mount. And climate change will likely exacerbate conditions, forcing more people to compete for depleted forest resources and land. More food shortages and instability will surely follow.

Rising tensions between Egypt and Ethiopia over construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) have led to speculation that there could be a war over water. When completed, the dam will be the largest in Africa. And it will give Ethiopia control over the Blue Nile River, a major source of Egypt’s water.

Scientists agree that many countries in tropical, subtropical, and arid regions should expect changes to water availability and supply from climate change. The U.S. intelligence community has likewise warned of water-driven challenges not only for countries directly affected by water changes, but indirectly to various U.S. national security interests. Perhaps not surprisingly then, the popular literature has been quite clear about prophesizing wars over water.

Forecasts of future climate conditions are fairly good, but forecasts of future socioeconomic conditions are another story. To get a sense of how climate change will impact society, many resort to simply layering future climate conditions on top of current socioeconomic conditions. That’s a mistake, write Wolfgang Lutz and Raya Muttarak in Nature Climate Change. “We see little value in the purely hypothetical exercise of assessing potential impacts of the future climate on a society that will not exist in the future.”

In a brief published by the Stanley Foundation, Cullen Hendrix explores how “the degradation and overexploitation of renewable sources…and unequal access to these resources” can make societies more or less susceptible to experiencing mass atrocities. Hendrix proposes that “demographic-environmental stress” is most likely to contribute to mass atrocities (genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity) in agricultural societies that have a high level of group identity-driven politics and economics, exclusionary political institutions, political actors that deprive certain groups, or when governments have low legitimacy.