When floods struck the Kurdistan region of Iraq earlier this month, it was a deluge that demonstrated how fragmented governance and weak state capacity can transform climate hazards into humanitarian and security crises.

When floods struck the Kurdistan region of Iraq earlier this month, it was a deluge that demonstrated how fragmented governance and weak state capacity can transform climate hazards into humanitarian and security crises.

At least five people were killed, dozens were injured, and more than 2, 600 homes flooded within hours, primarily in Chamchamal in Sulaymaniyah province. Iraqi parliamentarians later estimated the damages at roughly $200 million. The catastrophe also destroyed over 200 fishing ponds and killed nearly 10,000 fish, wiping out both livelihoods and local food sources.

In the days following the flood, the absence of a coordinated public distribution system for aid fueled further tension. As people rushed to receive assistance, disputes escalated into violence. In one incident, gunfire directed at security forces tasked with organizing distribution efforts left one security officer killed and two others injured.

Yet none of these post-flood impacts were inevitable. What happened in Iraqi Kurdistan in mid-December was not simply the result of heavy rain. It was a consequence of political paralysis, hollowed-out institutions, and unequal service provision. Such a confluence of the absence of trusted state institutions, scarcity, and perceived inequality can quickly turn humanitarian response into a security challenge.

Chamchamal’s experience shows how climate hazards compound risks, especially where authority is divided and public institutions are under-resourced. What unfolded in the region was not an anomaly, but a predictable outcome of weak governance colliding with intensifying climate stress.  

Conquered By Divisions

Since an October 2024 regional election, the Kurdistan Region has been unable to form a unified and legitimate government. A prolonged deadlock between the two ruling parties—the KDP and the PUK—has weakened government ministries and stalled any decision-making. In practice, governance has fractured into partisan zones: Erbil and Duhok are administered largely by the KDP, while Sulaymaniyah, Chamchamal, and Halabja fall under the influence of the PUK.

This political fragmentation also has tangible consequences for climate vulnerability. Infrastructure investment, service delivery, and disaster preparedness frequently aligns with political boundaries, rather than meeting the needs of its population.

Chamchamal—which is located in the PUK-administered zone—has waited for decades for completion of the Chamchamal–Goptapa Water Project, which would supply drinking water to its residents from the Lower Zab River, which is just 30 kilometers away. The city’s mayor has reported that local authorities have sent 77 formal requests to the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) for cooperation. Each time, they have received assurances, but with no serious implementation following these responses.

In such an environment, coordinated climate adaptation and disaster preparedness become exceedingly difficult. Divided authority and blurred accountability mean that no institution assumes full responsibility for reducing climate risk.

Hollowed-Out Institutions on the Frontline

A long-standing neglect of basic urban services in Iraqi Kurdistan magnified the impact of December’s flood.

For instance, many neighborhoods in Chamchamal lack sewage systems entirely, while others depend on drainage channels clogged with garbage due to irregular waste collection. Municipal workers—many of whom are in their late forties or fifties—relate that they are employed on insecure contracts, and often are paid late and without guarantees. They earn roughly $250 a month to clean streets, remove trash, and maintain manholes across entire districts. When their wages go unpaid for months, they sometimes strike for days.

The broader public sector in the region faces even deeper instability. Over the past eleven years, public employees received full salaries in only 58 of 132 months. In 44 of the remaining months, they obtained only partial payments or saw deductions, and for 20 months, these salaries were not paid at all. Institutional capacity steadily erodes in such conditions.

Local officials describe the resource gap in stark terms. The head of Chamchamal’s municipality said his office receives “only eight million Iraqi dinars per month (equivalent to $6118) to provide services for a city of nearly a quarter million people. Local media sources observe that this is roughly 75 times less than the monthly budget allocated to towns such as Zakho in Duhok province.

The director of Roads and Maintenance also reported that his department has just one shovel to clear floodwater and maintain drainage channels, adding that repeated requests to the KRG for basic equipment over the past three years have gone unanswered. Thus, when heavy rain arrived, blocked drains and broken infrastructure allowed water to inundate homes and streets.

Unplanned Development, Sudden Disasters

Unregulated urban expansion has further increased vulnerability. On the outskirts of Chamchamal, particularly in Banimaqan, agricultural land has been converted rapidly into villa compounds and informal housing that lack roads, sewage networks, or stormwater systems. These new developments also disrupt natural watercourses, redirecting runoff toward older, densely populated neighborhoods downstream.

Despite clear meteorological warning signs, local residents reported receiving no alerts before the devastating December flood. No coordinated effort was made to clear drainage systems or prepare evacuation routes in preparation.

When the water rose as the rains arrived, rescues relied upon improvisation: neighbors used private vehicles to reach stranded families, while bystanders pulled children from windows. Civil defense and police units arrived late, or in insufficient numbers, constrained by limited resources and fragmented command structures. Luck—and not preparedness—prevented a higher death toll.

The Peril of Parties Standing In for the State

As damaging as the deluge was, the most telling indicator of governance failure emerged only after the flood. The first organized response to the catastrophe did not come from government ministries, but rather from party-affiliated charities. Three KDP-linked NGOs—the Barzani Charity Foundation, the Kurdistan Foundation, and the Rwanga Foundation—moved quickly to provide assistance to affected families.

While these organizations did deliver urgent relief, residents emphasized that charity could not replace governance. As one flood victim told local media: “We ask the prime minister to look at us the same way he looks at the people of Duhok and Zakho (in the KDP zone).” Standing in his flooded home, this man added that “while our houses are underwater, our water tanks are empty. We don’t even have clean water to wash or clean our homes.”

Kurdistan’s flood underscores a critical policy lesson: climate adaptation is inseparable from governance reform. Investments in early-warning systems, drainage infrastructure, and urban planning will fail without the existence of legitimate state authority, stable public financing, and inclusive service delivery.

Climate resilience cannot be built through non-state actors or charity alone. As extreme weather incidents increase and intensify, the Kurdistan Region faces a clear choice. Without institutional reform, future floods—whether in Iraqi Kurdistan or elsewhere—will continue to escalate into humanitarian and security crises. Strengthening governance is not only a political imperative; it is a prerequisite for climate security.