Earlier this month, approximately eight boulders weighing 60-70 tons each split from the edges of the Muqattam cliffs and fell onto densely populated Manshiyet Nasr, a slum in eastern Cairo, killing more than 100 people and destroying 30-50 homes. By the next day, security officials outnumbered rescue workers in the area, and locals, outraged by the slow response of the government, were clashing with police. This tragedy and the ensuing conflict between residents and local authorities highlight the need for effective governance and urban planning to alleviate poverty and rapid urbanization and avoid conflict.

Rockslides are not uncommon in Manshiyet Nasr; in 2002, for example, 27 people were killed under similar circumstances in the same area. One local journalist reported that “the reason the rocks keep falling is because there is no sewage system and their wastewater is eating away at the mountain.” This lack of basic sanitation services is a common characteristic of the informal settlements and slums that are growing exponentially worldwide. This year, for the first time, more than half of the global population lives in cities; it is forecast that by 2030, 81 percent of the urban population will reside in the cities of developing countries, which are unplanned, underserved by services like sanitation, and unable to cope with continually growing demand for these services. The rockslide in Manshiyet Nasr is a stark example of what can happen when a city’s infrastructure and government are unprepared to deal with rapid urbanization and increasing poverty, and how these challenges are exacerbated by poor government response. (For more on Cairo’s informal settlements, see the Comparative Urban Studies Project’s Urban Studies in Cairo, Egypt.)

A recent Human Development Report analyzing Egypt’s progress toward attaining the Millennium Development Goals noted that the poverty rate in Cairo, a city of 16 million people, is expected to almost double between now and 2015. This growth in poverty is attributed to “increasing numbers of residents in vulnerable areas and increasing rates of internal migration.”

It is important to note, however, that migration alone does not account for increasing poverty. In Global Urban Poverty, a publication of the Wilson Center’s Comparative Urban Studies Project and the U.S. Agency for International Development, Loren Landau argues that “public responses to migration and urbanization—including the absence of a conscious coordinated response—have tended to exacerbate mobility’s negative effects on all of the Millennium Development Goals.”

The Egyptian government’s initial response to the rockslide in Manshiyet Nasr was to hold the residents accountable for living in an illegal settlement in a dangerous area. Yet 70 percent of Cairo residents live in informal communities like Manshiyet Nasr. In addition to a severe housing shortage and lack of urban planning, a history of slow government response to disasters is intensifying accusations of government neglect and incompetence.

Except for an 18-month break in 1980-81, Egyptians have lived under emergency law since 1967. This law prohibits public gatherings, restricts speech, permits searches without warrants, and enables the police to detain citizens without charge or trial. After promising to repeal the law during his 2005 presidential campaign, Hosni Mubarek, who has been in power since 1981, extended the law in 2006 and again in May of this year. While proponents of the law (and of Mubarek) claim that the state of emergency has helped stabilized the country, human rights groups argue that the law violates human rights and sanctions the government’s oppression of political rivals.

Egypt’s history of extreme law and unchecked police powers has stunted the development of a system of governance that responds to the most basic needs of Egyptians. Manshiyet Nasr residents’ angry reaction to the poor government response to the rockslide is evidence of their smoldering desperation.

I was disappointed but not surprised to receive a recent e-mail from Wilson Center Senior Scholar Murray Feshbach, warning me off visiting St. Petersburg. A demographer who closely tracks environmental and health conditions in the former Soviet Union, Feshbach was instrumental in pulling back the curtain on the Soviet Union’s catastrophic environmental legacy in his co-authored 1993 volume Ecocide in the USSR. Murray’s message contained further evidence of Russian environmental decline. In this case, institutional failings are throwing Russia open for the business of accepting the world’s nuclear waste. Russian civilian and military radioactive waste is now being supplemented by waste from the Netherlands and Germany—and soon, Pakistan, India, and China.

The beginning of a September 26 St. Petersburg Times article gives us a glimpse of this selective Russian embrace of free trade:

Up to 10,000 tons of depleted uranium hexafluoride are expected to travel through St. Petersburg in the next six months, according to the local branch of the international environmental pressure group Bellona….According to official sources, cargos containing depleted uranium hexafluoride arrive in the city on average ten times a month…radioactivity levels near the trains have significantly exceeded the norm on several occasions over the past year.

Environmental and health issues in Russia have not always looked so dire. In the early 1990s, in the wake of the fall of the Soviet Union, two exciting developments came out of northwest Russia from two unlikely sources: the military and civil society. In one of the most militarized regions of the world, the Russian military cooperated with the Norwegian military and eventually the U.S. military on joint assessments of threats posed by nuclear waste. The 1994 trilateral Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation agreement provided a mechanism for addressing radioactive waste and, more broadly, for finding a way for militaries to talk during the Cold War thaw in an example of what is now called environmental peacemaking or environmental peacebuilding.

Health concerns connected to nuclear waste also formed the basis of a blossoming civil society movement in early-1990s Russia. Both Russian and international NGOs were increasingly able to gather data and bring to light nuclear waste’s myriad threats to people and ecosystems. The Norwegian Bellona Foundation and its Russian affiliates were particularly effective in revealing the scope of the problems and prodding governments to take more aggressive action to respond.

But even by the mid-1990s, the tide was beginning to turn back to a secretive and securitized approach to environmental data. The celebrated treason case of former Russian submarine captain Aleksandr Nikitin was merely the most visible example of the recriminalization of sharing environmental data. Nikitin’s “crime” was co-authoring the 1996 Bellona Foundation report The Russian Northern Fleet: Sources of Radioactive Contamination. Following a year of imprisonment and the achievement of Amnesty International prisoner status, Nikitin was released, but his celebrated case was succeeded by the Russian government’s broad-stroke efforts to dial back environmental openness and the rights that came with it. We may be seeing the effects of this return to environmental secrecy in the current row over nuclear waste transportation through St. Petersburg.

Photo courtesy of Woodrow Wilson Center.

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Speaking at a Clinton Global Initiative plenary session (webcast; podcast) this morning, Senator John McCain (R-AZ) and Senator Barack Obama (D-IL) laid out their proposals for addressing the interconnected problems of global poverty, climate change, and disease. Excerpts from each senator’s speech are below.

Drought, continuing violence, returning refugees, and the spike in global food prices are combining to produce a serious threat to Afghan food security, reports the New York Times. The World Food Program has expanded its operations in Afghanistan to cover a total of nearly 9 million people through the end of next year’s harvest, sending out an emergency appeal to donors to cover the costs.

In the new video “Water Wars or Water Woes? Water Management as Conflict Management,” Environmental Change and Security Program (ECSP) Director Geoff Dabelko explains that although newspapers and politicians constantly warn of impending “water wars,” water rarely leads to interstate violence. By focusing on “water wars” – which evidence shows are extremely rare – we “are missing a lot of what is important around conflict management around water,” argues Dabelko.

Presidential administrations usually end with sepia retrospectives and long, adulatory lists of accomplishments. The present administration is unlikely to end this way, but it will certainly go out with many “what if” epitaphs. Near the top of my “what if” list is, “What if this administration had taken the threat of global climate change seriously and acted as though our future depended on cutting emissions and cooperating on adaptation?”

From July 27-30, 2008, my organization, the Center for a New American Security, led a consortium of 10 scientific, private, and public policy organizations in an experiment to answer this particular “what if.” The experiment, a climate change “war game,” tested what a change in U.S. position might mean in 2015, when the effects of climate change will likely be more apparent and the global need to act will be more urgent. The participants were scientists, national security strategists, scholars, and members of the business community from China, Europe, India, and the Americas. The variety was intentional: We hoped to leverage a range of expertise and see how these different communities would interact to solve problems.

Climate change may seem a strange subject for a war game, but one of our primary goals was to highlight the ways in which global climate change is, in fact, a national security issue. In our view, climate change is highly likely to provoke conflict—within states, along borders as populations move, and, down the line, possibly between states. Also, the way the military calculates risk and engages in long-term planning lends itself to planning for the climate change that is already locked in (and gives strategic urgency to cutting emissions and preventing future climate change).

The players were asked to confront a near-term future in 2015, in which greenhouse gas emissions have continued to grow and the pattern of volatile and severe weather events has continued. The context of the game was an emergency ad-hoc meeting of the world’s top greenhouse gas emitters in 2015—China, the European Union, India, and the United States—to consider future projections (unlike most war games, the projections were real; Oak Ridge National Laboratory analyzed regional-level Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change data from the A1FI series specifically for the game). The “UN Secretary-General” challenged the top emitters to come up with an agreement to deal with increased migration resulting from climate change; resource scarcity; disaster relief; and drastic emissions cuts.

Although the players did reach an agreement, which is an interesting artifact in itself, that was not really the point. The primary objective was to see how the teams interacted and whether we gained any insight into our current situation. While we’re still processing all of our findings, I certainly came away with an interesting answer to that “what if” question. If the United States had been forward-leaning on climate change these past eight years, taking action at home and proposing change internationally, it would have made a difference, but only to a point. As important as American leadership will be on this issue, it is Chinese leadership—or followership—that will be decisive. And it is going to be very, very difficult—perhaps impossible—for China to lead, at least under current circumstances. The tremendous growth of China’s economy has lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty, but there are hundreds of millions more still to be lifted. The stark reality is that China will be fueling that economic growth with coal, oil, and natural gas—just as the United States did in the 20th century—unless and until there is a viable alternative.

If the next administration hopes to head off the worst effects of global climate change, it will not only have to find a way to cut greenhouse gas emissions at home, it may well have to make it possible for China to do so, too.

Sharon Burke is a national security expert at the Center for a New American Security, where she focuses on energy, climate change, and the Middle East.

Photo: The U.S., EU, and Chinese simulation teams in negotiations. Courtesy of Sharon Burke.

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Europe’s deepening energy insecurity has been acutely demonstrated by the Russia-Georgia conflict, reports Jeff White, correspondent for the Christian Science Monitor. Russia’s demonstrated willingness to cut supplies to Europe has prompted the search for alternative sources, including the planned Nabucco pipeline, which bypasses Russia. However, the pipeline “stands little chance of success if this tense situation in Georgia continues,” Zurab Janjgava of Georgian Oil told the Wall Street Journal yesterday. Georgian energy executive Giorgi Vashakmadze expressed his agreement to the Monitor: “Russia is showing it controls this corridor.”

At a recent Wilson Center event, Marshall Goldman of Harvard University explained that Russian influence is wide and expanding because of their energy supplies. One illustration is the German natural gas supply, which is 40% Russian and growing. Russia’s phenomenal economic comeback since 1998 is due almost entirely to the strength of its energy sector. “Putin made a difference, but oil and gas made an even more important difference,” explained Goldman. He warned of the danger of Moscow’s strong control over vital energy supplies to Europe. Said Goldman, “Russia is indeed a petrostate and is very closely tied to the fate of energy.” Europe – and the West – can no longer hold any illusions to the contrary.

Sonia Schmanski contributed to this post.

The New York Times reports that Russian President Dmitri A. Medvedev has “ordered a halt to his country’s military operation in Georgia”; however, “he did not say that troops were pulling out and he insisted that Russian forces were still authorized to fire on enemies in South Ossetia.” Despite the ceasefire, a New York Times reporter said bombing continued.

As posted last week in the New Security Beat, the conflict in Ossetia has significant natural resources elements, as the region is rich in timber, manganese, iron ore, and copper and coal deposits. In a Foreign Affairs article last winter (which to a large extent predicted the current conflict), Nixon Center President Dimitri K. Simes pointed out that high energy prices have granted Russia newfound economic and political independence: “Energy exports finance about 30 percent of the Kremlin’s budget”—and this was at $61 per barrel.

By positioning itself as the major energy supplier to Europe, Russia is attempting to regain much of its sphere of influence. However, Georgia maintains oil and gas pipelines to Europe that offer alternatives to the Russian supplies. Some of these, such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, were built at the strong urging of the United States.

Reuters reports that Georgia “accused Russia of bombing its fuel lines on Tuesday.” However, while British Petroleum “has closed two oil and gas pipelines [including BTC] running from its Caspian Sea fields through Georgia,” according to inspections “neither has been damaged by recent fighting in the country.”

The BTC pipeline is “the only major conduit for Central Asian resources not under Russian control,” notes The Telegraph, which quotes the Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili on Russia’s motivation: “They need control of energy routes.”