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China’s Belt and Road in Pakistan: What CPEC Leaves Behind
October 7, 2025 By Aamir YaqoobLaunched in 2013, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has drawn wide global attention, with scholars and policymakers examining its geopolitical and economic implications. Much less explored, however, are the subnational impacts of BRI in participating countries. The China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), adopted as Pakistan’s flagship BRI project in 2015, offers a case in point.
More than a decade after its launch, CPEC has not delivered the broad socio-economic transformation promised at its launch. Instead, it has sharpened development disparities within Pakistan and further eroded the confidence of ethnic and religious minorities and marginalized provinces in Pakistan’s federal government. And yet, research on CPEC too often mirrors official narratives of Sino-Pakistan development (and security) cooperation, leaving aside and even undermining human security and local perspectives. This gap matters—the success and stability of large-scale projects ultimately hinge on how they affect people’s daily lives. A more nuanced analysis of CPEC and its implementation in Pakistan is needed to have an accurate picture of its successes and where it has fallen short.
“National Interest” is Superseding Local Impacts
Through CPEC, China pledged to invest billions of dollars in infrastructure and power generation projects across Pakistan. CPEC also advances Beijing’s Western Development Strategy by easing the “Malacca Dilemma,” linking landlocked Xinjiang to the Indian Ocean through new rail and road networks that culminate at Pakistan’s Gwadar Port. A lucrative development package for economically challenged Pakistan, the project has been framed as a national priority, strongly backed by both the federal government and the military-led establishment in Pakistan. Officials have repeatedly equated CPEC with the “national interest,” referring to it as a “game changer” not only domestically but regionally in South Asia. Opposition is often cast as unpatriotic.
While this framing accelerated early CEPC projects, it also narrowed space for debate. Resultantly, the room for public discussion has squeezed to the minimum disallowing any serious engagement with the local stakeholders, especially on the geographic and ethnic peripheries of the country. Policy and academic circles, instead of reaching out to the local population, seem to heavily rely on the official accounts of information on the project. Most of the BRI and CPEC related research and public scholarship in Pakistan, therefore, can be broadly categorized into two groups: (1) heavily influenced by the government propaganda and (2) focused on international and regional dynamics. As a result, the concerns especially of the people of Gilgit Baltistan, Balochistan, Southern Punjab, and Interior Sindh remain largely overlooked.
Centering the margins in practice and research
In a democratic republic as large and diverse as Pakistan, treating “national interest” as the domain of only Islamabad and the military carries risk, especially in case of large-scale development projects like CPEC. Religious and ethnic minorities, provinces and peripheral territories are stakeholders too, and their voices remain critical to CPEC’s future.
It is high time for both academia and policy circles to assess why BRI could not bring the fruits initially envisioned for Pakistan and why the security of CPEC infrastructure remains shaky despite massive deployment of specialized security forces. China’s own cautious stance with phase-II of CPEC suggests growing doubts about its viability.
Arguably, answers lie in genuine people-oriented research and public scholarship. It falls upon practitioners and researchers alike to pay attention to the critical views and marginalized voices on CPEC. This approach could help identify why the project has fallen short of expectations, and how to address local grievances. Without this, CPEC risks widening divides rather than fostering development.
Moving forward requires a critical evaluation of current policies
Large-scale infrastructure processes cannot succeed without democratic processes that allow inclusive debate, transparency, and public participation. When state security policies dominate development through centralized decision-making, transparency and public participation are often compromised. Consequently, dissent and criticism, however benign, are viewed as a threat rather than an opportunity. Civil society and academia have a responsibility to keep local perspectives in view and to press for development strategies that empower rather than sideline communities.
CPEC’s first decade should be read as a warning. Infrastructure development is not enough. The limited success of the development model adopted for CPEC should drive a more inclusive approach that recognizes historically marginalized and local populations as stakeholders. The first step is a critical evaluation of the prevailing development thinking in both Islamabad and Beijing.
Aamir Yaqoob is a Fulbright PhD candidate in Global Governance and Human Security at the University of Massachusetts Boston. His research focuses on securitization of development and the rights of marginalized communities in the context of Chinese funded CPEC in Pakistan.
Sources: Britannica; Brookings; Chatham House; China Daily; Diplomat; Express Tribune; Friday Times; South Asian Voices; United Nations
Photo Credit: Courtesy of Flickr user rosepepper.