Climate security raises questions about who is responsible for security (‘We have met the enemy, and they are us.’) which is rather different from how even earlier environmental security was often seen as a relatively local issue. From a more practical view, we were looking at climate changes for their potential to shift conditions very abruptly, and create new security conditions where none existed before.

Headline writers love to reduce the story line to ‘climate wars’ or ‘water wars.’ Short sells, dramatic sells, and conflict sells. Complexity doesn’t. Cooperation doesn’t. And again, oversimplification carries costs. The challenge is getting folks to look past the misleading but catchy title to engage and engage broadly on the diversity found under the climate and security umbrella.

The problem we face is that nuance doesn’t sell books, nuance certainly doesn’t get you on TV, and politicians and their staff don’t have time to get into nuanced arguments. I’ve been approached many times by various Senator’s staff saying ‘my boss is very interested in using the climate-security argument’. They want to use it because the concept of ’security’ brings images of soldiers – the most respected establishment in America – and it allows you to paint an enemy – after all we wouldn’t have gone to the moon if the Soviets hadn’t put Sputnik up first…This is the political and media world we live in, and you can’t ignore it. So long as politicians, the public, and the media live in the short-term, notions like climate security are difficult to get unless you make some strong and difficult to prove linkages.

Assessments conducted by the intelligence community indicate that climate change could have significant geopolitical impacts around the world, contributing to poverty, environmental degradation, and the further weakening of fragile governments. Climate change will contribute to food and water scarcity, will increase the spread of disease and may spur or exacerbate mass migration.

According to the Pew report, the Department of Defense has set a goal of producing or procuring at least 25 percent of its non-tactical electric energy needs from renewable sources by 2025. Highlights of the service’s efforts include:

• The U.S. Navy’s “Great Green Fleet” carrier strike group, which will run entirely on alternative fuels and nuclear power by 2016;
• The construction of a 500-megawatt solar facility in Fort Irwin, California by the U.S. Army which will help the base reach ‘net-zero plus’ status;
• The goal of acquiring 50 percent of the U.S. Air Force’s aviation fuels from biofuel blends by 2016;
• The U.S. Marine Corps’ 10×10 campaign to develop a comprehensive energy strategy and meet ten goals aimed at reducing energy and water intensity and increasing the use of renewable electric energy by the end of 2010.

1. In light of its implications for the global commons, ensure that DOD is included in the emerging debate over geoengineering.
2. Urge U.S. ratification of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea in order to provide global leadership and protect U.S. and DOD interests, especially in the context of an opening Arctic sea.
3. Eliminate the divided command over the Arctic and assign U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) as the supported commander.
4. The U.S. government should make an informed decision about constructing nuclear reactors on military bases and provide clear policy guidelines to DOD.
5. Congress and DOD should move away from the “cost avoidance” structure of current renewable energy, conservation, and efficiency practices in order to reward proactive commanders and encourage further investment.
6. All of the services should improve their understanding of how climate change will effect their missions and capabilities; e.g. migration and water issues may impact Army missions, a melting Arctic, the Navy.
7. The Air Force should fully integrate planning for both energy security and climate change into a single effort.

Indeed, in our conversation with officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy, it was clear that, in developing the climate change and energy section of the 2010 QDR, the Department of Defense has developed a nascent, intellectual infrastructure of civilian and military professionals who will continue to study the national security implications of climate change, and, we hope, will continue to reevaluate climate change risks and opportunities as the science continues to evolve.