A recently released report, NATO 2020, outlines expert recommendations for the alliance’s new strategic concept. However, while pointing to a nighttime satellite image of the globe at a Wilson Center conference last week, Professor Peter Liotta of Salve Regina University said the report focuses too much on conventional self-defense, when most of the new security challenges of the 21st century will come from areas of the world “where the lights are out.”

Does political and security demography have a professional society that it can call “home”? Research in this field—the study of the political and security-related consequences of demographic conditions and trends—already has an intellectual home within the Environmental Change and Security Program. But has it secured a place for itself among disciplinary academic societies?

In search of an answer, I undertook some serious “conference stalking” over the past year, attending the annual meetings of the International Studies Association (ISA), and the American Political Science Association (APSA). At the end of April, I returned from two more—the Population Association of America (PAA), held in Dallas, TX; and the American Association of Geographers (AAG), in Washington, DC.

International Studies Association

From my perspective, ISA currently offers the most promise for graduate students and young analysts who would like to participate in, or use results from, political and security demography. While the audiences at ISA’s political demography sessions have not been spectacularly large (usually fewer than 20 people), ISA is the only academic society, to my knowledge, that has organized a formal “Political Demography Section” to advance the field. (Former ISA president Jacek Kugler of Claremont Graduate University led the charge last year.)

(Editor’s note: At the 2010 ISA conference, ECSP organized a roundtable on “Strategies for Bridging Research and Policy in the Classroom: Teaching Environment, Population, Conflict, and Security.” A panel of four educators discussed the unique challenges facing those that attempt to teach hybrid security issues. Panelist Jennifer Sciubba’s presentation, in which she shared techniques for bridging the gaps that exist between the study of political science and issues of population and environment, is posted on the New Security Beat.)

Population Association of America

In terms of fostering political demography, PAA, the professional organization for American demographers, currently ranks second. Despite the lack of a formal section, PAA’s 2010 conference included several sessions on research germane to politics and security, including “Demographic Determinants and Consequences of War, Conflict and Terrorism; “21st Century Refugee Policy and Refugee Demography”; and “Population, Politics, and Conflict in the Middle East.”

The session on the Middle East, which was moderately well attended and fostered an animated discussion, featured papers on: internal migration during the 2006 Israel-Lebanon War (Marwan Khawaja and Shireen Assaf); demographic projections for Israeli ethnoreligious groups (Eric Kaufman and myself); and a discussion of possible demographic outcomes from the creation of a Palestinian state (Uzi Rebhun).

The PAA session on the demographic determinants and consequences of violent conflict focused on the human costs: forced migration’s impact on child survival in Angola (Winifred Avogo); impact of terror on birth rates in Israel (Guy Stecklov); the death toll in Cambodia (Patrick Heuvaline); and long-term consequences of war and genocide in Bosnia and Rwanda (Sarah Statveig).

While these topics—the demographic consequences of conflict—are important to international health and relief organizations, they don’t fit well within (my conceptualization of) political and security demography. In introducing the session, its chair, CUNY’s Neil Bennett, called attention to the absence of this perspective, by noting that he received over a dozen submissions on the demographic consequences of conflict, but only one submission (which was not selected for presentation) that hypothesized demography as a determinant of conflict.

The ebbing of political demography among demographers is a legacy of demography’s development over the past generation. Today, PAA annual meetings and the society’s journal, Demography, are dominated by what I call “passive demography”—programs hypothesizing the influence of social, health, economic, or political conditions on demographic trends; or research that employs demographic characteristics as categories for which sociological and health conditions are assessed (as in studies of the aged, urban residents, ethnoreligious groups, women of childbearing age, school-age children, etc.).

But even as the majority of academic demographers were settling into this approach, another group—mostly theoreticians—were digging through census and hospital records to identify how populations entered and passed through the demographic transition. Their efforts ultimately produced today’s population estimates and projections (published by the UN Population Division and U.S. Census Bureau’s International Program Center). 

The parallel development of these perspectives produced a somewhat schizophrenic discipline. While demography is unmatched in its abilities among peer social sciences to project—with surprising accuracy and clarity—two to three decades into the future, most demographers are uncomfortable ascribing meaning to demographic conditions or trends.

There are, of course, exceptions: active approaches that hypothesize influences of demographic factors on non-demographic conditions. For example, economic demography, which owes its origins to Ansley Coale’s early theorization of the demographic bonus, is focused on the influences of age structural changes on the economy of states. More recently, PAA organized a section that combines economic demography, population-environment studies, and other active demographic fields into the Population, Environment, and Development Section.

American Association of Geographers

The annual conference of the American Association of Geographers (AAG) seemed like a good fit. Geographers are interdisciplinary by training, and AAG has already organized formal “specialty groups” on political geography and population geography. Despite these advantages, few senior geographers (if any) have worked at the intersection of these two specialties.

For AAG 2010, Col. Laurel Hummel (USMA, West Point) and I organized a session titled “Demography as a Dynamic Predictor of Political, Developmental and Security Outcomes.” The four presentations included: liberal democracy and demography (John Doces and myself); the evolution of urban and rural age structures during the demographic transition (Elizabeth Leahy Madsen); and a demographic study of a voting in the U.S. Upper Midwest (Peter Camilli). Unfortunately, our session was scheduled on the final day and poorly attended.

Nonetheless, I was impressed at the number of population-related sessions at AAG 2010, including several related to population’s interactions with environmental conditions (tropical forest settlement; climate change’s possible health and demographic impacts) and on demographic issues of political consequence (China’s one-child policy; the geography of Sweden’s conscription and its future).

American Political Science Association

I’ve been most surprised to find that efforts to spark interest in political demography at APSA conferences have not been overly successful. Sessions that focus on the implications of religious demographic differences have gained some support from APSA’s Religion and Politics Section, but in general, political scientists have yet to embrace either political demography’s methods or its findings. In a 2005 interview with Robert Putnam and M. Kent Jennings, both past presidents of APSA, demographic change was identified as being among the most predictable of future trends, yet the least studied by political scientists.

A recent article in Foreign Affairs, “The Next Population Bomb” by Jack Goldstone (George Mason U.), could break down a few of political science’s disciplinary barriers. However, the fences seem exceptionally high. Despite being identified as a session “of special interest” at the 2009 APSA conference, “Demography and Security: The Politics of Population Change in an Age of Turbulence” (organized by Eric Kaufmann, U. London) was sparsely attended.

Political and security demography’s progress is as erratic as it is paradoxical. While demand in the security community grows for the field’s products, they appear to pass virtually unnoticed in academic circles.

But there’s a bright side to this puzzle. ISA draws a substantial portion of its membership from analysts in security think-tanks and among intelligence and defense-related agencies—and for that reason it may, after all, be the most comfortable spot for analysts pursuing political and security demography to call “home.”

Richard Cincotta is a consultant with the Environmental Change and Security Program and the demographer-in-residence at the H.L. Stimson Center in Washington, DC.

Photo Credit: “World population” courtesy of Flickr user Arenamontanus.

Brewing conflicts over water in South Asia are not new to the readers of the New Security Beat. Violence due to variations in the monsoon season , high tensions over water and energy diplomacy, and pressures stemming from mismanaged groundwater stocks in the face of burgeoning population growth have all been reported on before.

Promoting the Dialogue: Climate Change and U.S. Ground Forces, a new working paper by Christine Parthemore of the Center for New American Security (CNAS), delves into how climate change will affect future operating environments, related missions, equipment, and capabilities of U.S. ground forces. The working paper, part of “Promoting the Dialogue” series, is based on interviews, research, and site visits. The paper follows Promoting the Dialogue: Climate Change and the Maritime Services, also by Parthemore, and a publication on climate change’s implications for air missions is forthcoming. Parthemore concludes with recommendations for areas of future research and a call for “[d]eeper intellectual study of how climate change is likely to affect the U.S. ground forces.”

In March, Uganda’s cultural landmark, the Kasubi Tombs, were destroyed in a suspicious fire. Tensions spilled over when Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni paid a visit to the Bugandan site and found his entrance blocked by an angry crowd. According to an independent newspaper, soldiers accompanying the president opened fire, killing three civilians.

With ethnic-tinged unrest and student protests in Kampala, as well as cross-border conflicts in the north and east, Museveni, who has led Uganda since 1986, is facing a potentially serious test as elections approach early next year. The country’s demographic profile, and in particular the lack of opportunities for growing numbers of young people, will add to the country’s challenges, as I argue in a new case study of Uganda’s demography.

Uganda has the youngest population in the world, with 77 percent of its people younger than age 30. Women in Uganda have an average of 6.7 children each and 41 percent of married women have an unmet need for family planning. The population of Uganda is currently growing by about one million people per year, and given the force of its demographic momentum, Uganda’s population is likely to almost double by 2025 even if fertility declines.

Population Action International has found that countries with age structures like Uganda’s are the most likely to experience internal strife and autocratic governance. Between 1970 and 2007, 80 percent of outbreaks of civil conflict occurred in countries in which 60 percent or more of the population was younger than age 30.During that same period, 90 percent of countries with an age structure like Uganda’s had autocratic or only partially democratic governments.

Demography alone does not cause conflict. Most governments, even those with youthful populations, do not become entrenched in internal violence and upheaval. But age structure affects a country’s vulnerability to conflict, due to the demands a government faces in providing for its growing numbers.

In Uganda, young people face diminishing prospects in agriculture, the primary industry, as plot sizes shrink with each successive generation. At projected population growth rates, land density may increase 350 percent by 2050, from 122 inhabitants per km2 to a possible 551 inhabitants per km.

Only one-quarter of students who enroll in primary school reach the final grade, and even those with university degrees find few jobs. A reported youth unemployment rate of 22 percent is even higher in urban areas.

After 25 years in power, President Museveni will stand for a fourth official term in 2011. Despite growing dissent among his constituents, he appears confident of keeping his seat. Regardless of what happens next year,Uganda’s leaders must firmly commit to addressing their country’s demographic issues.

Age structure can become a window of opportunity if youth are engaged in society and couples can choose the number of children they can support. But in Uganda, that window remains far out of reach.

Three new case studies from Population Action International on Haiti, Yemen and Uganda examine the challenges specific to countries with very young age structures and recommend policy solutions.
Elizabeth Leahy Madsen is a senior research associate at Population Action International (PAI). She is the primary author of the 2007 PAI report The Shape of Things to Come: Why Age Structure Matters to a Safer, More Equitable World.

Photo Credits: “Atanga.pater.uganda,” courtesy of flickr user Kcarls.

Last month, the International Donors’ Conference Towards a New Future for Haiti sought to lay the groundwork for Haiti’s long-term recovery by pledging an impressive $9.9 billion over the next decade. A large portion of the money will fund health, education, and employment efforts that are crucial to meeting the needs of Haiti’s people—particularly its youth. In a new case study of Haiti’s demography and development, Population Action International (PAI) argues that the country’s age structure should play a central role in any reconstruction strategy.

In Haiti, almost 70 percent of the population is under the age of 30, and this very youthful population affects every aspect of the country’s development prospects, from economic opportunities to security issues, political stability, gender equality, and climate change adaptation.

Haiti is at a demographic crossroads. If sound policies are in place, youthful age structures can translate into an economic asset for the country. The combination of decreasing fertility levels and a growing working-age population may open a window of opportunity for economic growth. To seize it, large-scale education and employment policies and programs should seek to raise employment rates for both male and female youth.

For Haiti to reap the benefits of this “demographic dividend,” access to reproductive health services is equally important. According to the most recent Demographic and Health Survey (2005-2006), if all unintended births were avoided, the average fertility level in the country would be 2.4 children instead of four.

But if instead, Haiti ignores the needs of its youth, the country will remain vulnerable to a variety of political and economic challenges. Youth unemployment is twice that of the rest of the population, which could have a negative impact on the country’s political stability and security situation.

The PAI report The Shape of Things to Come shows that countries with very young age structures are less likely than others to sustain democratic regimes and that age structure impacts political stability. To be an effective partner in its reconstruction, the Haitian government needs stable governance. By prioritizing education, health, and employment for young people, Haiti may reduce the risk of urban violence, help attract private investors, and speed its recovery.

Addressing demographic factors will also help Haiti achieve broader development goals. Decades of high population growth and the use of charcoal as the main source of energy have deforested 97 percent of the country, increasing Haiti’s inherent vulnerability to environmental disasters and climate change. Denuded landscapes contribute to devastating floods, especially in urban coastal zones. The lack of tree cover reduces the country’s ability to absorb carbon and causes wide variations in temperature. Due to soil erosion, Haiti’s agricultural industry is one of the least productive in the world, leading to widespread poverty and food insecurity.

The integration of demographic factors into development strategies constitutes one of the most compelling ways for Haiti to facilitate not only its reconstruction, but also address the challenges of climate change and make its population more resilient and prosperous.

Three new case studies from Population Action International on Haiti, Yemen and Uganda examine the challenges specific to countries with very young age structures and recommend policy solutions.

Béatrice Daumerie is a research fellow at Population Action International (PAI).

Photo: Haitian youth. Courtesy Flickr user NewsHour

Yemen’s struggles with terrorism and political instability appeared on American radar screens with the bombing of the Navy destroyer USS Cole in 2000. The small country’s notoriety increased in 2008, following attacks against the U.S. Embassy, and again last Christmas, when a would-be terrorist trained in Yemen attempted to bomb a Northwest Airlines flight. Since then, Yemen has again slipped out of the headlines. But the deeply embedded problems the country faces deserve more sustained attention, as I argue in a new case study of Yemen’s demography.

Youth represent three-quarters of Yemen’s population, which has the youngest age structure outside sub-Saharan Africa. Population Action International has found that countries with age structures like Yemen’s are the most likely to experience internal strife and autocratic governance. Between 1970 and 2007, 80 percent of outbreaks of civil conflict occurred in countries in which 60 percent or more of the population was younger than age 30. During that time, an average of more than 75 percent of these countries had undemocratic governments.

While students of security, stability, and foreign policy may focus on the role of male-dominated terrorist and rebel groups, demographic dynamics in Yemen and the status of women may be a better indicator of broader challenges. A country’s demographic picture is driven primarily by its fertility trends. Women in Yemen average six children each, a rate that would lead the population to double in fewer than 25 years.

Unfortunately, many women in Yemen lack access to the health care that would allow them to determine their own family size. A 2003 survey found that 51 percent of married Yemeni women would like to prevent or delay their next pregnancy but are not using contraception, the highest measured rate of unmet need for family planning in the world.

Yemen has also received the lowest rating in the world in a survey of gender equity, based on women’s professional, political, and educational achievements relative to men. Unfortunately, this inequality is not surprising, given many of the structural barriers in place in Yemeni society. Only 41 percent of women are literate, compared to 77 percent of men, and there is a strong link between girls’ education and fertility later in life. Girls can legally be married at age 15, and pregnancies that occur too soon and too frequently are in part responsible for the country’s maternal mortality ratio, which is 39 times greater than that of the United States.

The key to a country’s future–at the political, economic and the social levels–is the young people who comprise the next generation. Youth in Yemen continue to face barriers to economic opportunity and democratic political engagement. With the size of the labor force growing faster than the number of jobs each year, youth unemployment could reach 40 percent in a decade. The demographic foundation to such economic pressures can combine with political marginalization to create an environment conducive to instability.

Yet at the social level, there is perhaps more promise. Literacy rates among young people 15 to 29 exceeded 90 percent in a recent survey, and youth also display more flexible and equitable attitudes in gender issues. Nearly three-quarters of young people report unconditional approval of contraception, a major determinant in whether Yemen’s high unmet need for family planning, and thus its very young age structure, are likely to change.

Although these issues may be rarely addressed in the political dialogue, it is critical that the efforts of Yemen’s government and its partners to promote peace and stability also incorporate policies that promote the legal rights and economic opportunities for women, together with access to reproductive health services.

Three new case studies from Population Action International on Haiti, Yemen, and Uganda examine the challenges specific to countries with very young age structures and recommend policy solutions.

Elizabeth Leahy Madsen is a senior research associate at Population Action International (PAI). She is the primary author of the 2007 PAI report The Shape of Things to Come: Why Age Structure Matters to a Safer, More Equitable World.

Photo: Yemeni youth. Courtesy Flickr user kebnekaise.

Can demobilized ex-combatants help improve water resources in post-conflict countries? Last fall, the Global Water Institute (GWI) held a symposium in Brussels to find out.

Seventy representatives from the African Union, the United Nations, civil society, research institutes, and EU water policy advisors discussed ways in which former soldiers could be employed in the water sector to create peace dividends, bridge divided societies, and improve water security in countries recovering from conflict.

GWI, which is headquartered in Brussels and led by Valerie Ndaruzaniye, formerly of the Institute of Multi-Track Diplomacy’s Global Water Program, hopes to use the water sector development to meet multiple objectives in post-conflict reconstruction, such as:

• increasing environmental security,
• reducing the likelihood of future conflict over water,
• enhancing security and stability, and
• employing demobilized ex-combatants to create peace dividends.

“The GWI’s suggested strategy is to exploit the enormous potential of demobilized forces who had made war,” said Ndaruzaniye at the symposium. “GWI proposes to re-channel this potential force for development of water programs and protection of the environment.” While this is a tall order for even the most established of organizations, GWI is already ahead of the game by recognizing the synergies between these issues.

While disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), is a fairly new process in post-conflict settings (the first program took place only 15 years ago), it has progressed rapidly in recent years, moving from a primarily military exercise to one focused on reintegration. Reintegration has also shifted from its exclusive focus on the ex-combatants, which often caused resentment in conflict-affected communities, to include women, children, youth, and the elderly and disabled, as well as the affected communities.

Reintegration is still the most difficult stage of any DDR program, not only for budgetary and political reasons, but also due to the processes of transitional justice and reconciliation. Through experience in the field, practitioners have realized that such programs are not simply technical exercises and must be better linked to wider recovery efforts and development programs for more sustainable results.

By supporting sustainable development in the water sector, and simultaneously contributing to reconciliation and peace dividends by involving ex-combatants in community development work, GWI can offer a substantial contribution to the reintegration process.

“Making the link between water management and DDR is a novel idea. GWI is a good example of integration of policy areas in order to build peace in some countries,” said Catherine Woolard, the director of the European Peacebuilding Liaison office.

Adrienne Stork is currently working on natural resource management and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs jointly with the UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery and the UNEP Disasters and Conflicts Unit in Geneva, Switzerland.

Photo Credits: Flickr User ISAFMEDIA, 080816-N-8726C-019