Lots of talk around Washington these days of the U.S. intelligence community preparing a National Intelligence Estimate on climate change. Gordon Mitchell at the University of Pittsburgh’s Security Sweep points out that the pending Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (S. 1538) includes specific language calling for the National Intelligence Council to conduct such an estimate. While the bill is in line for debate on the Senate floor, some of you aficionados might like a look at the full text. Section 321 reads:

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE.

(a) Requirement for National Intelligence Estimate-

(1) IN GENERAL- Except as provided in paragraph (2), not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to Congress a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on the anticipated geopolitical effects of global climate change and the implications of such effects on the national security of the United States.

(2) NOTICE REGARDING SUBMITTAL- If the Director of National Intelligence determines that the National Intelligence Estimate required by paragraph (1) cannot be submitted by the date specified in that paragraph, the Director shall notify Congress and provide–

(A) the reasons that the National Intelligence Estimate cannot be submitted by such date; and

(B) an anticipated date for the submittal of the National Intelligence Estimate.

(b) Content- The Director of National Intelligence shall prepare the National Intelligence Estimate required by this section using the mid-range projections of the fourth assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change–

(1) to assess the political, social, agricultural, and economic risks during the 30-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act posed by global climate change for countries or regions that are–

(A) of strategic economic or military importance to the United States and at risk of significant impact due to global climate change; or

(B) at significant risk of large-scale humanitarian suffering with cross-border implications as predicted on the basis of the assessments;

(2) to assess other risks posed by global climate change, including increased conflict over resources or between ethnic groups, within countries or transnationally, increased displacement or forced migrations of vulnerable populations due to inundation or other causes, increased food insecurity, and increased risks to human health from infectious disease;

(3) to assess the capabilities of the countries or regions described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (1) to respond to adverse impacts caused by global climate change; and

(4) to make recommendations for further assessments of security consequences of global climate change that would improve national security planning.

(c) Coordination- In preparing the National Intelligence Estimate under this section, the Director of National Intelligence shall consult with representatives of the scientific community, including atmospheric and climate studies, security studies, conflict studies, economic assessments, and environmental security studies, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Administrator of the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration, the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, the Secretary of Energy, and the Secretary of Agriculture, and, if appropriate, multilateral institutions and allies of the United States that have conducted significant research on global climate change.

(d) Assistance-

(1) AGENCIES OF THE UNITED STATES- In order to produce the National Intelligence Estimate required by subsection (a), the Director of National Intelligence may request any appropriate assistance from any agency, department, or other entity of the United State Government and such agency, department, or other entity shall provide the assistance requested.

(2) OTHER ENTITIES- In order to produce the National Intelligence Estimate required by subsection (a), the Director of National Intelligence may request any appropriate assistance from any other person or entity.

(3) REIMBURSEMENT- The Director of National Intelligence is authorized to provide appropriate reimbursement to the head of an agency, department, or entity of the United States Government that provides support requested under paragraph (1) or any other person or entity that provides assistance requested under paragraph (2).

(4) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS- There are authorized to be appropriated to the Director of National Intelligence such sums as may be necessary to carry out this subsection.

(e) Form- The National Intelligence Estimate required by this section shall be submitted in unclassified form, to the extent consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, and include unclassified key judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate. The National Intelligence Estimate may include a classified annex.

(f) Duplication- If the Director of National Intelligence determines that a National Intelligence Estimate, or other formal, coordinated intelligence product that meets the procedural requirements of a National Intelligence Estimate, has been prepared that includes the content required by subsection (b) prior to the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall not be required to produce the National Intelligence Estimate required by subsection (a).

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At a recent conference at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, PA, I had the chance to sit down with one of the most influential military voices on environmental security debates, Dr. Kent Hughes Butts. As both a professor of geography and a retired colonel in the U.S. Army, Dr. Butts has been at the center of the U.S. military’s efforts to grapple with the implications of environmental change. I asked Dr. Butts how he saw the field of environmental security (if we can call it a field) evolving over the last two decades.

They say that a good man is hard to find. But in some countries, the opposite is true: a good woman is hard to find—because it’s hard to find women at all. According to a recent article by the BBC, the Chinese city of Lianyungang has eight men for every five women. Ninety-nine cities in China have gender ratios as high as 125 (125 men for every 100 women, or a 5:4 ratio).

But China is not alone. India has a gender ratio of 113, and the ratio in Asia as a whole is 104.4. In the United States, by contrast, the rate is 97, meaning that there are more women than men.

Gender imbalances are caused by cultural and economic preferences for male children, which contribute to sex-selective abortion and female infanticide. Over 60 million girls are “missing” in Asia as a result of these practices.

Furthermore, some government policies may intensify these gender preferences. China’s one-child policy, for example, may cause concern among parents, particularly in rural areas, that having a female child endangers their family’s future. Government policies intended to combat skewed gender ratios, such as bans on prenatal ultrasounds for the purpose of determining the baby’s sex and bans on sex-selective abortion, have proven ineffective.

Unbalanced gender ratios have consequences that reach beyond just the mothers and children involved. According to Valerie Hudson, high gender ratios leave many men without prospects for marriage, which may mean these men have fewer incentives to contribute peacefully to society. The men with the slimmest prospects for marriage are likely to be unemployed, poor, and uneducated, so they are already at increased risk for violent behavior. Hudson cites statistical evidence showing links between high gender ratios and higher rates of violent crime, drug use, trafficking, and prostitution.

Hudson and co-author Andrea den Boer cover these links in greater detail in their book Bare Branches: The Security Implications of Asia’s Surplus Male Population. In the 11th issue of the Environmental Change and Security Report, Richard Cincotta takes issue with some of the statistical methods that Hudson and den Boer use. He argues that what is important is not nationwide gender ratios, but the number of “marriage-age men” (25-29 years old) and “marriage-age women” (20-24).

While there may be some debate over whether the relationship between gender ratios and violent behavior is a causal one, there is little doubt about what causes the gender imbalances in the first place. An end to preferences for female children will be beneficial not only to girls and women, but to societies as a whole.

Photo Credit: A subway in China, courtesy of flickr user 俊玮 戴.

A disorganized, inefficient foreign aid structure can wreak havoc on what the current administration refers to as “transformational diplomacy”—the attempt to build and nurture democratically elected governments. In our post-September 11^thworld, failed states (also labeled “precarious states” or “weak states”) have garnered increasing attention as targets for transformational diplomacy. For the U.S., ensuring sustainable and well-governed states depends partially on doling out foreign aid as collateral for reliable partnerships. But nations with limited internal capacity and extreme poverty levels teeter on the edge of uncertainty, and inefficient allocation of aid can further destabilize states that are already vulnerable to becoming havens for nefarious activity.

Current approaches to trade and aid often fail to stem poverty, promote stability, or prevent conflict in the developing world. According to Trade, Aid and Security: An agenda for peace and development, existing policies are poorly designed and benefit rich countries, denying developing nations access to vital financial markets. Lifting people out of poverty requires a secure environment and effective trade and aid policies can promote the preconditions for peace and stability. Oli Brown, a project manager and policy researcher at the International Institute for Sustainable Development and one of the editors of Trade, Aid and Security, discusses current development strategies and the conditions for wider political and economic stability.

General William E. Ward was recently chosen to lead AFRICOM, the new U.S. military command in Africa currently in its pre-implementation stage. If Ward and AFRICOM are to succeed in promoting peace and stability in Africa, the military must stop viewing security as consisting of conventional, state-to-state relationships and adopt a more flexible “human security” concept. This model views security as “freedom from want” and “freedom from fear,” and includes economic, food, health, personal, community, environmental, and political sub-components. Developing a robust environmental security engagement strategy would be one of the most constructive ways for AFRICOM to implement a human security approach.

The greatest challenge for this nascent command is expanding its tool bag beyond conventional military strategies to include programs that promote the health and security of Africans. Military planners are skilled at determining the number of brigade combat teams, battle carrier groups, and air wings needed for conventional security challenges. But security in Africa depends heavily on non-military factors that fall outside the traditional purview of the armed forces. For AFRICOM to be successful, it must approach security as a mutually beneficial proposition, not a zero-sum game. Most African governments view the Department of Defense’s attempt to adopt a more nuanced approach to security in Africa with guarded optimism. They would certainly welcome environmental partnerships with AFRICOM as a way to promote political and economic stability through sustainable ecological practices, according to discussions held with Amina Salum Ali, the African Union’s ambassador to the U.S.

One of the top security concerns of African leaders—and one that is little-appreciated in U.S. security circles—is the impact of environment on stability and security. The ongoing misery in Darfur, which is partially rooted in conflicts over land and water use, is one tragic example of this link. On a positive note, UN Environment Programme (UNEP) researchers recently discovered water there that may well prove to be a source of resolution. That said, numerous reports—such as the one by the CNA Corporation’s Military Advisory Board—indicate that climate change and environmental catastrophes will continue to be a source of instability in Africa. Unfortunately, the continent most affected by environmental shock is also the least capable of mitigating its effects. AFRICOM must develop an engagement strategy that works with host governments, international membership organizations, NGOs, and other U.S. governmental agencies to find solutions to Africa’s environmental challenges.

The first, and most obvious, advantage of an environmental security strategy is its potential to build nontraditional alliances. Numerous organizations, from UNEP to the World Wildlife Fund, are actively working in Africa in this arena. AFRICOM could benefit significantly from the years of on-the-ground experience that these groups possess. What remains uncertain is the willingness of these civilian organizations to partner with the new command.

A second advantage of an environmental security strategy is that it allows the U.S. military to engage constructively with host governments and regional economic communities. Using AFRICOM to train African militaries on emergency disaster response, for instance, encourages those militaries to work under the mandate of civilian authority and fosters long-term democratic governance.

The idea of environmental security as a military engagement strategy is not new. When General Anthony Zinni was head of Central Command in central Africa, he devoted an entire section to environmental engagement programs, establishing a strong track record of success. Given that environmental concerns are intertwined with a host of other pressing problems in Africa, a coherent environmental security strategy would pay dividends on multiple levels.

Shannon Beebe is a senior Africa analyst at the Department of the Army. The opinions expressed in this article are solely his own and do not reflect the positions of the Department of Defense or the Department of the Army.

Scholars, policy analysts, and even military officers are breaking down climate change’s impacts into what they hope are more manageable topics for examination. The migration that climate change could cause is one such topic. For instance, the Center for American Progress recently posted a piece entitled “Climate Refugees: Global Warming will Spur Migration.” The International Peace Academy analyzed “Climate Change and Conflict: The Migration Link” in a May 2007 Coping With Crisis working paper. Climate change-induced migration also figured prominently in the security perspective offered by the CNA Corporation’s Military Advisory Board in its “National Security and the Threat of Climate Change.”

The breadth and depth of statistics available on the WomanStats Project, a new online resource for statistics on women’s security, lends strength to the website’s claim that it is “the most comprehensive compilation of information on the status of women in the world.”