Showing posts from category youth.
-
Harnessing the Peace Potential of Youth in Post-Conflict Societies
›July 22, 2010 // By Marie HokensonIn many post-conflict societies throughout the world, young people must deal with poverty, exploitation, and neglect. It is perhaps not surprising then that many youth eventually find themselves embroiled in violence, either as perpetrators or victims of crime. However, often overlooked are young people’s current and potential future contributions to peace, since with the proper support, youth can prove instrumental in a society’s rebuilding process.
In her new book Youth in Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Agents of Change, Stephanie Schwarz examines the intersections between youth, war, and peace. These linkages were examined at a book launch and panel discussion held last week at the U.S. Institute of Peace.
According to Schwarz, youth are often ignored despite their potentially strong influence on society. Traditionally, children and adults—easier age cohorts to define—dominate the focus of aid programs and government outreach efforts in nations recovering from war, she said.
Yet in post-conflict environments, youth are highly vulnerable, since they often comprise a large portion of society, but have few opportunities available to lead a peaceful life. Schwarz broadly defines youth to encompass those that should be targeted in order to improve the prospects for a successful post-war reconstruction process.
Schwarz challenged those that link “youth bulge” with instability, describing the concept as an “exaggerated youth theory.” She asserted that youth can play either negative or positive roles in post-conflict societies, but specifically emphasized young people’s positive contributions as community leaders, with their ability to raise a “coordinated political voice…through spontaneous motivation.”
Communities and governments need to support young people engaged in these positive roles, Schwarz added. Otherwise, youth could become a “resource for perpetuation of violence,” she warned, especially if they become apathetic toward the reconstruction process, or are recruited as child soldiers. Schwarz advised that young people need empowerment programs to “provide skills to be productive in [their] community,” as well as to boost their sense of belonging.
Marc Sommers, also with the U.S. Institute of Peace, described obstacles that youth programs currently face in post-conflict societies. He pointed out that although post-war populations are often “youth dominated,” many young people are disengaged from programs linked to reconstruction efforts, which he said exacerbates the feeling of exclusion. In turn, he said, it becomes difficult for youth to reintegrate themselves into their communities, increasing the likelihood that they fall victim to child-soldier recruiters, or become drawn into other negative roles.
Lessons From Kenya: Integrate Young People to Avoid Conflict
In an interview, Margaret Muthee, a scholar with the Wilson Center’s Africa Program, used her personal observations and experiences from Kenya to shed some light on the obstacles young people often face in the developing world. She emphasized that while “youth are very resilient with lots of potential,” they often find themselves in a “disadvantaged position.”
In Kenya, Muthee said, youth suffer from a vicious cycle, where a lack of educational or economic opportunity places young people—especially men—on a slippery slope toward crime and violence. In turn, she explained, “male youth are vilified” and sometimes dealt with through government-supported “shoot to kill…[measures] designed to instill fear rather than reintegrate them into society.”
Muthee recommended countering the top-down approach of dealing with youth, asserting that with the right approach and improved support from government and civil society, peaceful paths can be developed for young people, which would help achieve a greater sense of security for entire communities.
Marie Hokenson is a cadet at the United States Military Academy at West Point and an intern with the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Environmental Change and Security Program.
Photo Credit: “Joy Centre – BEC,” used courtesy of flickr user Ben Namibia.
-
Demographics, Depleted Resources, and Al Qaeda Inflame Tensions in Yemen
›July 21, 2010 // By Schuyler NullA second spectacular Al Qaeda attack on Yemeni government security buildings in less than a month is a worrisome sign that the terrorist group may be trying to take advantage of a country splitting at the seams. U.S. officials are concerned that Yemen, like neighboring Somalia, may become a failed state due to a myriad of challenges, including a separatist movement in the south, tensions over government corruption charges, competition for dwindling natural resources, and one of the fastest growing populations in the world.
Wells Running Dry
Water shortages have become commonplace in Yemen. Last year, the Sunday Times reported that Yemen could become the first modern state to run out of water, “providing a taste of the conflict and mass movement of populations that may spread across the world if population growth outstrips natural resources.”
Earlier this year, government forces came to blows with locals over a disputed water well license in the south. Twenty homes were damaged and two people were killed during the resulting eight day stand-off, according to Reuters.
The heavily populated highlands, home to the capital city of Sanaa, face particularly staggering scarcity. Wells serving the two million people in the capital must now stretch 2,600 – 3,200 feet below the surface to reach an aquifer and many have simply dried up, according to reports.
Yemeni Water and Environment Minister Abdul-Rahman al-Iryani told a Reuters reporter that the country’s burgeoning water crisis is “almost inevitable because of the geography and climate of Yemen, coupled with uncontrolled population growth and very low capacity for managing resources.”
Nineteen of Yemen’s 21 aquifers are being drained faster than they can recover, due to diesel subsidies that encourage excessive pumping, loose government enforcement of existing drilling laws, and growing population demand. Qat farmers in particular represent an excessive portion of water consumption; growing the popular narcotic accounts for 37 percent of agricultural water consumption. Meanwhile, according to a study by the World Food Programme this year, 32.1 percent of the population is food insecure and the country has become reliant on imported wheat.
Yemen’s other wells – the oil variety – have long been the country’s sole source of significant income. According to ASPO, oil has historically represented 70-75 percent of the government’s revenue. But recent exploration efforts have failed to uncover significant additions to Yemen’s reserves, and as a result oil exports have declined 56 percent since 2001. The steep decline has pushed Yemeni authorities to look to other natural resources, such as rare minerals and natural gas, but the infrastructure to support such projects will take significant time and money to develop.
The Fastest Growing Population in the Middle East
Despite the country’s limited resources, Yemen’s population of 22.8 million people is growing faster than any other country in the Middle East. According to projections from the Population Reference Bureau, by 2050, Yemen’s burgeoning population is expected to rival that of Spain.
Fully 45 percent of the current population is under the age of 15 – a troubling ratio that is expected to grow in the near future. The charts from the U.S. Census Bureau embedded below illustrate the dramatic growth of the country’s youth bulge from 1995 through 2030.A poor record on women’s rights and a highly rural, traditional society contribute to these rapid growth scenarios. According to Population Action International’s Elizabeth Leahy Madsen, only 41 percent of Yemeni women are literate and their total fertility rate is well over the global average. A recent survey from Social Watch ranking education, economic, and political empowerment rated Yemen last in the world in gender equity. Yemeni scholar Sultana Al-Jeham pointed out during her Wilson Center presentation, “Yemeni Women: Challenges and Little Hope,” that there is only one woman in a national parliament of 301 members and that ambitious political women routinely face systematic marginalization.
A contributing factor is that 70 percent of Yemen’s population live outside of cities – far more than any other country in the region – making access to education and healthcare difficult, especially in the large swaths of land not controlled by the government.
External migration from war-torn east Africa adds to Yemen’s demographic strains. According to IRIN, approximately 700,000 Somali refugees currently reside in country, and that number may grow as the situation in Somalia continues to escalate. Within Yemen’s own borders, another 320,000 internally displaced people have fled conflict-ridden areas, further disrupting the country’s internal dynamics.
Corruption and Rebellion
Competition over resources, perceived corruption, and Al Qaeda activity have put considerable pressure on the Saleh regime in Sanaa. The government faces serious dissidence in both the north and the south, and the Los Angeles Times reports that talk of rebellion is both widespread and loud:Much of southern and eastern Yemen are almost entirely beyond the central government’s control. Many Yemeni soldiers say they won’t wear their uniforms outside the southern port city of Aden for fear of being killed. In recent months, officials have been attacked after trying to raise the Yemeni flag over government offices in the south.
USAID rates Yemen’s effective governance amongst the lowest in the world (below the 25th percentile), reflecting Sanaa’s poor control and high levels of corruption. Some reports claim that up to a third of Yemen’s 100,000-man army is made up of “ghost soldiers” who do not actually exist but whose commanders collect their salaries and equipment to sell on the open market.
The West and Al Qaeda
In testimony before Congress earlier this year, Assistant Secretary of State Jeffrey Feltman called on the Yemeni government to take a comprehensive approach to “address the security, political, and economic challenges that it faces,” including its natural resource and demographic challenges.
The Yemeni government is poised to receive $150 million in bilateral military assistance from the United States. But some experts are critical of that approach: Dr. Mustafa Alani of the Dubai-based Gulf Research Center told UN Dispatch that, “you are not going to solve the terrorist problem in Yemen by killing terrorists,” calling instead for investing in economic development.
USAID has budgeted $67 million for development assistance, economic support, and training programs in Yemen for FY 2010 and has requested $106 million for FY 2011 (although about a third is designated for foreign military financing).
While Yemen’s Al Qaeda presence continues to captivate Western governments, it is the country’s other problems – resource scarcity, corruption, and demographic issues – that make it vulnerable to begin with and arguably represent the greater threat to its long-term stability. The United States and other developed countries should address these cascading problems in constructive ways, before the country devolves into a more dangerous state like Somalia or Afghanistan. In keeping with the tenets of the Obama administration’s National Security Strategy, an exercise in American soft power in Yemen might pay great dividends in hard power gains.
Sources: Association for the Study of Peak Oil – USA, Central Intelligence Agency, Congressional Research Service, Guardian, IRIN, Los Angeles Times, New York Times, Population Action International, Population Reference Bureau, ReliefWeb, Reuters, Social Watch, Sunday Times, U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Department of State, UN Dispatch, USA Today, USAID, World Food Programme.
Photo Credit: “Yemen pol 2002” via Wikimedia Commons courtesy of the U.S. Federal Government and “Yemen youth bulge animation” arranged by Schuyler Null using images courtesy of the U.S. Census Bureau’s International Data Base. -
‘Interview:’ Educate Girls, Boys, To Meet the Population Challenge, Say Pakistan’s Leading Demographers
›June 25, 2010 // By Russell SticklorPakistan is at a major demographic crossroads. With a youth-heavy population of some 180 million and an annual population growth rate around 2 percent, the country’s population is projected to swell to roughly 335 million by mid-century. Such explosive growth raises major questions about Pakistan’s future, from looming food and water scarcity, to yawning inequalities in the nation’s educational and economic systems. Some warn that these problems threaten to drive a new generation of disaffected Pakistani youth toward political and religious radicalization.
Recently, I asked a number of leading Pakistani demographers visiting the Wilson Center how their country could best achieve more sustainable population growth rates and effectively harness the economic potential of Pakistani youth.
Educate Girls
Zeba Sathar, Pakistan country director for the Population Council in Islamabad, told me empowering girls through education represents one of the most important means of reducing the total fertility rate, which currently stands at four. “When children are educated—particularly when girls are educated—they take care of their fertility and their family size themselves,” Sathar said.
Yet securing educational opportunity for Pakistani girls has often been an uphill battle, largely due to entrenched social norms. Yasmeen Sabeeh Qazi, Karachi-based senior country adviser for the David and Lucile Packard Foundation’s Population Program in Pakistan, pointed out that a traditional preference for male children in Pakistani society has meant girls do not often receive the same level of family resources as males. This phenomenon has historically fed gender inequality, she said.
“Since boys are preferred, girls are not given the same kind of attention and nutrition, especially in the poorer and less-educated families,” Qazi told me. “But as the education level goes up, you see that this divide starts narrowing.” For Qazi, one of the keys to heightening educational access for girls is to increase both the quantity and quality of schools in rural districts, where two-thirds of Pakistanis live.
Decentralize Family Planning Services
Others I spoke with emphasized improving access to reproductive health and family planning services in rural and urban areas. The federal government’s relatively recent move to delegate operational authority for family planning services to the provincial or district level has encouraged many, such as Dr. Tufail Muhammad with the Pakistan Pediatric Association’s Child Rights & Abuse Committee in Peshawar.
Muhammad said the ongoing decentralization—which he described as “a major paradigm shift”—is meant to increase ownership of population planning policies at the local level, and therefore lead to more effective implementation because “the responsibility will be directly with the provincial government.” Once capacity is established at the local level to design and implement those policies, Muhammad added, “supervisors, administrators, and policymakers will be very close to [family planning] services.”
Manage the “Youth Bulge”
Yet despite the fact that both the public and private sectors are taking steps to address Pakistan’s growth issues, the population crunch will intensify before it potentially eases. Even assuming that greater educational opportunity for girls and increased local control over family planning services help drop Pakistan’s total fertility rate, the sheer size of the current youth bulge—two-thirds of the country’s population is under age 30—means population issues will inform every aspect of Pakistani society for decades to come.
In discussing the current state of Pakistan’s education system, some speakers also asserted that the influence of madrassas, or religious schools, over the student-aged population has often been overstated. Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan’s former finance member and recent senior scholar at the Wilson Center, said during the panel discussion that inaccurate enrollment estimates created “the impression that the system is now dominated” by those institutions. He noted that more recent figures place madrassa enrollment at just five percent of the total student population.
With a majority of Pakistani students enrolled in regular public schools, he insisted that “public policy in Pakistan has to focus on public education” in order to prevent those students from slipping through the cracks. The problem, he added, was that “the education that they are receiving is pretty bad. It really does not prepare them to be active participants in the workforce and contribute to the economic development of the country.”
Still, most of the experts sounded optimistic about Pakistan’s potential to mitigate some of the adverse effects associated with the near-doubling of the country’s population during the next 40 years. By starting to more openly address an issue that the government and the powerful Pakistani media have long preferred to ignore, they seemed to agree the country is taking a big step in dealing head-on with its looming demographic challenges.
“I don’t look at the Pakistani population as a burden, but rather as an asset,” remarked Burki. “But it has to be managed.”
Photo Credit: “School Girls Talk in Islamabad,” courtesy of flickr user Documentally. -
‘Dialogue Television’ Explores Pakistan’s Population Challenge
›It’s difficult to imagine a scenario for a stable and peaceful world that doesn’t involve a stable and peaceful Pakistan. The country is among the world’s most populous and is also home to the world’s second largest Muslim population, making it the only Muslim majority nuclear state. Its history has been characterized by periods of military rule, political instability, and regional conflicts. This week on dialogue host John Milewski explores the nation’s changing demographics and what they may tell us about near and long term prospects for this vital U.S. ally with guests Michael Kugelman, Zeba Sathar, and Mehtab Karim.
Watch above or on MHz Worldview.
Michael Kugelman is program associate with the Wilson Center’s Asia Program. Much of his recent research and programming focus has involved demographics in Pakistan. He is a regular contributor to Dawn, one of Pakistan’s major English language newspapers.
Zeba Sathar is Pakistan country director at the Population Council in Islamabad. Prior to joining the council, she was chief of research in demography at the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics and a consultant with the World Bank.
Mehtab Karim is a distinguished senior fellow and affiliated professor with the School of Public Policy at George Mason University. Additionally, he is a senior research fellow at the Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion and Public Life, specializing in global Muslim demographics. Previously, he was a professor of demography at Aga Khan University in Karachi.
Note: A QuickTime plug-in may be required to launch the video. -
Brookings’ “Taking Stock of the Youth Challenge in the Middle East”
›Samantha Constant and Mary Kraetsch of the Brookings Institution have created a handy visual aid to understanding the Middle East’s demographics. The interactive flash graphic shows select economic and demographic information as you scroll over each country, including GDP per capita, youth percentage of the population, secondary school enrollment rate, and unemployment figures. Clicking on each country brings up a more detailed fact sheet that breaks down economic, education, and demographic statistics.
The companion write-up to the map stresses the importance of these figures to youth-inclusive development. Citing the 2009 UN Arab Human Development Report, the authors point out that the region will need to create about 51 million jobs by 2020 to account for youth entering the work force and already high unemployment rates.
The report does however shy away from some of the Middle East’s most difficult demographic challenges. Iraq and the West Bank are mentioned as areas that will continue to have large youth bulges, but Yemen, which has far and away the most troubling demographics in the region, is not mentioned at all. Adding “total fertility rate” as a statistic, which shows the average number of children born to an average woman over her lifetime, might illustrate these trouble areas more clearly. As illustrated by data from the Population Reference Bureau, Yemen (5.5), the Palestinian Territory (4.6), and Iraq (4.4) all have noticeably higher total fertility rates than other countries in the region, which helps explain why their demographic problems will continue.
The inclusion of total fertility rates would also help make a stronger argument for closer attention to be paid to women’s rights issues, as generally better women’s rights translates to lower total fertility rates, which help draw down youth bulges over time. The report only briefly mentions that more research is needed to create better paths for young women to become productive members of society with “greater career opportunities beyond traditional roles.”
The map does mention that information will be updated on a regular basis so it is worth checking back to see what it added to this useful primer.
Sources: The Brookings Institution, Population Reference Bureau.
Interactive Map: “Understanding the Generation in Waiting” courtesy of The Brookings Institution. -
Defusing the Bomb: Overcoming Pakistan’s Population Challenge
›According to the UN’s latest mid-range demographic projections for Pakistan, the country’s population–currently about 185 million–will rise to 335 million by 2050. This explosive increase, however, represents the best-case scenario: Should fertility rates remain constant, the UN estimates this figure could approach 460 million. Such soaring population growth, coupled with youthful demographics, a dismal education system, high unemployment, and a troubled economy, pose great risks for Pakistan. Predictably, many observers depict Pakistan’s population situation as a ticking time bomb.
At the same time, some demographers contend that the country’s population profile can potentially bring great benefits to the country. If young Pakistanis can be properly educated and successfully absorbed into the labor force, such experts explain, then the country could experience a “demographic dividend” that boosts social well-being and sparks economic growth. On June 9, the Wilson Center’s Asia Program, Environmental Change and Security Program, and Comparative Urban Studies Project, along with the Karachi-based Fellowship Fund for Pakistan, hosted a day-long conference to examine both the challenges and opportunities of Pakistan’s demographics, and to discuss how best to tackle the former and maximize the latter.
Pakistan at a Crossroads
In her opening address, Zeba A. Sathar of the Population Council declared that Pakistan is “at a crossroads.” Demography will play a key role in determining the country’s future trajectory, she said, yet there is presently little discussion about demographics in Pakistan. Sathar’s presentation traced Pakistan’s recent demographic trends. Despite its high population growth, Pakistan’s fertility rates have actually been in decline since the early 1990s–a fact that Sathar attributed to progressively higher ages at marriage (for both men and women), but also to the “reality” of abortion. However, Pakistan’s pace of fertility decline has slowed in the last few years–a consequence, Sathar argued, of Islamabad’s failure to promote social development (particularly education) and of the international donor community’s prioritizing of HIV/AIDS funding over that of family planning since 2000. Sathar concluded that achieving Pakistan’s “demographic dreams” will require more educational and employment opportunities (particularly for women) and better access to family planning in rural areas.
In the following panel, Wilson Center Senior Scholar Shahid Javed Burki noted the long-standing failure of demographers and economists in Pakistan to work together on the country’s population issues. This failure, Burki asserted, has resulted in poor choices and bad policy. He also criticized officials and scholars for being reactive in their population proposals, rather than proactive. Burki emphasized that good policy choices can produce favorable results. If, for instance, the population policies launched in Pakistan’s early decades had been sustained to the present, the country today would have 30 million fewer people. Similarly, had Pakistan followed the Bangladeshi approach and concentrated on the economic empowerment of women, today there would be more than 40 million fewer Pakistanis. Good policies matter, Burki repeatedly asserted, and Pakistan’s large and growing population, if dealt with wisely, can be an asset rather than a burden.
Development Through the Bangladeshi Model and Education
Like Burki, Yasmeen Sabeeh Qazi of the Packard Foundation pointed to Bangladesh as a relative success story. She highlighted Bangladesh’s reproductive health services system, which has served to increase the health of Bangladeshis and reduce their poverty. Indonesia and Iran, whose fertility rates are one-half Pakistan’s, provide other examples in the Muslim world where official policy has made a significant difference. Qazi’s presentation emphasized the linkages between family planning, reproductive health, and development. Noting that one-third of pregnancies in Pakistan are unplanned, she underscored the correlation between smaller family size and higher gross national income. She urged the government to fashion a population policy that expands access to reproductive health services, strengthens the health system generally, promotes education (especially for girls), and creates more jobs.
Moeed Yusuf of the U.S. Institute of Peace examined the prospects for radicalization of Pakistan’s youth. Pakistan’s stratified education system, Yusuf cautioned, is not training productive, employable members of society. Only graduates of elite private schools or of foreign schools are prepared for the economy of the 21st century. Meanwhile, the economy is not producing the quality jobs the young expect, leading to an “expectation-reality disconnect” that fosters not only un- or underemployment, but also anger and alienation. Moreover, the state, by deliberately cultivating the ultra-right elements in Pakistani society who most want to radicalize the country’s youth, is part of the problem. Still, Yusuf added, echoing the hopefulness of other speakers, it is not too late. These disturbing trends can be reversed, with help from outside friends like the United States, which, Yusuf counseled, should focus on assisting Pakistan’s education system, support rural private schools, and allow more Pakistani students to study in the United States.
Plugging Public Sector Holes with Private Initiatives
Saba Gul Khattak focused her luncheon address on the work of the Pakistan government’s Planning Commission, of which she is a member. In recent years, Pakistan’s population programs have been devolved from the federal to the provincial and sub-provincial levels. This decentralization, she averred, has opened the way for a genuine reform agenda. But it has also contributed to a situation where no one at the federal level feels any “ownership” over the country’s population programs. Implementation has always been the most vulnerable point in the policy process–and the lack of “ownership” only accentuates this problem today. Khattak emphasized the linkages between population, health, education, and development. Today, she asserted, children are seen by their parents as a source of old age security. Only when the government fills this void through the establishment of an effective social security structure will Pakistan be able to reduce its fertility rates. Development must accompany a truly effective population program.
In the afternoon panel, Sohail Agha of Population Services International discussed the role of the private sector in family planning in Pakistan. He argued that this sector has made a “substantial contribution” to Pakistan’s increased use of condoms: In 2006-07, a period when condom use spiked by nearly 8 percent, about 80 percent of this increase was covered by contraceptives provided by the private sector. Additionally, he noted that a 2009 survey found that urban Pakistanis exposed to social marketing campaigns about condom utilization increased their use of the contraceptive by 10 percent. Furthermore, he described private-sector-led health financing plans for women’s fertilization–a method of contraception that, like condoms, has increased over the last 30 years in Pakistan.
Engaging Youth and Political and Religious Leaders
Shazia Khawar of the British Council discussed the “Next Generation” report, a 2009 Council study about Pakistan’s youth. The report, based on a survey of 1,500 young people across both rural and urban Pakistan, concludes that young Pakistanis are deeply disillusioned about their country and its institutions, with three-quarters of those surveyed saying they regard themselves as “primarily” Muslims, not Pakistanis. The report’s “critical point,” said Khawar, is that Pakistani youth participation in policy development is nonexistent. To this end, the British Council has spearheaded several initiatives to engage the country’s youth in Pakistani politics and to spark dialogue between young Pakistanis and policymakers. Khawar concluded, however, that success is possible only if Pakistan’s top political leaders “pledge themselves to this agenda.”
Mehtab S. Karim of the Pew Research Center offered a comparative perspective, discussing demographics in the broader Muslim world, with particular emphasis on Bangladesh and Iran. Why, he asked, has Pakistan experienced less fertility decline than most of its fellow Muslim-majority nations? He suggested that the answer lies in the failure of Pakistan’s political and religious leaders to make early and sustained commitments to family planning. In Bangladesh, he explained, the country’s very first government made lower population growth rates a “prime goal.” And in Iran, spiritual leader Ayatollah Khomeini issued a fatwa in support of contraceptive use soon after the Islamic Revolution. Yet in Pakistan, according to Karim, religious figures have consistently opposed Islamabad’s family planning efforts, and the government has proven unwilling or unable to combat this resistance.
Scott Radloff of USAID discussed his agency’s family planning and reproductive health (FP/RH) projects in Pakistan. FP/RH aid to Pakistan was largely cut off during much of the 1990s due to the Pressler Amendment–a 1985 modification to the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act that banned most U.S. military and economic assistance to Pakistan unless the U.S. president certified that Pakistan had no nuclear weapons. President George W. Bush waived this prohibition in 2001, and since then USAID FP/RH assistance has risen to nearly $45 million. Current interventions focus on strengthening services within Pakistan’s Ministry of Health and Ministry of Population Welfare; improving contraceptive supplies and logistics; expanding community-based services; and increasing awareness and commitment, including among religious leaders.
Participants concurred that Pakistan’s demographic situation is fraught with risk. Yet they also highlighted a series of hopeful signs. Yusuf noted the absence of an “imminent” danger of youth radicalization; Khawar pointed to the testimonies of “many young leaders determined to do their part” that flow from the “Next Generation” report; and both Karim and Qazi cited Bangladesh and Iran as proof that successful family planning programs are possible even in countries marked by deep poverty or conservative Islam. The presenters were also in accord about the necessary policies moving forward: more extensive family planning and reproductive health services, better education, and more job opportunities (particularly for women). At the same time, speakers repeatedly underscored the profound challenges facing the implementation of such policies. Still, for all the talk about major obstacles and challenges, there was recognition that more modest and simple steps can be taken as well–such as promoting more discussion about demographics within Pakistan, and especially among experts from different disciplines.
Michael Kugelman is program associate and Robert M. Hathaway is director of the Wilson Center’s Asia Program.
Photo credit: Traffic in downtown Karachi, courtesy Flickr user Ali Adnan Qazalbash. -
Look Beyond Islamabad To Solve Pakistan’s “Other” Threats
›After years of largely being ignored in Washington policy debates, Pakistan’s “other” threats – energy and water shortages, dismal education and healthcare systems, and rampant food insecurity – have finally moved to the front burner.
For several years, the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Asia Program has sought to bring these problems to the attention of the international donor community. Washington’s new determination to engage with Pakistan on its development challenges – as evidenced by President Obama’s signing of the Kerry-Lugar bill and USAID administrator Raj Shah’s comments on aid to Pakistan – are welcome, but long overdue.
The crux of the current debate on aid to Pakistan is how to maximize its effectiveness – that is, how to ensure that the aid gets to its intended recipients and is used for its intended purposes. Washington will not soon forget former Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf’s admission last year that $10 billion in American aid provided to fight the Taliban and al-Qaeda was instead diverted to strengthen Pakistani defenses against archrival India.
What Pakistani institutions will Washington use to channel its aid monies? In recent months, the U.S. government has considered both Pakistani NGOs and government agencies. It is now clear that Washington prefers to work with the latter, concluding that public institutions in Pakistan are better equipped to manage large infusions of capital and are more sustainable than those in civil society.
This conclusion is flawed. Simply putting all its aid eggs in the Pakistani government basket will not improve U.S. aid delivery to Pakistan, as Islamabad is seriously governance-challenged.
Granted, Islamabad is not hopelessly corrupt. It was not in the bottom 20 percent of Transparency International’s 2009 Corruption Perceptions Index (Pakistan ranked 139 out of 180), and enjoyed the highest ranking of any South Asian country in the World Bank’s 2010 Doing Business report.
At the same time, the Pakistani state repeatedly fails to provide basic services to its population – not just in the tribal areas, but also in cities like Karachi, where 30,000 people die each year from consuming unsafe water.
Where basic services are provided, Islamabad favors wealthy, landed, and politically connected interests over those of the most needy – the very people with the most desperate need for international aid. Last year, government authorities established a computerized lottery that was supposed to award thousands of free tractors to randomly selected small farmers across Pakistan. However, among the “winners” were large landowners – including family members of a Pakistani parliamentarian.
Working through Islamabad on aid provision is essential. However, the United States also needs to diversify its aid partners in Pakistan.
For starters, Washington should look within civil society. This rich and vibrant sector is greatly underappreciated in Washington. The Hisaar Foundation, for example, is one of the only organizations in Pakistan focusing on water, food, and livelihood security.
The country’s Islamic charities also play a crucial role. Much of the aid rendered to health facilities and schools in Pakistan comes from Muslim welfare associations. Perhaps the most well-known such charity in Pakistan – the Edhi Foundation – receives tens of millions of dollars each year in unsolicited funds.
Washington should also be targeting venture capital groups. The Acumen Fund is a nonprofit venture fund that seeks to create markets for essential goods and services where they do not exist. The fund has launched an initiative with a Pakistani nonprofit organization to bring water-conserving drip irrigation to 20,000-30,000 Pakistani small farmers in the parched province of Sindh.
Such collaborative investment is a far cry from the opaque, exploitative foreign private investment cropping up in Pakistan these days – particularly in the context of agricultural financing – and deserves a closer look.
With all the talk in Washington about developing a strategic dialogue with Islamabad and ensuring the latter plays a central part in U.S. aid provision to Pakistan, it is easy to forget that Pakistan’s 175 million people have much to offer as well. These ample human resources – and their institutions in civil society – should be embraced and be better integrated into international aid programs.
While Pakistan’s rapidly growing population may be impoverished, it is also tremendously youthful. If the masses can be properly educated and successfully integrated into the labor force, Pakistan could experience a “demographic dividend,” allowing it to defuse what many describe as the country’s population time bomb.
A demographic dividend in Pakistan, the subject of an upcoming Wilson Center conference, has the potential to reduce all of Pakistan’s threats – and to enable the country to move away from its deep, but very necessary, dependence on international aid.
Michael Kugelman is program associate with the Asia Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
Photo Credit: Water pipes feeding into trash infected waterway in Karachi, courtesy Flickr user NB77. -
Coffee and Contraception: Combining Agribusiness and Community Health Projects in Rwanda
›“Population pressures and diminishing land holdings – due to high fertility rates, war and genocide, and subsequent migration – have caused a rapid decrease in the forested and protected areas and increased soil infertility and food insecurity” in Rwanda, USAID’s Irene Kitzantides told a Wilson Center audience.
Kitzantides, a population, health, and environment advisor and global health fellow, said “the population is projected to reach over 14 million by 2025” – nearly one-third more than today, due to the country’s high fertility rate of nearly 5.5 children per women–which could continue to negatively impact forests and food supplies.
In response to these challenges, USAID supported the Sustaining Partnerships to Enhance Rural Enterprise and Agribusiness Development (SPREAD) Project. SPREAD uses an integrated population-health-environment (PHE) approach to develop the coffee agribusiness and bring family planning, HIV/AIDS, and reproductive health services to coffee workers.
Combining income generation with health services was thought an effective way to “fulfill the overall SPREAD goal of improving lives and livelihoods,” said Kitzantides.
A SPREADing Mandate: Integrating Health and Agribusiness
SPREAD follows USAID’s PEARL I and II Projects, which focused exclusively on agricultural development. Coffee is still at the center of SPREAD’s activities, with $5 million of the project’s $6 million USAID budget earmarked for agricultural development.
However, a broader mandate to include health services emerged after recognition that greater income alone does not ensure greater quality of life. The additional health funding leverages SPREAD’s already established relationships with farming cooperatives to bring health services to traditionally underserved rural communities.
“We really tried to build on the existing assets of the cooperative,” said Kitzantides. “We also really tried to complement local and national public health policy and partners.”
The integration of health with agricultural goals, and the use of already established in-country health programs, has made SPREAD extremely cost-effective, with HIV/AIDS prevention education costing less than $2 per person.
Examples of SPREAD’s integrated work include:Combined health and agricultural lessons: Kitzantides and her colleagues trained nearly 400 animateurs de café, cooperative employees running the agricultural education programs, to incorporate public health objectives into their activities. Combining health and agricultural education into one session takes advantage of workers already trained during previous USAID programs. The combination also attracts more male participants, who traditionally shunned HIV/AIDS, family planning, and reproductive health campaigns and services.
Radio programming: SPREAD worked with the agricultural radio program Imbere Heza (“Bright Future”) to incorporate health messaging at the end of each program.
- Mobile clinics: SPREAD works with cooperatives and local health centers to bring convenient services to farmers when they gather at sales or processing stations during harvests.
Community theater: SPREAD hires local theater groups to perform skits on health. The farming communities “really love community theater and always ask for it,” said Kitzantides.
In its relatively short existence, SPREAD’s health activities have reached over 120,000 people with HIV/AIDS prevention messages; nearly 90,000 with messages discussing family planning/reproductive health; and almost 40,000 about maternal and child health. The project counts 347 women as new users of family planning services.
Lessons learned – which will be examined in more detail in an upcoming issue of Focus – include the importance of using community-based approaches to overcome perceived social barriers; the advantages of integrating cross-cutting activities at the outset of a program; and the need for strong monitoring and evaluation systems to measure the effort’s outcomes.Jason Bremner of the Population Research Bureau said PHE projects such as SPREAD go “beyond what the health sector itself can do and find new ways of reaching underserved remote populations.” He presented a soon-to-be-released PRB map plotting the location of more than 40 PHE projects in Africa.
The success of SPREAD and similar projects demonstrates the potential for PHE approaches to bring reproductive health and family planning services to rural areas, Bremner noted, but there is still much work to be done to scale up this integrated approach – and to document its successes.
Sustaining SPREAD
Kitzantides said it took several years to integrate health activities with the already established agricultural programs. Since USAID funding for the program is scheduled to end in 2011, she is uncertain that the time remaining will be enough for SPREAD’s health partners to develop the logistical and financial capacities to become self-sustaining. But SPREAD has changed attitudes and beliefs, two key objectives that do not require sustained funding.
“We used to talk about growing coffee, making money, buying material things like bikes – not about problems like malaria, HIV/AIDS, etc.,” said one SPREAD agricultural business manager during the program’s evaluation. “Someone could have 5 million Rwandan francs in the house but could suffer from malaria where medicine costs 500 Rwandan francs, due to ignorance. You have to teach people about production, you have to also think of their health to improve their lives.”
Photo Credits: Irene Kitzantides, courtesy David Hawxhurst; condom demonstration, courtesy Nick Fraser; community theater group, courtesy SPREAD Health Program; Jason Bremner, courtesy David Hawxhurst.
