Wildlife trafficking is one of the most lucrative and destructive criminal enterprises in the world. Valued at more than $20 billion annually, these criminal networks impact more than 4,000 plant and animal species across 162 countries and territories. Yet for decades enforcement efforts focused narrowly on poachers, missing the broader criminal foundation that makes the trade resilient: the corrupt officials, armed non-state actors, and agile transnational networks.

A window into what we’re reading in the Stimson Center’s Environmental Security Program 

The Bolivian Cacao Farmers Taking on the Gold-Mining Industry (The Guardian) 

Cacao farmers in Bolivia’s Alto Beni and Palos Blancos municipalities successfully pushed for local mining bans in 2021, protecting their organic agroforestry land from the destructive gold rush sweeping the region. Gold prices are up over 64% since 2020—intensifying illegal and legal mining across Bolivia, driving deforestation, mercury poisoning, flooding, and encroachment into protected national parks. Communities near active mining zones report polluted rivers, declining fish populations, and mercury-related illnesses. 

This article was originally published on South Asian Voices, a publication of the Stimson Center.

“Do not give away Diego Garcia,” warned U.S. President Donald Trump on February 19, as the United Kingdom moved forward with plans to transfer sovereignty of the Chagos Archipelago to Mauritius. While the Chagos Archipelago has often been viewed through the prism of the sovereignty dispute between the United Kingdom and Mauritius, the islands today serve as a fulcrum for regional rivalries and great-power competition.

A window into what we’re reading at the Stimson Center’s Environmental Security Program

Rising Food Insecurity is Driving Instability (Foreign Affairs)

Since 2020, the number of people facing acute hunger and chronic food insecurity has increased 130% above existing levels. And supply is not the issue. At present, the world produces enough food to feed nearly 10 billion people, yet there are 720 million people who are food insecure and a further 319 million face acute hunger. Today’s hunger is driven instead by barriers to access.

The global energy transition is often framed as a balancing act between climate commitments on one hand, and sufficient energy and economic security on the other. That framing assumes the transition will mean less: less energy, less growth, and a steady decline in fossil fuel use. But this rhetoric is, as Ambassador Anthony Agotha put it at last month’s Berlin Climate Security Conference a “false choice.”

Launched in 2013, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has drawn wide global attention, with scholars and policymakers examining its geopolitical and economic implications. Much less explored, however, are the subnational impacts of BRI in participating countries. The China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), adopted as Pakistan’s flagship BRI project in 2015, offers a case in point.

A window into what we’re reading at the Stimson Center’s Environmental Security Program

The Mining Town Funding Congo’s Rebels and Tech Giants (Reuters)

In April 2024, the M23 rebel group seized control of Rubaya, a mining town that produces 15% of the world’s coltan—a critical mineral worth used in mobile phones, computers, and aerospace components. Rebels imposed a parallel administration in the town, and placed a 15% tax on mineral traders that generates $800,000 monthly from levies. Thousands of impoverished miners in the town, however, still work 12-hour shifts in dangerous conditions earning just $5.15 per day.

This article is adapted from “Rare Earths and Realpolitik: Kachin Control, Chinese Calculus, and the Future of Mediation in Myanmar,” written by Amara Thiha for the Stimson Center.

As global powers race to secure critical minerals, Myanmar’s rare earths have emerged as both prize and flashpoint. Last week, Reuters reported that the Trump administration has been privately reviewing competing proposals to access Myanmar’s heavy rare earth minerals, including potential engagement with Myanmar’s military junta and direct negotiation with the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), an ethnic armed group that now controls key extraction sites. Since the February 2021 military coup, rare earth mining has surged in northern Kachin State near the Chinese border, where the KIA has seized highly valuable rare earth mines and a critical corridor in the global supply chain. What began as a local insurgency has evolved into resource-backed diplomacy, drawing in China, India, and now the United States.