Observers typically view the race to lay claim to territory in the Arctic as a competition for oil and gas resources or an exercise in national sovereignty. But for Russia, there could be a third reason to try to claim the North: identity. “The parallel with Stalin’s triumphalist propaganda campaign of ‘conquering the North’ launched in 1936-1939 on the background of severe internal repressions is too obvious to miss,” argues Pavel Baev, research professor at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), in “Russia’s Race for the Arctic and the New Geopolitics of the North Pole,” an occasional paper published by the Jamestown Foundation. According to Baev, Russia’s entire Arctic campaign—including the planting of the titanium flag on the sea floor and the flights of Tu-95MS strategic bombers over Arctic waters—is intended to bolster Russians’ nationalism.

Baev believes that oil alone cannot explain Russia’s actions in the Arctic. First, no one is sure just how extensive the Arctic’s oil reserves really are, because minimal exploratory drilling has been carried out. Moreover, Russia currently lacks the technology to develop offshore oil and gas fields in harsh conditions, and does not seem interested in developing that technology. “The underlying proposition for claiming exclusive economic rights for the seabed beyond the 80°N latitude is that 30-50 years from now hydrocarbons would still be in such high demand that production at enormous costs will be economically efficient. What follows logically is that Russia is not particularly worried about the climate change and has few thoughts about alternative energy sources,” writes Baev.

According to Baev, oil is a motivation for Moscow, but only in the long term. Oil reserves, combined with other strategic interests—such as maritime shipping routes, which have historically been a significant concern for Russia—pushed the Kremlin to take steps to assert Russia’s claims to significant Arctic territories. Three factors contributed to Russia’s Arctic strategy: a growing awareness of climate change; the goal of deterring other nations from asserting their claims to the territory; and a desire to strengthen Russians’ national pride. “Putin’s spin-masters have stumbled upon rather than invented the Arctic theme,” concludes Baev.

Today marked the release of The Age of Consequences: The Foreign Policy and National Security Implications of Global Climate Change, a report by the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). This morning’s launch of the report featured commentary by a few of the report’s many high-profile contributors, including John Podesta, who served as former President Clinton’s chief of staff, Leon Fuerth, who served as former Vice President Gore’s national security adviser, and James Woolsey, the former director of the CIA.

The Age of Consequences analyzes the effects three different climate scenarios could have on foreign policy and national security: an expected scenario (based on a 1.3ºC average global temperature increase by 2040); a severe scenario (a 2.6ºC increase by 2040); and a catastrophic scenario (a 5.6ºC increase by 2100). Leaders and policymakers must strive to understand and plan for the potential geopolitical impacts of climate change, said the report’s authors, despite inherent uncertainty regarding the precise severity and timing of those impacts.

Podesta described the expected scenario—which is the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) medium-range scenario—as the “best we can hope for, the least we should be prepared for.” This least-dramatic scenario still anticipates a plethora of effects stemming from climate change, including a sharp rise in internal and international migration, the spread of infectious diseases, and growing tensions over the distribution of dwindling natural resources. Podesta emphasized that leaders must prepare for climate impacts to interact with one another and cause cascading geopolitical implications. For better or worse, he said, the United States is already viewed as the world’s first responder to natural disasters, and even under the mildest climate scenario, the American military’s disaster response role can be expected to grow.

While presenting the severe climate scenario, Fuerth reminded the Washington policymaker audience that extreme nonlinear environmental changes will likely generate dramatic institutional changes with far-reaching geopolitical implications—but that the trigger point for these changes is always hard to predict. He also argued that the United States and other wealthy countries have a responsibility to take action to mitigate climate change’s harmful global effects. Inaction by the United States over the next 30 years in the face of severe climate change impacts in the developing world would be akin to “kicking people away from the lifeboats,” he said. The report emphasizes that poorer countries will be disproportionally affected by climate change under all scenarios, in part because they lack the resources to cope with changing conditions. However, even for developed countries, says the report’s Executive Summary, the “collapse and chaos associated with extreme climate change futures would destabilize virtually every aspect of modern life.”

Woolsey emphasized that a catastrophic climate scenario would seriously threaten both ecosystems and infrastructure systems. The debate should not become mired in whether catastrophic climate events may occur in 2050 or 2100, said Woolsey—just as it is useless for a heavy smoker to debate whether he will contract lung cancer at age 49 or 53. As a society, he argued, we are effectively “smoking six packs a day.”

Woolsey stressed that both the “treehugger” interested only in reducing carbon emissions and the “hawk” interested only in security vulnerabilities want many of the same things. For instance, they both wish to move away from a carbon-based economy—the treehugger to mitigate climate change, and the hawk to reduce the nation’s dependency on unstable overseas regimes and its energy infrastructure’s vulnerability to terrorist attack. Woolsey will expand on this coincidence of interests with a future publication featuring an imagined conversation between the ghosts of “treehugger” John Muir and “hawk” General George Patton.

ECSP Director Geoff Dabelko, who attended this morning’s briefing, noted, “The Age of Consequences is an important report that brings together a wide range of experts and succeeds at bolstering the significance of climate change as a serious long-term security concern.” Dabelko believes the next steps are “deriving specific action items for a range of actors from this report” and from similar reports, including the April 2007 CNA Military Advisory Board report, the forthcoming Council on Foreign Relations report by Joshua Busby, and the National Intelligence Council’s National Intelligence Estimate, which is expected in early 2008.

ECSP Director Geoff Dabelko contributed to this report.

Yesterday, Senators Lieberman and Warner teamed up to move the America’s Climate Security Act (S. 2191) to the full Committee on Environment and Public Works. The act would go beyond recent legislation mandating that the intelligence community assess climate-security linkages and would create more formal institutional structures and resources for addressing climate-conflict connections.

Hill Heat summarizes the provisions for a new Climate Change and National Security Council as:

The Secretary of State is the Council’s chair, and the EPA Administrator, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of National Intelligence are the Council’s other members.

The Council makes an annual report to the President and the Congress on how global climate change affects instability and conflict, and recommends spending to mitigate global warming impacts and conflict.

Up to five percent of auction proceeds, at the President’s discretion, may be used to carry out the report recommendations.

Some environmentalists don’t care for the provisions. They are wary of national security discretion for some adaptation resources and find the strings reminiscent of Cold War conditionality, when foreign assistance went to those who stood with the U.S. against the Communist menace. We will be watching the progress of this bill with interest; check back in this space for the latest developments.

The U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) recently issued a “report card” for the Arctic, which warned that the polar ice cap is melting rapidly, and that air temperatures continue to rise. A brief sampling of stories covering the implications of this warming, melting Arctic.

Lots of talk around Washington these days of the U.S. intelligence community preparing a National Intelligence Estimate on climate change. Gordon Mitchell at the University of Pittsburgh’s Security Sweep points out that the pending Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (S. 1538) includes specific language calling for the National Intelligence Council to conduct such an estimate. While the bill is in line for debate on the Senate floor, some of you aficionados might like a look at the full text. Section 321 reads:

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE.

(a) Requirement for National Intelligence Estimate-

(1) IN GENERAL- Except as provided in paragraph (2), not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to Congress a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on the anticipated geopolitical effects of global climate change and the implications of such effects on the national security of the United States.

(2) NOTICE REGARDING SUBMITTAL- If the Director of National Intelligence determines that the National Intelligence Estimate required by paragraph (1) cannot be submitted by the date specified in that paragraph, the Director shall notify Congress and provide–

(A) the reasons that the National Intelligence Estimate cannot be submitted by such date; and

(B) an anticipated date for the submittal of the National Intelligence Estimate.

(b) Content- The Director of National Intelligence shall prepare the National Intelligence Estimate required by this section using the mid-range projections of the fourth assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change–

(1) to assess the political, social, agricultural, and economic risks during the 30-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act posed by global climate change for countries or regions that are–

(A) of strategic economic or military importance to the United States and at risk of significant impact due to global climate change; or

(B) at significant risk of large-scale humanitarian suffering with cross-border implications as predicted on the basis of the assessments;

(2) to assess other risks posed by global climate change, including increased conflict over resources or between ethnic groups, within countries or transnationally, increased displacement or forced migrations of vulnerable populations due to inundation or other causes, increased food insecurity, and increased risks to human health from infectious disease;

(3) to assess the capabilities of the countries or regions described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (1) to respond to adverse impacts caused by global climate change; and

(4) to make recommendations for further assessments of security consequences of global climate change that would improve national security planning.

(c) Coordination- In preparing the National Intelligence Estimate under this section, the Director of National Intelligence shall consult with representatives of the scientific community, including atmospheric and climate studies, security studies, conflict studies, economic assessments, and environmental security studies, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Administrator of the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration, the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, the Secretary of Energy, and the Secretary of Agriculture, and, if appropriate, multilateral institutions and allies of the United States that have conducted significant research on global climate change.

(d) Assistance-

(1) AGENCIES OF THE UNITED STATES- In order to produce the National Intelligence Estimate required by subsection (a), the Director of National Intelligence may request any appropriate assistance from any agency, department, or other entity of the United State Government and such agency, department, or other entity shall provide the assistance requested.

(2) OTHER ENTITIES- In order to produce the National Intelligence Estimate required by subsection (a), the Director of National Intelligence may request any appropriate assistance from any other person or entity.

(3) REIMBURSEMENT- The Director of National Intelligence is authorized to provide appropriate reimbursement to the head of an agency, department, or entity of the United States Government that provides support requested under paragraph (1) or any other person or entity that provides assistance requested under paragraph (2).

(4) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS- There are authorized to be appropriated to the Director of National Intelligence such sums as may be necessary to carry out this subsection.

(e) Form- The National Intelligence Estimate required by this section shall be submitted in unclassified form, to the extent consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, and include unclassified key judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate. The National Intelligence Estimate may include a classified annex.

(f) Duplication- If the Director of National Intelligence determines that a National Intelligence Estimate, or other formal, coordinated intelligence product that meets the procedural requirements of a National Intelligence Estimate, has been prepared that includes the content required by subsection (b) prior to the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall not be required to produce the National Intelligence Estimate required by subsection (a).

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On Friday, October 12, 2007, the Norwegian Nobel Committee chose the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and former U.S. Vice President Al Gore to receive the 2007 Nobel Peace Prize for their respective efforts to document and raise awareness of the effects of climate change.

Some observers are perplexed by the Committee’s decision to award a peace prize for work on an environmental issue. The Environmental Change and Security Program (ECSP), however, has long been cognizant of the myriad ways in which the environment is linked to peace and conflict. Climate change is only one of many environmental issues—including water scarcity, pollution, deforestation, and natural resource exploitation—that can affect security.

This is the second time in three years that the Committee has awarded the Peace Prize to an environmentalist. 2004 winner Wangari Maathai and her Green Belt Movement were recognized for their efforts to develop sustainable livelihoods and empower women through tree planting and other environmental activities. In the latest issue of the ECSP Report, Maathai explains the close linkage between good governance, sustainability, and peace: “When we manage our resources sustainably and practice good governance we deliberately and consciously promote cultures of peace, which include the willingness to dialogue and make genuine efforts for healing and reconciliation…Whenever we fail to nurture these three themes, conflict becomes inevitable.”

ECSP Director Geoff Dabelko reflected on the Committee’s selection of Maathai—and its implications for the international community’s notions of peace and security—in several articles on leading environmental blog Gristmill. Dabelko’s words on Maathai’s selection still ring true: “Yet the criticism may miss the point by missing the widespread violence that goes on within states, violence that is not necessarily well-organized or by force of arms. The structural violence of poverty, corruption, and environmental degradation affects literally billions every day. The Nobel Prize rightly stretched the prior confines of the award and called attention to these ‘conflicts.’”

“Energy is a critical, yet hugely neglected, determinant of human health. Health is an important enough aspect of energy policy to deserve a much greater influence on decisions about our future personal, national, and global energy strategies….Energy is as important as any vaccine or medicine. 2 billion people currently lack access to clean energy: they live in energy poverty and insecurity. International institutions, such as the World Bank and WHO, have repeatedly failed to make the connection between energy and health in their country work,” writes Lancet editor Richard Horton in the journal’s September 15, 2007 issue.

A six-article series in The Lancet examines how energy use—or the lack thereof—affects human health. Providing needed data on the health and economic impacts of both energy use and energy scarcity, the series explores one of the many links between environment and human security. The series is available on The Lancet’s website (subscription required).

At a recent conference at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, PA, I had the chance to sit down with one of the most influential military voices on environmental security debates, Dr. Kent Hughes Butts. As both a professor of geography and a retired colonel in the U.S. Army, Dr. Butts has been at the center of the U.S. military’s efforts to grapple with the implications of environmental change. I asked Dr. Butts how he saw the field of environmental security (if we can call it a field) evolving over the last two decades.