Supply chain considerations in today’s globalized economy have expanded beyond minimizing costs. As Duncan Wood, Vice President for Strategy and New Initiatives and Senior Advisor to the Mexico Institute at the Wilson Center, noted at a recent panel hosted by the Environmental Change & Security Program as part of the Transatlantic Climate Bridge conference, issues ranging from environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) to national security and geopolitics, have transformed critical mineral supply chains into something that is now “inherently political.”

Ukraine and its people will feel the effects of the Russian invasion for years to come. More than 6 million refugees have left Ukraine, another 8 million Ukrainians are internally displaced. Among those most impacted are Ukraine’s women and girls, who have a greater chance of experiencing gender-based violence, exploitation, and trafficking. They also face escalated maternal and newborn mortality rates stemming from lack of services and diminished care, as well as injuries and trauma due to the ongoing conflict. Less visibly, Ukrainians are confronting severe emotional distress and trauma.

As Russia’s war in Ukraine continues and nations are returning to behaviors best explained by realism, we are wrestling with these trends’ longer-term implications on water diplomacy. States are becoming inward-looking and prioritizing national sovereignty. Debates about water and climate are resurfacing, and we should better understand how hard power and inward-looking approaches can impact water diplomacy and cooperation. To inform policymakers about power sensitivities and power games played in diplomacy, water diplomats must rethink the future of water security and peace. They should reexamine leadership styles, cultural sensitivities, and knowledge exchange from the lens of realism.

From climate change to COVID-19 and the war in Ukraine, the world is a landscape of increasing instability. Book-ending the Top 5 posts of June are two articles that explore different aspects of these converging risks. In the top post for June, Steven Gale and Mat Burrows write that globally, younger generations are becoming increasingly disengaged and discontent with their democratic governments, civil society, and institutions. Youth disillusionment is not a result of ignorance to current affairs, but rather a lack of faith in democratic institutions to address today’s most pressing global issues. Tackling youth disillusionment, suggest Gale and Burrows, begins with examining youth engagement trends and placing it at the top of the agenda.

The Sahel region of Africa is a semi-arid, arc-shaped landmass that stretches 3,860 kilometres from Senegal across portions of Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria, Chad, and even Sudan. It is also the most neglected and conflict-ridden part of the planet, according to the Norwegian Refugee Council.

Last month, as global leaders met in Lisbon for the UN Oceans Conference, President Biden signed a National Security Memorandum to address the challenge of illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing. This event is a promising sign that the U.S. and other governments are accelerating the response to the threat that IUU fishing poses—not just to the environment, the economy and human rights, but also to global peace and security.

As climate change worsens, the once-unimaginable power to use technology to cool the planet—a method known as “solar geoengineering”—has quietly entered the realm of possibility. Yet the prospect of developing such planet-altering technologies has launched an intense debate: Can this be achieved responsibly? Should it be attempted at all?

My latest book—States and Nature: The Effects of Climate Change on Security (Cambridge University Press)—has been more than two decades in the making. And as I reflect on that journey, I see significant parallels between my own trajectory and the larger efforts to define and refine thinking about climate security.