The success of all interventions and relief efforts in conflict and post-conflict situations is dependent on politics and political action. For the United States, political action translates into military action. During my career, I’ve been involved in five conflict situations with the U.S. military, and each one made a different claim and set different restrictions for intervening with “aid.”
In the 1990s, after several frustrating years of failures, many in government believed that humanitarian assistance without political solutions achieved nothing. In good Wilsonian fashion, they saw political action—and the military interventions that followed—as a means to project, influence, and spread U.S. values. As such, the military became the security and protection tool of political humanitarianism, especially among those who considered that the convergence of humanitarian actors with the military ensured that the duty to provide assistance and the right to receive it was guaranteed.
The Kurdish crisis after the Persian Gulf War was instrumental for many reasons. One, it was the first time the Security Council did not veto a resolution to protect vulnerable populations within a sovereign state. Two, it was considered in most circles to be a success, because the coalition led by the U.S. military was considered by the humanitarian community to have been an ally in the struggle to provide security and assistance. The military presence allowed the humanitarians to work in an austere environment and to save lives.
What happened afterwards is a different story. Influenced by the post-9/11 global war on terrorism, increasingly insecure conflict environments, and the unilateral approach to conflict management, the military began to provide direct assistance to the population themselves. Liberties were taken: NGOs were recruited as “force multipliers,” “a second front,” or “part of our combat team.” The traditional leaders of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, the Red Cross and the UN’s Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, were ignored. A “partnership” of the U.S. military-political command, the World Bank, corporate contractors, and like-minded NGOs dominated the scene.
In the last four months I’ve been confronted by two retired generals. One strongly insisted that the military must “stay within their lane” or risk destroying the military and supporting the perception of a U.S. politico-military “empire.” The other strongly insisted that the only entity in the world that could do humanitarian assistance and disaster relief is the U.S. military
So who should be leading these efforts for the United States? USAID, which was decimated in the 1980s, has never come back. The more than 12,000 USAID professionals during the 1960s-70s now number only 2,000. Reestablishing USAID’s place in development and relief will take much money, time, and expertise.
In the meantime, the only show in town, DoD, grows even larger and stronger. Gates’ statement that more civilians are needed in Afghanistan and Pakistan was actually a request for more “civilians” to be coordinated by the military.
It is not unusual to find those who think that the politico-military “relief and reconstruction complex” is impossible to change, especially when they are favored by Congress over USAID and State to solve these problems. But if “outcome indicators” rather that the current DoD-dominated “achievement indicators” were used to measure success, they would tell a totally different story.
In the last few years, the argument that such efforts are essential to “winning the hearts and minds” of a population has come out of nowhere. This claim is not grounded in accepted measures that monitor and evaluate such success. Yet the defense budgets that are heavily supported by Congress are based on achievement indicators alone.
President Obama does not come to the table with a strong and substantive knowledge or experience with the nuances of foreign assistance and the critical importance of the traditional humanitarian community. He is currently hearing only voices from the military and industry on this issue. We owe it to both the humanitarian community and the military to ensure that evaluation of their effectiveness is transparent, accountable, and evidence-based.
Current USAID leadership, short of a named Administrator, must speak up. The opportunity to reestablish USAID’s role in development and humanitarian assistance may never come this way again.
Dr. Frederick M. Burkle, Jr., is a professor and senior fellow with the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, Harvard University; a senior public policy scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center; and a retired Navy Reserve Captain and combat decorated for service with the U.S. Marines.
Good point. And while I think DoD does not know how to "win hearts and minds," I am equally skeptical that USAID knows how. Either in "diplomatic" settings or in "war" settings. In fact I am completely insecure about whether USAID is fighting a counter insurgency in Afghanistan where "hearts and minds" are the Center of Gravity. But that's OK, we could teach them if they would let us. Which is the point–some in USAID won't even talk to those of us in DoD. I don't think it's possible that there will be "either/or" anymore. I think we are all going to have to get along and sort it out, context depending. But it would be nice to have someone there to sort it out with.
Gail: Thanks for your comments…we certainly need many voices to respond and appreciate your time and attention. This is a dilemma issue for which there are no easy solutions…and to be honest DoD has stepped in out of default where USAID no longer has the capacity….and getting USAID back to a spot where they can be an appropriate actor in the future should be priority one for both Congress and DoD. I really don't like the term "hearts and minds"…it tells me nothing that I can measure as a success or failure. Analysis from MEDCAPS and MILPHAP/CORDS programs in VN cannot be analyzed even today as to their success or failure because they only used achievement indicators. I've been consistent in all my training and discussions with DoD since that time about using outcome indicators but nothing ever changes. Reasons for using outcome indicators were clearly demonstrated in Sudan in the early 1980s… by every organization and agency working there. The respect DoD desires from the humanitarian community will never materialize until they become, as Gates emphasized, essential to DoD's scrutiny and transparency. Truely, I believe much would change if this was accomplished across the board in DoD, CoCOMs and individual service HA programs. Shamefully, some problematic issues stem from basis and confusing semantics/defintions. USAID calls HA what OFDA does with emergency relief to save lives and development is what USAID Missions do. The military calls both emergency aid and development HA…there are many issues to explore and unfortunately many fly back and forth across screens like these and rarely get to the people who can make a difference. I still teach about the successes of Operation Provide Comfort to all my classes…even General Jay Garner who Commanded that effort contends it should remain the model for today. There is a bevy of expertise from retired ranks who strongly differ from the stance they loyally held when on active duty. We need their input. Lots to learn but many more people at the decision-making level need to jump into the discussion.
The above comment came from me, not Meaghan…sorry my fault
Anonymous
During 1966 to 1968 I witnessed the effort of USAID at the rural district level in Viet Nam, as a member of Navy Team 6 Milphap. Few Americans other than Advisors of Team 63 worked in our Province. The measure was the monthly Hamlet Evaluation Report, including the number of births, epidemics, crops, political activity and military actions. (my bono fides)
My view is that USAID must not be a tool of State or the military. Otherwise the result will be as the British are viewed, particularly in India)"a wonderful people, as individuals admirable, but as a nation, scoundrels for what the have done here."
No political action is possible unless there is properity, which is not available to a person living in a village, which should be the focus of any improvement. My E-mail is onefouralpha67 @ yahoo.com. As Ake Gata, authors, we have translated "The basis for the Political Organization of the Argentine Republic, by Juan Bautista Alberti from Spanish. Be happy to provide this work, sent it to McCain, Obama and Dr. Frazier, Assistant Sectretary of State for African Affairs, all last year before the financial crisis. Also have a hyper-inflation paper if interested. many thanks Ernesto Aviles Experimental Neurology Research.