In Myanmar’s resource-rich Kachin State, deforestation linked to illegal logging and mining has surged over the past decade. While the national government struggles to assert control, the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO)—a political organization seeking autonomy for Kachin State in Myanmar—has also stepped in to regulate land use, restrict timber harvests, and manage permits. These activities serve to conserve local ecosystems and extract revenue. KIO’s environmental governance is strategic, aiming to bolster civilian support and consolidate territorial control. It is also shaping how communities cope and adapt to climate change.

As climate change intensifies around the globe, it is not just states and international organizations responding to droughts, floods, and extreme heat. Increasingly, rebel groups are also engaging in forms of climate governance. These groups, often seen solely as driving violence and instability, are also at the frontlines of environmental change and its management in these areas where the state is absent or weak. Their actions raise critical and uncomfortable questions about who governs in the age of climate change.

In our recent Cambridge Element, Rebel Governance in the Age of Climate Change, we explore how armed groups are increasingly involved in shaping climate adaptation strategies, managing natural resources, and enforcing environmental regulations. While this rebel-led environmental and climate governance can at times provide some stability and resilience in the face of environmental shocks, it complicates the global climate response and challenges conventional approaches to peacebuilding and development.

Why Rebel Groups are Increasingly Active in Climate Governance

Rebel governance refers to the systems of authority and public service provision established by armed non-state actors. Traditionally, this has included education, health, and justice systems. As environmental and climate challenges become more pressing, these rebel administrations are also stepping into the climate space. For example, even before their 2021 return to national power, the Taliban had been implementing water infrastructure projects, regulating forest use, and adapting crop patterns in the regions they controlled. In Colombia, former FARC combatants in demobilized territories have been involved in environmental protection initiatives, including efforts to curb illegal logging and restore degraded landscapes.

These cases are not outliers. Through a new dataset that we call Rebel Environmental Governance plus the effect of climate change on these activities (REG+), we document where and how armed rebel groups manage land, water, forests, environmental hazards, and even establish environmental ministries or assist with environmental displacement. Our research shows that nearly half of all rebel groups active since 1989 have engaged in at least one form of environmental governance.

Rebel Group Legitimacy in a Fragile Climate

These actions are not altruistic. Controlling natural resources can be a strategic tool for extracting revenue, exerting political authority, and winning civilian support. Yet the governance functions performed from building irrigation channels, enforcing conservation rules and managing forests are happening. And in many cases, these actions support the coping and adaptation of civilians in spaces where there are otherwise no formal state agents or international actors on the ground.

Climate change does not create armed groups, but it can influence the spaces in which they operate. Environmental stress, such as recurring droughts or the collapse of agricultural systems, can deepen local grievances, challenge state capacity, and create openings for non-state actors to expand their influence. In Somalia, for instance, prolonged droughts have exacerbated tensions between pastoralist communities and fueled migration to Al-Shabaab-controlled areas. Al-Shabaab imposed sharia law but also enacted environmental regulations, including bans on charcoal production. These policies are often enforced with coercion, yet they also respond to real environmental degradation. In this sense, climate governance becomes a source of both legitimacy and control.

This legitimacy is precarious. Rebels can lose local support just as quickly as they gain it, especially if environmental policies are overly extractive or disrupt traditional livelihoods. In Myanmar, the Kachin Independence Organization has struggled to balance local demands for environmental protection with the economic incentives of resource extraction. Climate governance, like all rebel governance, is shaped by contested authority, competing interests, and shifting alliances.

Implications for Peacebuilders and Policy Actors

For the international community, rebel-led climate governance presents new challenges. On one hand, these actors are addressing real environmental needs in areas where official governments cannot or will not intervene. However, engaging with armed groups risks conferring legitimacy, violating state sovereignty, or running afoul of anti-terrorism laws. However, failing to recognize rebel climate governance can lead to blind spots in data and decision-making. Climate assessments and funding calls, for example, often assume state control and overlook regions under non-state authority. This skews the picture of and allocation of resources to places where risks are highest and where responses are most urgently needed.

This tension plays out in humanitarian and climate adaptation programming. Aid agencies may need to negotiate access with armed groups to deliver assistance. Climate funds intended for national governments may never reach the communities most affected if those communities lie in rebel-held zones. Peacebuilding strategies that overlook environmental governance risk missing a key component of local power dynamics and lead to unintended and violent consequences.

Steps to Managing Climate Risks in Contested Settings

Rebel climate governance is not a desirable alternative to legitimate, accountable state authority. Their actions are shaped by conflict dynamics, and they often use coercion to enforce rules. Ignoring their role does not make it disappear. Building climate resilience in conflict-affected areas requires a broader view of governance beyond formal state institutions.

Here, we echo calls that aim for more pragmatic approaches that acknowledges the de facto governance role played by armed groups in certain regions, while working carefully to avoid legitimizing violence or undermining state-building efforts. This might mean engaging through local intermediaries, investing in aid delivery mechanisms, and even rethinking how international climate finance is distributed.