Today marked the release of The Age of Consequences: The Foreign Policy and National Security Implications of Global Climate Change, a report by the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). This morning’s launch of the report featured commentary by a few of the report’s many high-profile contributors, including John Podesta, who served as former President Clinton’s chief of staff, Leon Fuerth, who served as former Vice President Gore’s national security adviser, and James Woolsey, the former director of the CIA.

The Age of Consequences analyzes the effects three different climate scenarios could have on foreign policy and national security: an expected scenario (based on a 1.3ºC average global temperature increase by 2040); a severe scenario (a 2.6ºC increase by 2040); and a catastrophic scenario (a 5.6ºC increase by 2100). Leaders and policymakers must strive to understand and plan for the potential geopolitical impacts of climate change, said the report’s authors, despite inherent uncertainty regarding the precise severity and timing of those impacts.

Podesta described the expected scenario—which is the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) medium-range scenario—as the “best we can hope for, the least we should be prepared for.” This least-dramatic scenario still anticipates a plethora of effects stemming from climate change, including a sharp rise in internal and international migration, the spread of infectious diseases, and growing tensions over the distribution of dwindling natural resources. Podesta emphasized that leaders must prepare for climate impacts to interact with one another and cause cascading geopolitical implications. For better or worse, he said, the United States is already viewed as the world’s first responder to natural disasters, and even under the mildest climate scenario, the American military’s disaster response role can be expected to grow.

While presenting the severe climate scenario, Fuerth reminded the Washington policymaker audience that extreme nonlinear environmental changes will likely generate dramatic institutional changes with far-reaching geopolitical implications—but that the trigger point for these changes is always hard to predict. He also argued that the United States and other wealthy countries have a responsibility to take action to mitigate climate change’s harmful global effects. Inaction by the United States over the next 30 years in the face of severe climate change impacts in the developing world would be akin to “kicking people away from the lifeboats,” he said. The report emphasizes that poorer countries will be disproportionally affected by climate change under all scenarios, in part because they lack the resources to cope with changing conditions. However, even for developed countries, says the report’s Executive Summary, the “collapse and chaos associated with extreme climate change futures would destabilize virtually every aspect of modern life.”

Woolsey emphasized that a catastrophic climate scenario would seriously threaten both ecosystems and infrastructure systems. The debate should not become mired in whether catastrophic climate events may occur in 2050 or 2100, said Woolsey—just as it is useless for a heavy smoker to debate whether he will contract lung cancer at age 49 or 53. As a society, he argued, we are effectively “smoking six packs a day.”

Woolsey stressed that both the “treehugger” interested only in reducing carbon emissions and the “hawk” interested only in security vulnerabilities want many of the same things. For instance, they both wish to move away from a carbon-based economy—the treehugger to mitigate climate change, and the hawk to reduce the nation’s dependency on unstable overseas regimes and its energy infrastructure’s vulnerability to terrorist attack. Woolsey will expand on this coincidence of interests with a future publication featuring an imagined conversation between the ghosts of “treehugger” John Muir and “hawk” General George Patton.

ECSP Director Geoff Dabelko, who attended this morning’s briefing, noted, “The Age of Consequences is an important report that brings together a wide range of experts and succeeds at bolstering the significance of climate change as a serious long-term security concern.” Dabelko believes the next steps are “deriving specific action items for a range of actors from this report” and from similar reports, including the April 2007 CNA Military Advisory Board report, the forthcoming Council on Foreign Relations report by Joshua Busby, and the National Intelligence Council’s National Intelligence Estimate, which is expected in early 2008.

ECSP Director Geoff Dabelko contributed to this report.

Yesterday, Senators Lieberman and Warner teamed up to move the America’s Climate Security Act (S. 2191) to the full Committee on Environment and Public Works. The act would go beyond recent legislation mandating that the intelligence community assess climate-security linkages and would create more formal institutional structures and resources for addressing climate-conflict connections.

Hill Heat summarizes the provisions for a new Climate Change and National Security Council as:

The Secretary of State is the Council’s chair, and the EPA Administrator, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of National Intelligence are the Council’s other members.

The Council makes an annual report to the President and the Congress on how global climate change affects instability and conflict, and recommends spending to mitigate global warming impacts and conflict.

Up to five percent of auction proceeds, at the President’s discretion, may be used to carry out the report recommendations.

Some environmentalists don’t care for the provisions. They are wary of national security discretion for some adaptation resources and find the strings reminiscent of Cold War conditionality, when foreign assistance went to those who stood with the U.S. against the Communist menace. We will be watching the progress of this bill with interest; check back in this space for the latest developments.

Our notion of security has evolved in the years since September 11th, with increasing attention being given to understanding the underlying causes of conflict and state failure. Colin Kahl, an assistant professor in Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service and a fellow at the Center for a New American Security, argues that these underlying causes of conflict can include—but are not limited to—demographic change, environmental degradation, and poverty.

“What we’re changing is how we do business, not what we do. And it is true, in Africa our focus has been basically around three issues…the first is civil control of the military and defense reform, which we see as sort of two sides of the same coin. The second is military professionalization, and the third is capacity building. And those three things are the things that DOD has been focused on in Africa for the probably about the last 10 years. And those three things will continue to be DOD’s focus in the context of capacity building and the mission of the command,” said Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs Theresa Whelan, discussing the creation of AFRICOM, the U.S. military’s new Africa Command, with a group of foreign policy and security bloggers.

One issue Whelan expects AFRICOM to focus greater attention on is maritime security. She explained that several illicit maritime activities are hurting African economies and environments, including trafficking in people, weapons, and drugs; piracy, which has been on the rise recently; and illegal fishing—which can also damage coral reefs. “I think the World Bank did a study not too long ago—a couple of years ago—in which they found that…countries like Mozambique were losing in excess of a billion dollars a year in lost revenue from illegal fishing and also the destruction to their reefs—reef structures and also the depletion of their fishing resources,” said Whelan. A full transcript of the October 24, 2007, discussion is available online.

Lots of talk around Washington these days of the U.S. intelligence community preparing a National Intelligence Estimate on climate change. Gordon Mitchell at the University of Pittsburgh’s Security Sweep points out that the pending Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (S. 1538) includes specific language calling for the National Intelligence Council to conduct such an estimate. While the bill is in line for debate on the Senate floor, some of you aficionados might like a look at the full text. Section 321 reads:

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE.

(a) Requirement for National Intelligence Estimate-

(1) IN GENERAL- Except as provided in paragraph (2), not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to Congress a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on the anticipated geopolitical effects of global climate change and the implications of such effects on the national security of the United States.

(2) NOTICE REGARDING SUBMITTAL- If the Director of National Intelligence determines that the National Intelligence Estimate required by paragraph (1) cannot be submitted by the date specified in that paragraph, the Director shall notify Congress and provide–

(A) the reasons that the National Intelligence Estimate cannot be submitted by such date; and

(B) an anticipated date for the submittal of the National Intelligence Estimate.

(b) Content- The Director of National Intelligence shall prepare the National Intelligence Estimate required by this section using the mid-range projections of the fourth assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change–

(1) to assess the political, social, agricultural, and economic risks during the 30-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act posed by global climate change for countries or regions that are–

(A) of strategic economic or military importance to the United States and at risk of significant impact due to global climate change; or

(B) at significant risk of large-scale humanitarian suffering with cross-border implications as predicted on the basis of the assessments;

(2) to assess other risks posed by global climate change, including increased conflict over resources or between ethnic groups, within countries or transnationally, increased displacement or forced migrations of vulnerable populations due to inundation or other causes, increased food insecurity, and increased risks to human health from infectious disease;

(3) to assess the capabilities of the countries or regions described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (1) to respond to adverse impacts caused by global climate change; and

(4) to make recommendations for further assessments of security consequences of global climate change that would improve national security planning.

(c) Coordination- In preparing the National Intelligence Estimate under this section, the Director of National Intelligence shall consult with representatives of the scientific community, including atmospheric and climate studies, security studies, conflict studies, economic assessments, and environmental security studies, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Administrator of the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration, the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, the Secretary of Energy, and the Secretary of Agriculture, and, if appropriate, multilateral institutions and allies of the United States that have conducted significant research on global climate change.

(d) Assistance-

(1) AGENCIES OF THE UNITED STATES- In order to produce the National Intelligence Estimate required by subsection (a), the Director of National Intelligence may request any appropriate assistance from any agency, department, or other entity of the United State Government and such agency, department, or other entity shall provide the assistance requested.

(2) OTHER ENTITIES- In order to produce the National Intelligence Estimate required by subsection (a), the Director of National Intelligence may request any appropriate assistance from any other person or entity.

(3) REIMBURSEMENT- The Director of National Intelligence is authorized to provide appropriate reimbursement to the head of an agency, department, or entity of the United States Government that provides support requested under paragraph (1) or any other person or entity that provides assistance requested under paragraph (2).

(4) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS- There are authorized to be appropriated to the Director of National Intelligence such sums as may be necessary to carry out this subsection.

(e) Form- The National Intelligence Estimate required by this section shall be submitted in unclassified form, to the extent consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, and include unclassified key judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate. The National Intelligence Estimate may include a classified annex.

(f) Duplication- If the Director of National Intelligence determines that a National Intelligence Estimate, or other formal, coordinated intelligence product that meets the procedural requirements of a National Intelligence Estimate, has been prepared that includes the content required by subsection (b) prior to the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall not be required to produce the National Intelligence Estimate required by subsection (a).

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At a recent conference at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, PA, I had the chance to sit down with one of the most influential military voices on environmental security debates, Dr. Kent Hughes Butts. As both a professor of geography and a retired colonel in the U.S. Army, Dr. Butts has been at the center of the U.S. military’s efforts to grapple with the implications of environmental change. I asked Dr. Butts how he saw the field of environmental security (if we can call it a field) evolving over the last two decades.

They say that a good man is hard to find. But in some countries, the opposite is true: a good woman is hard to find—because it’s hard to find women at all. According to a recent article by the BBC, the Chinese city of Lianyungang has eight men for every five women. Ninety-nine cities in China have gender ratios as high as 125 (125 men for every 100 women, or a 5:4 ratio).

But China is not alone. India has a gender ratio of 113, and the ratio in Asia as a whole is 104.4. In the United States, by contrast, the rate is 97, meaning that there are more women than men.

Gender imbalances are caused by cultural and economic preferences for male children, which contribute to sex-selective abortion and female infanticide. Over 60 million girls are “missing” in Asia as a result of these practices.

Furthermore, some government policies may intensify these gender preferences. China’s one-child policy, for example, may cause concern among parents, particularly in rural areas, that having a female child endangers their family’s future. Government policies intended to combat skewed gender ratios, such as bans on prenatal ultrasounds for the purpose of determining the baby’s sex and bans on sex-selective abortion, have proven ineffective.

Unbalanced gender ratios have consequences that reach beyond just the mothers and children involved. According to Valerie Hudson, high gender ratios leave many men without prospects for marriage, which may mean these men have fewer incentives to contribute peacefully to society. The men with the slimmest prospects for marriage are likely to be unemployed, poor, and uneducated, so they are already at increased risk for violent behavior. Hudson cites statistical evidence showing links between high gender ratios and higher rates of violent crime, drug use, trafficking, and prostitution.

Hudson and co-author Andrea den Boer cover these links in greater detail in their book Bare Branches: The Security Implications of Asia’s Surplus Male Population. In the 11th issue of the Environmental Change and Security Report, Richard Cincotta takes issue with some of the statistical methods that Hudson and den Boer use. He argues that what is important is not nationwide gender ratios, but the number of “marriage-age men” (25-29 years old) and “marriage-age women” (20-24).

While there may be some debate over whether the relationship between gender ratios and violent behavior is a causal one, there is little doubt about what causes the gender imbalances in the first place. An end to preferences for female children will be beneficial not only to girls and women, but to societies as a whole.

Photo Credit: A subway in China, courtesy of flickr user 俊玮 戴.

A disorganized, inefficient foreign aid structure can wreak havoc on what the current administration refers to as “transformational diplomacy”—the attempt to build and nurture democratically elected governments. In our post-September 11^thworld, failed states (also labeled “precarious states” or “weak states”) have garnered increasing attention as targets for transformational diplomacy. For the U.S., ensuring sustainable and well-governed states depends partially on doling out foreign aid as collateral for reliable partnerships. But nations with limited internal capacity and extreme poverty levels teeter on the edge of uncertainty, and inefficient allocation of aid can further destabilize states that are already vulnerable to becoming havens for nefarious activity.